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Toward a theory 
of 
cultural transparency: 
elements 
of a social discourse 
of the visible 
and the invisible 
This dissertation develops a number of analytical categories for 
investigating what people know about the world in which they live. It 
is an attempt to open up a universe of discourse about learning that 
does justice to the social character of human life. The argument of the 
dissertation is developed in the context of an ethnographic study of a 
claim processing center in a large insurance company. 
The basic argument is that knowledge does not exist by itself in the 
form of information, but that it is part of the practice of specific 
sociocultural communities, called here "communities of practice." 
Learning then is a matter of gaining a form of membership in these 
communities: this is achieved by a process of increasing participation, 
which is called here "legitimate peripheral participation." Learning 
thus is tantamount to becoming a certain kind of person. 
Visible objects such as artifacts, symbols, language, gestures, also 
belong to the practice of these communities. Therefore, seeing the 
cultural significance of these objects, something I call "cultural 
transparency," requires access to the practices to which they belong. 
This in turn requires membership in the relevant communities. The 
relation between artifacts and persons, which one may describe as 
understanding or not understanding, is therefore never a direct 
relation between them, but one that is mediated by a person's specific 
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forms of membership in specific communities and by an object's being 
part of the social practices of some communities, which may or may 
not be the same. To the extent that these communities are different, 
such an object can be called a .. boundary object" that mediates the 
articulation of these communities. This dissertation investigates the 
nature of one such object and analyzes both the relations that it can 
mediate and the forms of knowledge and senses of self that can result. 
The availability of an analytical discourse such as the one explored 
here is important because technological advances and the division of 
labor imply that we deal more and more with objects that do not 
primarily belong to our communities of practice. This is especially 
relevant to the design of computer systems. 
Introduction: 
acting 
knowing 
being 
I have always found myself reluctant to write introductions. There is a 
problem with the traditional format whereby you are supposed to tell 
readers what you are going to tell them, then tell it to them, and then 
in conclusion tell them what it is you just told them. It seems to me 
that one is always trying to tell so much more than one is telling. The 
themes are so much more interrelated; the points connected: only the 
reader, through personal experience inside and outside of reading, has 
a chance to make the text meaningful; that chance always lies beyond 
the text. But I reckon that there is a fine line between trivialization 
and obscurantism. Since there is no virtue in the latter for my 
purposes, I am going to abide by the traditional format and provide an 
introductory chapter in which I try to outline what this thesis is about. 
I apologize if, by not starting straight with the next chapter, by 
directing the gaze of the reader on the outset, by centering the 
reading of the text on what I think are my intentions, I have robbed 
anyone of an important insight. 
Texts and subtexts 
As the title indicates, the main purpose of this thesis is not to propose 
a theory, but to move toward the possibility of a theory by developing 
analytical categories. These categories constitute the elements of a 
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universe of discourse, which can provide a framework for developing 
theories. This discourse explores ways of talking about issues such as 
knowing, learning, understanding, and intelligence, in terms that do 
justice to the social character of human life. Thus this discourse is 
about knowing, but about knowing as done in activity in the world by 
human beings who engage in practices that are defined in the context 
of specific sociocultural communities. It is about learning, but about 
learning as done by human beings who are members of these 
communities. It is about understanding, but about understanding as 
done by human beings whose view of the world is mediated by all the 
artifacts that these communities produce. It is about intelligence, but 
intelligence as achieved through the constant renegotiation of 
meaning implied by social existence in the world. 
This discourse is also about technology, about objectifying, about 
encoding, about the sociocultural process that includes into one 
integral, dialectical phenomenon the transformation of understanding 
into artifacts and the transformation of artifacts into understanding. 
Technological advances and the division of labor have created a world 
in which we rely increasingly on artifacts that we do not understand. I 
call this phenomenon the "black-box syndrome" by reference to the 
electronic devices that are often small black boxes, whose internal 
functioning is often not understood by those who use them. There is 
therefore a central social concern in this dissertation's attempt to find 
a way to speak about the world and living in the world that would allow 
both theorists and designers to get a handle on this issue. The black-
box syndrome needs to be understood and the problems that it raises 
addressed lest it become a serious limitation to our ability live in a 
democratic society. 
There are a number of subtexts that surface here and there. There is a 
definite concern with pedagogy, with education and schooling, with 
training, with creating ways of allowing members of social 
communities to expand the scope of their understanding, of their 
insights into the possible meanings associated with their activities. 
There is also a concern with the design of computer systems and of 
work environments. Finally there is an interest in the philosophy of 
computation and some of the foundational issues of fields such as 
artificial intelligence and information-processing theories of the mind. 
The gist of the argument 
The argument that I am trying to make is that understanding the 
world is a matter of seeing the cultural significance through what is 
made visible. This is what I call cultural transparency. But the central 
point of the dissertation is that the relation between artifacts and 
persons, which one may describe as "understanding" or "not 
understanding" is never a direct relation between them, but one that 
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is mediated by a person's membership in specific sociocultural 
communities and by an object's being part of the social practices that 
characterize some communities, which may or may not be the same. 
To the extent that these communities are different, the object 
becomes a boundary object at their articulation. 
It becomes then essential to eXplore what are sociocultural 
communities and how one gains a form of membership by which one . 
can get access to the understanding that underlies the production of 
the visible. The argument is that this understanding lies in a particular 
practice and that one becomes a member of the community by starting 
with a peripheral involvement in such practice, moving progressively 
toward full participation. But on this view, knowing something is not 
just a matter of assimilating some information, but becoming a certain 
kind of person, constructing a certain identity with respect to the 
sociocultural communities in which some knowledge exists. 
Method and evaluation: ethnography and 
design 
This dissertation stands at the crossroad of many fields of research. It 
started in the context of trying to understand the role that artificial 
intelligence could play in supporting learning in situ. For instance, job 
aids might integrate learning into working activities by taking 
advantage of learning opportunities as they present themselves, so that 
the relevance of what is learned can be understood in context. I 
became clear fairly early on that the field of artificial intelligence as it 
was conceived of was too narrow for such an enterprise. We were 
ready to embark on design projects but we did not have a very good 
idea of how people learn, and in particular how they learn in the 
context of activities whose primary goal is not learning. The traditions 
of information-processing theories and cognitive psychology did 
address questions about learning but did so in a way that seemed too 
out of context to be useful. That is when I started to become very 
interested in social theory. Although its level of analysis appeared to 
concentrate mainly on the reproduction of social structures, issues of 
context were central to its concerns and it offered conceptual tools to 
analyze the world as a place to learn in. 
There is a long methodological tradition concerned with the structure 
of human communities, their practices, their culture, and the forms of 
membership that can develop there. It was therefore natural that I 
would tum to ethnography as a method for pursuing my investigation. 
While ethnography may appear to be an unusual approach for a 
computer scientist, I believe that this is the case only because 
computer science mistakingly views itself almost exclusively as a 
science of representational formalisms. I think that this narrow focus 
will have to change as we realize more and more that in order to be 
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successful we need to understand in a deep way the world of which 
the system we produce become part. As our understanding of 
intelligence grows to include the social fabric of the phenomenon, our 
methods for investigate is will also have to expand. And I believe we 
will then find that computer science is a social science just as much as 
it is a mathematical science and an engineering discipline. And this 
applies a fortiori to artificial intelligence. 
One day I was talking about my research with someone who is in 
charge of designing information systems, and he asked me: "That's 
very nice, but I'm interested in change, in design, so where's the 
beef?" As sympathetic as I am to his question, I had to first try to 
make clear that this is not just beef; it is more like a cow, a living cow: 
one can make beef with it, of course, but one can do many other 
things: one can pull a plow, milk it, breed it, show it in country fairs. 
What I am trying to develop is not a recipe or a method; it is a 
discourse, a perspective,, a way to look at the world. But it is a 
discourse that has wide-reaching practical implications, especially for 
design endeavors. I will actually suggest that it may cause us to 
reconsider what we mean by design. The validity of such a discourse 
can in fact be said to reside in its ability to inform a variety of 
activities. An example of design ideas cast in the terms of this 
discourse is provided in Appendix. 
Another criterion for the validity of such a discourse is its ability to 
generate specific theories that use its categories. For instance, it can 
be used to explain the successes and failures of design projects. In 
many cases, this type of analytical discourse can thus be used to give a 
theoretical grounding and a more thorough articulation to the deep 
intuitions or insights that were at the roots of existing experiments or 
methods. For example, the discourse I am developing could be used to 
articulate further the principles of participatory design (Ehn, 1989), 
the notion of "informating systems" (Zuboff, 1988) or a number of 
organizational methods based on the idea of autonomous work units. 
Fieldwork 
The theoretical development presented in this dissertation is based 
on fieldwork I did in a claim processing center run by a large 
insurance company, which I will call here Alinsu.1 This processing 
center, which employs about 200 people, processes health insurance 
claims for group plans sold to client companies as part of their 
employment benefit packages. In many cases, client companies 
I In English, Alinsu could stand for "all insured" which seems appropriate for an 
insurance company, but in French "a l'insu" means "unknown to" which seems 
approptlate for a pseudonym. 
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themselves disburse the money going out as medical benefits (i.e .. they 
provide their own health insurance to their employees), but Alinsu 
administers their plan and sells them its claim processing as a service. 
I will call these companies Alinsu's .. clients, .. and I will call 
"customers .. the employees of these clients who submits their medical 
bills as claims to be reimbursed. 
Claims are submitted by mail. They are received by the clerical 
department, sorted according to clients, sent down to the processing 
units. processed, and sent back up to the clerical department to be 
archived on microfilm. For a claim not to be called "delayed" the 
entire process must take less than 15 days. 
The claim processors never actually send benefits to the customers. As 
they process a claim. they enter all the information into a computer 
system. This information is then dispatched to a centralized location, 
from where checks are sent to customers along with a brief 
explanation of benefits. In some cases, the checks are sent directly to 
service providers, such as doctor offices or hospitals. 
I started my fieldwork by attending two complete training classes (one 
for each of the two types of insurance handled by the claim processing 
center and described in Chapter 3). I also took some of the exams for 
new recruits and was subjected to a mock job interview. After the two 
training classes, I followed some processors through their day, and 
then joined a processing unit as an observant-participant: I processed 
claims at my own desk and I participated in the conversations and the 
social events of the unit. In addition to my direct involvement, I 
interviewed a number of trainees and claim processors, some 
individually and some in small groups. 
Whenever possible, I tried to receive all my information from the same 
channels as the trainees and processors with whom I was working. In 
this regard, I limited my interactions with management to the process 
of obtaining permission to participate in activities. In many cases, I 
even chose to remain ignorant about specific points rather than to 
obtain information from sources outside the purview of a processor. 
This intentional restraint was a strategy I adopted for this initial piece 
of fieldwork in order to understand as authentically as possible the 
viewpoints and experiences of claim processors 
The events and phenomena that I describe are not extraordinary. On 
the contrary, they are common, under one form or another, to most 
organizations, in the U.S. and around the world. Thus they will 
probably sound exceedingly familiar to the reader. Their unremarkable 
character, however, is itself significant as it obviates the need to weigh 
out their long- and short-term advantages and disadvantages. In this 
dissertation I hope to shed a new light on these familiar phenomena 
by analyzing the ways of knowing enabled by the human communities 
of which they have become a such "natural" constituent. 
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Any human lifeworld defies description. It is always more complex, 
more dynamically structured, more richly diverse than any description 
of it. And so are the individual experiences of the people living in it, 
shaped as it is by a nexus of interrelated factors, many of them hidden 
to the observer. I have tried to capture some of the dimensions that 
shape the claim processing office as a place in which to work, to be 
someone, to learn, to know, and to find~r not to find-meaning. 
The structure of this dissertation 
To set a concrete context for the later argument, I start with a 
fictional account of one working day in the life of a claim processor. I 
call this account fictional not because it is the fruit of my imagination 
but because that specific claim processor is not an actual person and 
that specific day never happened. Ariel is a character I have composed 
by conflating partial descriptions of the personalities and lives of many 
claim processors I got to know during my fieldwork, and that 
Thursday is a collection of events I have personally observed or heard 
described by actual participants. Thus the fictional character of this 
account is only a rhetoric device used to present some of my 
observations in a concise, concrete, and I hope compelling manner. 
The reader should be warned that quotation marks in this initial 
chapter are used to indicate talk, but do not necessarily imply a literal 
transcript of sentences I heard. 
In Chapter 3, I paint a portrait of the working life at the claim 
processing center in terms of the institutional structures that organize 
it. I argue that within that structure, workers form their own 
communities with their own practice in order to get the job done and 
to create a place in which they can develop a sense of themselves. In 
the course of this preliminary analysis, I introduce many of the 
categories discussed later in order to provide a context for these later 
theoretical discussions. 
In Chapter 4, I analyze the case of one specific event of use of one 
specific artifact. This case illustrates the type of problems that can 
arise when workers are asked to perform procedural activities without 
being given a good understanding of what the activity is about. I argue 
that the artifact that was used in this case is best understood as a 
boundary object between two communities that obviated the need for a 
shared understanding. 
In Chapter 5, I introduce the concept of cultural transparency with its 
dual nature consisting of both visibility and invisibility and I engage in 
some philosophical discussions about the nature of meaning, 
knowledge, and understanding. 
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In Chapter 6, I discuss learning. I argue that learning a form of 
practice implies becoming a member of the community of which the 
practice is part. I introduce the concept of legitimate peripheral 
participation as a descriptor of learning that implies increasing 
membership. I describe the learning that takes place in the claim 
processing center in those terms. Toward the end of the chapter, I 
expand the scope of the concept to see it as a descriptor of 
engagement in social practice that implies learning as an integral part 
of that practice. 
In Chapter 7, I explore the concept of community of practice. I argue 
that it is a fundamental analytical category for describing the social 
world as a context for achieving cultural transparency and I distinguish 
communities of practice from other categories such as culture or 
institution. I try to show why the two components of the term are 
essential to its analytical leverage. I also address the issue of how 
communities of practice reproduce themselves over time. 
As a conclusion, in Chapter 8, I explore some implications of this view 
of the social world for more global issues concerning the notion of 
expertise, such as professionalization, the relations between experts 
and other members of society, the definition of basic sociocultural 
categories such as health or justice by those who have develop 
technical means of dealing with them. I also try to look at the notion of 
intelligence in a new way. 
In Appendix, I have included an informal report written for people at 
Alinsu about some observations I made during my fieldwork there, and 
some of the implications the perspective developed in this thesis 
might have for the issues I bring up. This will give a flavor of the 
design implications of this theoretical framework. 
It is important to me that this dissertation be useful. To illustrate this 
point, and perhaps also as a warning to the reader, I would like to 
report a small incident, which I experienced as a heartening 
encouragement. A management consultant with a sincere concern for 
the state of our world had participated in a day of discussion in which 
I had presented the framework for talking about the social world that 
this thesis develops. He told me afterwards in his evocative language: 
"You know, I will never look at the world in the same way. I don't 
know what to do about it yet. But I've lost my innocence: I am no 
longer a virgin." 
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Prologue: 
to be 
just a 
processor 
Ariel grabs her purse, turns off the television, and checks the fridge. 
The problem with her boyfriend is that he eats too much. Guys can 
really gobble up mounds of food. This is costing a lot of money and is 
becoming a serious drain on their finances, especially considering that 
she is making payments on four credit cards as well. Not to speak of 
her new car. She doesn't know why she bought it; it's costing her a 
quarter of her income in monthly payments. But the old one was 
starting to fall apart and she could not keep paying for repairs. 
She has been living with her boyfriend for two and a half years now, 
and they are planning to get married next year. They found a nice 
church, just the right place. She will get three extra days of paid 
vacation, but they have not decided where they are going to go on 
honeymoon because ofthe expenses. Yet these three days are precious 
to her somehow, a special luxury afforded to her by her work situation, 
and whenever she feels like quitting, she remembers that she needs 
to stay on her job at least long enough to take these three days. 
She runs down the stairs. She has to be at work at 8:00, and she will 
need a lot of luck with traffic to make it. She should really stop using 
the snooze button. The fact is, she would rather go to work earlier and 
come home earlier, like people with more seniority who get to choose 
their hours first: they can have the 7:00 to 3:00 schedule. She did that 
for a while. It's a bit hard in the morning, but when you get off at 3:00, 
it's like, you still have the day in front of you. Staying there until 4:00 
makes a big difference, but the office needed some people to answer 
the phones between 3:00 and 4:00, so now junior processors have to 
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stay later. Although she has been working in the claim office for well 
over a year now, Ariel is still considered a junior processor. She has 
recently been promoted to what they call a level 6. 
Predictably, it's congested between Ridgewell and Lincoln. As her car 
comes to a halt, Ariel grabs the rearview mirror to check her make-up. 
She is a young woman of 25. Her brown hair is not very thick, but it 
falls on her shoulders in gentle waves ending with a half curl, a natural 
tendency she likes and encourages regularly with the help of a curler. 
She brushes her hair from her forehead and checks her eyelashes. She 
does not consider herself stunningly beautiful, but her only serious 
concern is being slightly overweight. She has to be careful, and 
spending her whole day mostly sitting of course does not help. She has 
to find a way to exercise more, and today she will skip her morning 
snack. 
Overall, she takes good care of herself. She makes up, but discreetly, 
and dresses cleanly but not aggressively. Fortunately. the office is 
rather informal about appearance. You could spend a fortune 
otherwise. Of course. she could not go to work in shorts, this 
management barred explicitly, but even jeans are OK as long as they 
are not torn. Altogether, there are not too many rules about dress, 
although it has been clearly intimated on a few occasions that it is 
better to look somewhat professional and that appearance as well as 
behavior will influence promotional reviews. Besides, it makes her feel 
better about her work to come in with proper clothes. Today she made 
a special effort because some visitors are expected in the office: she is 
wearing her new woolen skirt and matching high heels. 
The signal at the left turn is always red when she is in a rush. Come 
on, move. She turns into the parking lot. In a few minutes, she will be 
on the second floor of the building on the left. The two slick buildings 
of the office complex are two layered cakes of grey concrete and black 
windows with a thin red line for special effect; they are not just 
square, but of a more sophisticated shape, with the top floors tapering 
slightly. Very modern. In the courtyard that separates them, a large 
fountain was built around a tall piece of modern art, some kind of 
sculpture. Of course, at this time, she has to park by the trees on the 
perimeter of the parking lot by Emerson Avenue. That's another 
advantage of coming in early, you get the best parking spaces, right by 
the entrance. For some reason, this short walk is a burden: it is not 
the kind of exercise she means to get. And besides, it is already five 
past. She starts to run. 
Judith and Eleanor are already waiting for the elevator ... Hi, how are 
your She glances at the indicator: "L" for lobby and the steel doors 
slide open. The three coworkers step in hastily. The elevator has the 
soft rose carpeting that covers the floors inside the building and its 
walls are made of smoked mirrors so you don't feel encased in a small 
box. The inside is at once dark and well-lit: two rows of indirect 
10 
spotlights, built deep into the ceiling, shine softly onto people's heads. 
Like the lobby, with its large glass entrance, its peach walls, and its 
marble floor, the elevator seems made for business suits and attache 
cases, rather than for the jean jacket of Eleanor, with her lunch bag 
and her thermos hanging-whatever it is she drinks in the morning-
or for the bright sneakers of Judith, who still looks so much like a 
highschool girl. The numbers flip above the door. "Second floor," says 
the synthesized voice of the friendly elevator in the same old tone; 
that voice saying "second floor," Ariel can hear it in her head 
whenever she wants. Just close her eyes: "second floor." 
The office occupies the entire second floor of the building-plus a 
large part of the third floor, where the clerical unit, the training class. 
and the employees' lounge are located. The second floor consists of 
one large room, with no walls, except for the two management offices 
in the corners. But even these offices have two large windows so that 
visually they are almost part of the main room. One's view of the office 
is only obstructed by two square structures in the middle of the area, 
one of them being the elevator shaft with the entry hall and the 
bathrooms. The two bathrooms on this floor are women's. There was 
no need to reserve a whole bathroom for the few guys who work here; 
they can just go upstairs. 
At first sight, the office seems to be furnished with rows after rows of 
desks. Closer inspection reveals small clusters of four to six individual 
desks, which are formed by two facing rows of two or three. A 
partition about shoulder high runs between the facing rows so that 
processors at opposite desks do not see each other, but there is no 
partition between neighbors. An even closer look reveals that these 
clusters are themselves clustered: five or six of them are arranged in a 
square U-shaped configuration around the desk of a supervisor. This is 
called a "unit." Ariel's unit has been named the "Lakefield" unit, after 
a local town. She thinks it is kind of a dumb name, but the unit chose 
it before her time. 
The first thing Ariel does is to walk toward her supervisor's desk to 
sign in. Since she is ten minutes late, she promises to make up for the 
time this very day: she will stay until ten past four. Before going to her 
desk, Ariel checks her bin: only one referral and nine pieces of mail. 
She usually receives a lot of mail addressed specifically to her; Gayle 
told her that it is because she always gives her name on the phone. It 
seems like the right thing to do, but she came to realize that many 
processors try to avoid doing so. 
Ariel's desk is on the inner side of the U-shape, in the middle of a row 
of three desks. The supervisor's desk is just behind her, and of course, 
so are the supervisor's eyes: she has to make sure that she does not 
chat too much. In fact, she suspects that it's the reason she was told to 
sit there. Before. she was sitting beside Eric, and he kept talking to 
her. Now she does not have much privacy. but that's good too. It helps 
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her concentrate. She knows herself, and if she wants to make 
production and get her promotions, it's better she can't fool around. 
Also, in this position, she is closer to the center of the unit and she 
always knows what is happening. On her left sits Joan. She is a level 8, 
who works very hard and is very dedicated. Level 8 is the highest level 
for processors; beyond that, one is no longer a processor. On Ariel's 
right sits Annette, a level 5 who is having some difficulty and has been 
placed on warning for a while. Level 5 is the first level at which one is 
no longer a trainee. Ariel thinks that Annette will most likely get fired 
soon because she was placed on warning: her warning has already been 
extended and she is still having trouble. 
Until Ariel was asked to move recently, this desk was occupied by 
Corey, a new trainee, who quit three or four weeks after transferring 
from the training class to the floor. Really, this job is not for everyone; 
some people just don't get it. Right out of training is the hardest time. 
Ariel herself almost quit at that time. Like just about everyone here: 
those who did not quit at least thought of it. Eight weeks of class, and 
then you are thrown in the middle of things. Of course, there is a 
back-up trainer who is there to help and answer questions, but she 
can't help you with every claim and there are so many things you don't 
know. In the beginning, most of the claims have one problem or 
another. What it took for Ariel, really, was to stop caring, to just do her 
best and not care: just get the quality right as much as possible, and 
not care about production quotas. "If it's not good enough, fire me." 
Every day when she was coming home, her boyfriend used to tell her 
"Listen, just quit, it's not worth it." In fact, she had started looking for 
another job, and she just didn't care. That's how she made it through. 
Now at least she does not go home with a headache, and she does not 
think about claim processing when she is out of the office. 
But Corey, she looked like she was going to make it without much of a 
problem; she looked like she was going to be very good. In the training 
class, she had been very successful, and the trainer thought highly of 
her. She had taken a substantial cut in pay from her former job to be 
here; she wanted to make use of the medical knowledge she had 
gained working in a doctor's office; she liked the idea of working for a 
large company with possibilities for advancement; and she seemed the 
kind of person who was going to hang on. Then she started to feel like 
she was falling behind. There were too many questions. Her claims 
kept getting "voided" by quality review; she was worried. Then she 
was absent a few times. During the probation period, you can't be 
absent, that's deadly. Then one day, she was gone. "She is no longer 
with us," said the supervisor. She had been fired. 
Except for supervisors' desks, whose gray and burgundy tones match 
the rose carpet, every desk in this office has the same imitation -wood 
desktop and mustard-color steel body. And like every desk around, 
Ariel's is cluttered with the paraphernalia of claim processors. She has 
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organized her small space into an efficient place for doing her work, 
but she has been careful to leave some room for a few personal objects. 
Hanging above her desk in the rtght corner are a series of slanted 
paper trays. The first two are for claims that she has already 
processed: one, labeled "Q's, .. is for claims that will be picked up by 
someone from the quality review team and the other, labeled "D's," 
for claims that will be picked by someone from the clertcal 
department to be archived on microfiches. In the third tray, she keeps 
her current work, that is, the stack of claims she still needs to 
process. Three more trays contain forms that she needs on a regular 
basis: the "batch forms" which she must fill out and attach as a cover 
sheet to each claim she processes, forms to report on phone calls, and 
blank sheets of papers on which she must glue undersized bills 
submitted by customers, in order to make handling and microfilming 
easier. 
On an adjacent hanging tray, she has her reference books. These 
include a medical dictionary; the physician's desk reference, a thick 
book containing detailed descrtptions of drugs; a rtngfolder describing 
the fee schedules of special contracts that some doctors and hospitals 
have with Alinsu; and a smaller ringfolder containing the most recent 
memos that were distributed to her unit whenever attention had to be 
drawn to a change, a common difficulty, a misunderstanding, etc. 
Under this tray, on her desk, stands a row of thick ringfolders. One is 
her training manual, and another contains old memos. The two on the 
right contain the descriptions of the various health plans that dictate 
the way in which claims from different companies have to be paid. 
Ariel pays claims from as many as eighty different plans: it would be 
easier to be in the County College unit, which only takes care of one 
big plan. Hanging from the tray are a photo of her old car and a card 
Ruth gave her for her engagement. 
The wall of the partition serves as a private bulletin board: a motley of 
notes and lists, yellow "stickies" that remind her of calls to make and 
errors to watch for, a caricature of herself purchased for her by her 
boyfriend at a fair, a list of colleagues' extensions, and a tiny calendar. 
Underneath, on her desk, leaning against the partition is an oblong 
piece of cardboard with a summary of codes and abbreviations for 
diseases, medical specialties, patient statuses, etc. On the right, she 
has two stacked paper trays. In one of them, she keeps her notes, 
some of them still from her training class; and in the other, she keeps 
a few small folders containing miscellaneous lists. For instance, one 
lists the numeric codes and contents of hundreds of prewritten 
paragraphs which she can request the computer system to insert into 
the explanation of benefits sent to customers. By these trays. she has a 
box of kleenexes and a bottle of hand cream. In front of them is her 
calculator. 
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On her far left stands a box of layered paper trays in which she keeps 
track of things to do, such as phone calls on which she needs to follow 
up, claims delayed by requests for further information, and current 
work she has "prescreened" already, that is, claims for which she has 
performed some preliminary checks. On top of this tray, she keeps a 
small plant and a picture frame with photos of her boyfriend, her little 
niece, and her dog. Below the desk on the left handside, she has two 
drawers. In the top drawer, she keeps her personal stock of office 
supplies mixed with some personal items and some snacks. In the 
hanging files of the bottom drawer, she keeps all the forms that she 
uses less often: for referring claims to the technical unit; for 
requesting file maintenance, that is, modifications to the database 
which she is not authorized to perform: for requesting the generation 
of form letters to customers; for performing certain complex 
calculations, etc. All in all she has close to 30 different forms in that 
drawer. 
On the front edge of the desk, slightly to the left, lies her keyboard. 
On the right of it is the space where she places the paperwork while 
she is processing a claim. Behind the keyboard, on a plastic organizer, 
she keeps office supplies she uses all the time: her staple remover for 
unstapling claims and the accompanying documentation, her glue 
stick, roll of scotch tape, and scissors for gluing receipts on standard-
size paper, pens and white-out for filling out forms, and a small bucket 
of paper clips for reassembling the paperwork of processed claims 
without having to use staples. Behind her keyboard is also the area 
where she keeps her desk calendar and her mug. Then in the back, 
from a recess in the left half of the partition, the grey square face of 
her computer terminal blankly stares, awaiting Ariel's first keystroke 
to light up. 
Presently, Ariel is walking toward her desk. Her gaze ignores the two 
phone messages that stand on her keyboard, held up by the keys 
between which they have been slid; it also ignores the pile of claims 
that someone has placed beside her keyboard for her to work through. 
What she immediately notes are two claims covered with pink batch 
sheets: two "voids." Shit! Two more voids with only two days left this 
week. "Here goes my quality!" she exclaims. It will take a lot of luck if 
she is to make up for them and maintain the weekly percentage of 
correct claims she needs. She hates voids; they are frustrating and 
humiliating. Not only do they mean lower quality rating for the week in 
which they occur, but they also mean more work since they have to be 
processed again. 
She takes a look at the first void. She reimbursed lab charges at the 
regular rate of 85%, but the quality reviewer claims that these charges 
were related to an out-patient surgery, which the plan reimburses at 
1 OOOA> and should therefore have been reimbursed at 1 OOoA> as well. 
She must check this up. She sits down, pushes papers aside, and 
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starts logging into the system. "What a way to start the day!" she 
complains to Annette. 
She enters her operator number and her password to access the main 
network and then enters them again to log into ALINSYS, the actual 
system she is using. There are strict rules about safety and no one is 
allowed to do anything under anyone else's account. You are even 
supposed to logout if you are away from your desk and can't see your 
terminal even for a short time, but everyone is rather loose on this 
one. Ariel has heard through the grapevine that there have been some 
cases of embezzlement in the past. that some people have been fired, 
but she does not know the details. Finally, the initial working screen 
comes up. She enters the control number of the employer contract 
and the social security number of the employee and inspects the 
patient's claim history. The QR person was right. the current lab 
charges were related to a surgery that had been the object of a 
previous claim. She should have caught that: there is no way out. She 
quickly reprocesses the claim. 
Then she takes a look at the second void. What? But the patient was 
seen for headaches. And neurological exams for headaches are 
considered medical, even if there is a secondary psychological 
diagnosis. Therefore the .. psych" maxi.mum does not apply. She had 
actually discussed this case with Nancy, the back-up trainer, who had 
agreed with her opinion. She goes over to show her the void, gets 
some comforting grumbling about the quality review people, comes 
back to her desk, pulls out a dispute form from her drawer, and starts 
filling it out, explaining in detail how she came to her decision and 
stating emphatically that the back-up trainer had confirmed her 
determination. Then she goes to her supervisor who must sign a 
dispute form before it is submitted to quality review for appraisal. The 
supervisor shakes her head in solidarity. Ariel is now quite confident 
that she will be able to resolve this one in her favor. What a reliefl 
Now that she has taken care of her voids, Ariel reads her phone 
messages, and puts them in a tray on her left. She will take care of 
that in the afternoon. Then she starts looking through the other 
claims that were sitting on her desk. These are mostly "junk claims" 
that will require much work. They were referred to the technical units 
by other units, mainly the second shift; part-timers are not prepared 
to process complex claims. From the technical unit, these junk claims 
go to more experienced people for final processing. "What is the 
oldest 'maintenance' you have?" she asks Joan, trying to get an idea of 
the general backlog in maintenance requests. 
Ariel is well organized. "You have to be, in this job," she always says. 
What she tries to do is to process easy claims fast during the morning 
and early afternoon, and get her "production" out of the way. Once she 
has reached her daily quota. she uses the last few hours of the day to 
take care of "junk" claims and to make phone calls. Quickly, she flips 
15 
through her piles of claims and separates the ones she Will process 
this morning. Of course, you never really know just by looking at the 
claim how involved it is going to be, because there can be surprises 
when you open the customer's ftle on the system. But after a while you 
have a pretty good idea at first sight about how difficult a claim is likely 
to be. Usually, Ariel does this sorting before leaving so that her pile is 
ready for the next day, but yesterday, she was held up by a lady who 
had gotten divorced and who wanted to know why her claims were no 
longer being paid. That lady was pretty upset because Ariel was 
supposed to protect the privacy of Alinsu's customer and thus could 
not disclose the reason for which her claims were being denied. She 
could only tell her that she had to talk about this with her ex-husband. 
Ariel ended up transferring the call to her supervisor because the 
conversation was degrading fast. Yesterday had been a terrible day, 
anyway. There was just one obnoxious phone call after another, and 
then the computer went down for almost an hour. Everyone was 
screaming. That's always the same thing: just before the hour is over, 
the system comes up again. Processors do not get to write time off for 
the first hour of computer "down time" because they are supposed to 
do other things like taking care of paper work. Not only did she not 
make production, but she got these voids. 
Ariel starts on her first claim. There is an office visit, a series of tests, 
and some drug bills. Nothing too complicated. She removes the staples 
and glues the drug bills on blanks. Next she goes into the database, 
using the company's contract number and the insured person's social 
security number. She checks that the employee is on ftle and that the 
dates of service on the bills fall after the employee's "effective date"-
and before termination if there is any termination date. There are a 
number of codes to look for: the branch in the client company, the 
status code of the employee to make sure that the dependents are 
covered, and some other codes that, if present, would make this claim 
complicated. But everything checks out fine: she can start processing. 
First, she has to enter the social security number and the name again 
to select the file for processing. Because a claim has to· be paid under 
the plan governing the period during which the charges were 
incurred, the computer displays the dates of successive plan changes. 
She chooses the most recent plan change, since this claim is recent. 
On the next screen, she has to enter the year the claim is for and the 
date the claim was received, which was stamped in red on the claim 
by the clerical employee who opened the mail. It is easy to forget to do 
that because the system enters by default the date of the last claim 
processed. She ignores a number of caution messages, which appear in 
bright white characters, but come up with almost every claim anyway 
at this stage. She moves on to the next screen where she checks the 
address. It is important to make sure the address is correct so the 
check will reach its destination properly. You will definitely get a void 
if the address is wrong, even the ZIP code. Next, she selects the 
customer's son as the patient from a list of dependents. It is easy to 
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choose the wrong dependent; she got voided for this last month. She 
makes sure the son is under the age of 19. He is not, but there is a 
note on his me that he is a full-time student, a fact that was 
investigated last month so that she does not need to confirm it. Oh, 
no! Not again. She does not want to listen once more to Annette's 
plans to go to Richland Hot Springs this weekend. What's the big deal 
with that mud bath? Is she afraid, or what? 
She now comes to the .. paylines," the screen on which she will enter 
information about the charges so that benefits can be calculated. These 
lines are located on the upper part of the screen and will stay 
displayed until the claim is done. She starts with the office visit. She 
enters first the type of service, then the name of the service provider, 
which leads her into the providers file: there she makes sure she 
checks that the provider's address is correct since the insured has 
"assigned" the benefits to be disbursed directly to the doctor. Then 
she enters the date of service and the charges. In this case, she must 
also enter a deduction because the provider happens to have a special 
contract with Alinsu. She uses a calculation sheet to figure out what 
the deduction is, looking up in a ringfolder what the standard charge 
for this type of office visit is in the provider's area, entering the 
amount on her calculator to compute a reduction of 15%, choosing the 
larger amount of the two. It has occurred to her that it would be more 
advantageous for Alinsu to take the smaller one, but the procedure says 
to take the larger one. 
Since the patients went to such a .. preferred" doctor, Ariel must 
remember to increase the rate of reimbursement from 80% to 85%. 
But this means that she will have to split the claim in two since the 
other charges are to be reimbursed at 80% and cannot be included in 
this payment. She likes the idea of having this claim generate two 
"batches" that will count toward her production: after spending all 
this time on that silly void, she can use a bit of luck. But she quickly 
checks in the providers' file that the lab where the tests where 
performed does not have a similar contract. You will get in trouble for 
splitting claims unnecessarily. 
The rest of the claim goes fairly fast: enter the code for the diagnosis, 
for the contract type, skip the coordination section, indicate the 
assignment of benefits. Remember to include the pattern paragraphs 
for the special deduction and for the deductible, which the system has 
automatically taken into account. Ariel types and writes impressively 
fast. Her eyes scan computer screens quickly, knowing what to look 
for. Check everything on this last screen and press enter. Then Ariel 
gets a new claim for the lab charges and for the drug bills. She has to 
check that a drug she does not remember having seen before is an 
acceptable prescription drug; Joan says that it's OK with any 
circulatory condition. But the vitamins, of course, have to be denied. 
All standard stuff. She collects the papers for the two claims, attaches 
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them with paper clips, places them in her outgoing bin, and circles 
two numbers on the sheet on which she keeps track of her work. 
At half past eight, the supervisor comes around to distribute 
paychecks: sprinkle of sealed white envelopes-from hand to hand-
consecrated wafers swallowed into expectant rows of purses. She also 
reminds everyone of the unit meeting to be held at 9:00, and asks who 
is going to do overtime this Saturday. Ariel will certainly be there, in 
the morning at least. She can use the money, and on Saturdays, there 
are no phones: one can catch up on production. 
Presently Ariel's phone is ringing: once, twice. Reluctantly she grabs 
the handset. While she talks, however, she does not interrupt her 
work immediately, but holds the phone with her shoulder and keeps 
processing the current claim. 
- Thanks for calling Alinsu Insurance Company. Can I help ... 
- Yes, I would like to know what's happening with my claim. 
- When did you submit it? 
- I sent it more than a month ago. 
Now Ariel realizes that she will need to access information to answer 
the person's question and that she will not be able to finish the claim 
she is currently processing before having to do so. She will have to 
"clear" out of this claim and thus to lose all the information she has 
already entered. She resigns herself, clears out, and starts typing the 
access information as her interlocutor gives it to her. 
- What is the company the insured works for? 
- ZollePro. 
- Do you have the control number? 
- I don't know. What does it look like? 
- It's a five-digit number starting with a 2. 
- I can't see it. 
- I can look it up for you. 
Ariel muffles the phone and turns to Annette. "What's the control 
number of ZollePro?" she asks. "I don't know." "It's 21131," replies 
Pat who happened to be walking by. Ariel enters the control number of 
the company. · 
- I got it. What's the social? 
- 123121234. 
-Your name? 
- Jerry Hotchaud. 
- Is this the social security of the insured? 
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- No, it's mine. 
- I need the employee's number. 
- 098090987. 
- OK So, what can I help you with? 
- I have not heard from you ever since I sent my claim in. 
- When did you send it in? 
- In early December. 
- What was the date of service? 
- November 15, or something like that, with Dr. Monoeil. 
- I don't show any claim for services around that date. I have a claim 
for an office visit on October 13, but nothing in December. 
- Oh my God! What happened? 
- We always have some delay around the HoUdays, it may still be in 
our backlog. 
- But have you received it? 
- I have no way to tell you that because we have piles of claims right 
now, and I can't search through that. 
- What? But I sent it in, it must have been ... it must have been ... 
December 8 or something. 
- Well, Sir, all I can tell you is that I don't show anything on the 
system for that date of service. If you really sent it on the 8th, we 
should have processed it by now. 
- Yes, I sent it early because of the Holidays, you know, to get the 
money. 
- I understand Sir, but it probably came in late and is still in our 
backlog. You could resubmit it, but if I were you, I'd give it a 
couple of weeks, and call again. 
The conversation continues for a while, sometimes testing Ariel's 
patience. There is backlog, what can she do about it? And it's not her 
fault if there is no way that clerical can log the receipt of submitted 
claims into the system. Finally, the caller hangs up. 'That guy, he just 
wouldn't let me go," Ariel complains to Annette. "I know," Annette 
replies, "as if we had nothing better to do." 
At 9:00, the claim processors converge toward the supervisor's desk 
for a unit meeting. They roll their chairs, or push themselves on their 
chairs with their feet, and sit in a semi-circle around her desk. 
Postures vaiy, ranging from straight backs to leaning over a desk 
nearby. Most examiners sit cross-legged with their notebooks on their 
lap. There ts a mixture of local chat with interjections across the semi-
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circle. The atmosphere is generally relaxed and the talking as well as 
the configuration convey a sense of familiar conviviality. These 
meetings are a regular occurrence in the office; they take place at 
least once a month, but usually at shorter intervals whenever there is 
business to discuss. Harriet, the supervisor, checks that everyone is 
there. Esther is still on the phone, we'll wait for her. There she comes 
on her chairs: after some shuffling and scooting, everyone is ready. 
First Harriet reminds everyone of the visit of some important clients 
and asks processors to clean their desks and to make sure they do not 
fool around while the visitors are present. Then she announces that 
she has the vacation list and that she wants people to fill it out. 'This 
list is for vacation weeks only. If someone wants to take a day off, come 
see me." The list is ordered by seniority. Harriet is at the top, and she 
has already filled her slot out. The list will go around the office in the 
order in which it is printed, and nobody can be skipped. If someone is 
sick or otherwise absent, the list will have to sit on her desk until she 
comes back. The rule for choosing vacation weeks is that there cannot 
be more than two people out on any given week. The list should be 
completed by the end of the month, so people should not hold on to it 
for long, and no one should take the list home. "Just go home and 
think about the days you want. Then come back and fill it out. If you 
want to change your vacation week later, and this week is already 
taken, too bad. So think about it and plan your vacation carefully." After 
June, examiners who are "on good standing" can take their entire 
vacation for the rest of the year. Before June, they can only take 
vacation as they have earned it. For instance, by April, Harriet explains, 
they should have earned between 5 and 6 days, but they can only take 
what they have earned minus what they have already taken. "If you 
want to know how many days you have taken, come see me." There are 
certain periods of times during which management has decided that 
nobody should take vacation. If someone wants a vacation during these 
times, it is necessary to fill out special request forms, which are 
attached to the vacation list. The rule that up to June employees can 
only take the vacation they have already earned is flexible: "If someone 
really needs to take vacation earlier, come see me, and if I know that 
you are going to be here for a long time, and you are not on status, I 
will usually say OK." 
Harriet goes on to communicate a problem concerning the 800 
number that Alinsu customers can call to get information. Management 
has a suspicion that this number was given out by some processors to 
their acquaintances as a way of calling them free of charge. From now 
on, all phone calls exceeding 15 minutes will be marked. Harriet 
senses the tension that her remark has brought into the meeting and 
is quick to clarify that the marking of these phone calls does not in 
itself constitute an accusation. It is only if patterns develop that an 
investigation will result. Still the subject seems delicate, and there is 
some grumbling and a few defensive remarks. 
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Th.en Harriet discusses the idea of creating a phone unit within the 
unit. The gist is that at all times only a few processors would take all 
incoming phone calls and that people would take turns handling the 
phones. They have not yet figured out how to do that. Harriet asks for 
suggestions and requests that processors think about how they would 
want to go about implementing such an idea. She recalls one 
suggestion that a quarter of the processors in the unit would be on the 
phone each week; they would not have to meet production on that 
week, but would have to make up in the following three weeks by 
reaching their four-week production leveL Ariel is not even quite sure 
that she wants a phone unit at all. She is rather ambivalent about 
phone calls; she sees them as interruptions, either welcome or 
unwelcome depending on circumstances. She certainly perceives 
them as obstacles to production; sometimes she spends as much as 
half her time on the phone. They disturb her peace, and can be a real 
pain when customers are nasty. But they also break the routine. And 
having to answer the phone allows her to receive private calls without 
drawing attention to herself. 
The next item on Harriet's agenda is a memo that modifies the codes 
that processors are supposed to use to indicate the types of service 
rendered by provider. Two old service types have just been 
reactivated, in order to generate better data about psychiatric care, as 
differentiated from medical care. And the existing code for office visits 
has been modified to cover medical care exclusively. Harriet goes 
through the memo with the processors, paraphrasing each item and 
letting them ask questions. The change is substantial because these 
codes are used very frequently, but it is received rather casually by 
everyone: just another change, another improvement that will 
complicate their work only very slightly. The change will take effect 
on Monday, after the new version of the system has been installed. 
Harriet then asks the processors if they have any items of business to 
bring up. The assistant-supervisor complains that there have been too 
many overpayments lately. She blames it on the fact that processors do 
not check "eligibility" carefully enough. Nancy reminds everyone that 
they cannot keep paying for physical therapy for a long time, even with 
a new prescription from a doctor. They must have a progress report. 
She gives an example of a prescription that had been used for 
continuation: the doctor had merely crossed out the old date on the 
old prescription and replaced it with a new one. And if physical 
therapy goes on for more than a year, it has to be referred to the 
technical unit. Finally, Beliza says: "Well, for me, it's just this 
deductible." Everyone understands what she is talking about: certain 
plans stipulate a complicated way of determining when a family 
deductible is satisfied. An animated discussion ensues with everyone 
contributing examples and partial explanations until Beliza seems 
satisfied: "It's easy to explain here. but it's a pain to explain it on the 
phone." she says. Many processors shake their heads. 
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Last Sunday was the birthday of Sara, the assistant-supervisor. A half-
sheet birthday cake is placed on Harriet's desk, along with a small 
present from the unit. Sara blows the candle and starts cutting the 
cake, and the whole unit applauds and cheers. She and Trish 
distribute pieces. These cakes are a nice break from the daily routine, 
but the frosting is always much too thick: Ariel got a corner piece with 
close to a half-inch coat of white sugary fat on three sides. Before Ariel 
can complete her eating duties, however, the supervisor says: .. Well, it 
was nice seeing all your faces again." Ariel complies with this 
invitation to return to processing, taking her piece of cake with her. 
The meeting and the cake cutting ceremony have lasted for 45 
minutes and Joan wonders whether the cake cutting part of the 
meeting must be considered morning break. There is some discreet 
talk about the issue, but the question is never posed directly to the 
supervisor. Along with everyone, Ariel decides to assume that this did 
not count as a break and to see what happens. At a quarter past ten, 
she leaves for the lounge with Joan, where they spend most of their 
ten minutes discussing with Trish her use of her sister's driver's 
license to get into a bar last Saturday and her fright when there was a 
check-up. As they come down the spiral stair to return to their desks, 
Ariel reminisces about her own escapades. At her desk, she logs back 
into the system and starts processing. After a while she adds, without 
actually turning to Joan: .. One good thing about being over ~l is you 
don't have to deal with this anymore." Two easy claims, two circles in 
quick succession. Joan has been thinking about Ariel's remark on 
being over 21, and says: .. But, you know, there are so many other 
things to worry about." 
A few minutes before 11 :00, Beliza comes by Ariel's desk and asks 
what she wants for lunch because she is getting ready to call the deli. 
It's a bit cheaper and there is less waiting when one orders in 
advance; and since they have only a half hour for lunch, they do not 
have much time to spare. Still, thinks Ariel, it's better to have a short 
lunch break and get out earlier ... A ham sandwich with everything on 
it." 
Now there is no TIN (taxpayer information number) for this doctor. 
Why can't they just fill out these forms completely? Ariel has to send a 
letter requesting the information: this means clearing out of the claim, 
and putting it on the paper tray where she keeps claims awaiting 
further information. Five or six years ago, they could simply call the 
doctor's office, but now it is necessary to have all this in writing. She 
pulls out a form from her drawer and fills out a request to send a form 
letter. Annette wants to know if she can assume that the date of 
emergency room treatment is the date of the accident when the 
patient did not enter the accident date. Ariel is not sure: accident 
dates are important because of temporary supplemental benefits for 
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accidents on certain plans. Joan says that she always assumes that and 
that she's never been voided on it. 
Ariel is processing a claim for which there is a suspicion of a pre-
existing condition. On the computer, she flips through the claim 
history to get an idea of how this has been handled so far. Her plan has 
a $2. 000 waiver limit on expenses for pre-existing conditions, and the 
expenses related to this condition only amount to $384 so far. so that 
she need not investigate it. An investigation is only started when the 
related expenses approach the limit. Good. Investigating a "pre-exist" 
can become quite involved, with numerous letters and phone calls. In 
this case, she pays the claim and enters a claim note stating how much 
has been paid out of the limit so far. In this office, some people are 
good about notes and some are not. At any rate, Ariel only trusts her 
own notes. She is quite diligent with notes in general. For instance, 
every time she changes an address, something she has already done 
three times today, she enters a dependent note to that effect, with the 
date and the source of the new address, so that if another processor 
later receives an old claim dating before the change, that processor 
will not put the old address back in. 
It is 12:00. Beliza goes around to gather the lunch group. Ariel looks at 
her circle sheet to see how many claims she has processed so far. She 
counts 22, not including the void she re-entered since these do not 
count as production. She is on schedule, but she might have to skip 
her afternoon break. Ariel, Beliza, Sandra, Eric, and Leonora take the 
elevator down to the deli on the ground floor. Sandra is worried about 
her quality, which has been in the eighties lately. The deli's modest 
outfit is in sharp contrast with the style of the building. The first time 
Ariel left the lush decor of the lobby through a small door in the 
corner to the right of the elevator shaft, she remembers being 
surprised: she had expected a nice cafe with a full array of delicatessen 
refinements. Instead she had found herself in a small, poorly-lit room, 
with a few homely, dark brown tables and chairs and a 1V on in a 
corner. The counter offered a simple menu of cafeteria food and the 
walls were covered with shelves of food items in truck-stop style. But 
on reflection she likes it that way because at least it is affordable. She 
just smiles at the thought that this deli, cooped in a corner of a 
building whose style reflected the tastes of cosmopolitan executives 
and the means of her mammoth employer, is very much like her. 
After getting their orders, they all sit around a table. Beliza reassures 
Sandra that her quality won't affect her pay until she is put on 
warning. When Sandra expresses her surprise that this has not 
happened yet, Ariel asks her: "Do you want us to tell them to put you 
on warning?" They all laugh. 
Suddenly Eric leans back: there is a caterpillar on his plate, furiously 
looking for a safe place to continue its caterpillar life, away from the 
hot baked potato placed on the leave of lettuce where it had made its 
23 
home. Screams and sighs around the table: it is terrible, it is 
unbelievable! The man at the counter is very apologetic and takes the 
plate away. Eric tells him that he need not bring anything else. The 
deli employee comes back a bit later, explaining that he talked to the 
manager, and that they are only going to charge Eric for his salad, that 
is, $2.45. Given that the combination was $3.60, the discount is 
minimal. At first, Eric does not argue. He does not seem ready to put 
up a fight for a few dollars and seems resigned. Still he looks dejected 
when he comes back and quietly explains to his companions at the 
table what happened. Everyone complains that it is unfair; they 
commiserate with Eric and exhorts him to stand for his rights. Sandra 
even mentions that she has a friend who would have made such a fuss 
that the whole room would have eaten for free! By the nervous 
motions on Eric's face, it is not clear that he enjoys this loud 
compassion. Whatever his original feelings may have been, however, he 
is now undoubtedly compelled to take some action. He raises from the 
table to go and talk to the manager. He walks away swinging his 
shoulders under his black leather jacket. After a while, he comes back 
beaming: the manager has agreed to waive the entire bill. Justice has 
been served. 
The conversation resumes. Quality is a problem with the whole unit. 
That's why the idea of a phone unit has been raised. With all these 
phone interruptions, it is easy to make careless mistakes. Eric does 
not know whether he would like to be just on phones for a whole 
week. And what would they do when there are too many calls at the 
same time? And now they are going to monitor long calls! Everyone 
knows that there are business calls that are long. Beliza reminds 
everyone of that 45-minute phone call that drove her crazy. Surely 
"they" will recognize that this is unfair. 
The conversation turns to the storm that is expected for tonight. 
Suddenly, Beliza starts telling a story about her adventure during that 
terrible flood a few years back. Her husband was sure that the road was 
safe and that the water was shallow, and he drove on. But suddenly the 
car started to sink and water started to ooze in from every crack. They 
had to get out through the windows and climb on the roof. Her 
husband had to jump into the water and wade through it to get some 
help. The AAA officer was teasing her husband with mocking 
skepticism until he saw the car and realized that he was going to have 
to dive into this water to hook the car up and get it out. Mind you, the 
car started before the incredulous eyes of all onlookers. Beliza always 
comes up with these incredible stories. But it is time to go back. 
As the group reaches the office, they see a gorgeous flower 
arrangement on Harriet's desk. Since she is out to lunch, they get the 
story from Trish that her husband had forgotten their anniversary 
yesterday and was really sorry about it. To send all these flowers like 
that, he must have been. Ariel notices that Joan's desk is all clean. She 
remembers the visitors and gets her desk in some order. In her mail 
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bin she has found a response to an inquiry she had sent to technical. 
""This guy's gonna yell at me." Joan asks her who that is and she 
reminds her of the case. 
Ariel: .. His wife's deductible is not transferable from one employer 
to another." 
Joan: .. Make sure you tell him about the three-month carry over. 
That will make him feel better." 
Ariel: .. Good idea." 
Joan: "This guy's a kid," 
Ariel: "He's 23." 
Joan: "He can't get too mad." 
Ariel: "He works in the warehouse or something." 
There is no answer. Ariel will have to try later. Gayle has rushed over 
to Annette with her walkman in her hand: .. Quick, tune to KROK! What 
a great song!" She would not do that if Harriet was here. Annette 
complies and starts dancing on her seat, still processing: "Oh yeah!" 
Ariel asks to listen and Annette hands her her headphones. Ariel likes 
the song, but she can't work with music; she gets too distracted. 
When Harriet comes back from lunch, she hands Ariel the response 
from Quality Review on her void dispute: her judgment has been 
accepted as valid. Good! In spite of her weight concern and the 
morning cake, Ariel allows herself to take a piece of chocolate from 
the jar on Harriet's desk. It's hard to resist when that jar is always 
there, tempting you. Back to work. On an ambulance claim, Ariel does 
not have a diagnosis, but finds one that would do in claim history. 
Since she is a bit hesitant, "just to be sure," she goes over to Nancy to 
ask whether it is still necessary to assess the medical necessity of the 
ambulatory transport now that she has found a diagnosis. Of course not. 
Now this claim looks like a duplicate, but Ariel can't tell from the 
claim history on line; she needs to check the original bill to see if the 
services covered are really the same. She goes to the microftlm 
reader, but the claim was recent and the film has not yet come back 
from the lab. So Ariel has to fill out a request for clerical to get a copy 
of the original bill on paper. She clears out of the claim and puts it 
aside. Here is a claim for a routine lab test which, according to her 
search through history, seems to have been performed in the context 
of a larger exam for a specific diagnosis. She turns to Joan, starting 
with: "Joan, this is a stupid question, ... ".After she has received an 
answer. she feels that she should have known, but that it is always 
better to ask someone else. She could also have referred the claim to 
the technical unit, but people there would think: "Doesn't this girl 
kr:iow?" 
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The four visitors announced in the morning have arrived, and they 
come towards Ariel's unit. Kathryn, the assistant-manager, and Roger, 
from technical, are giving them a tour. These are important 
customers, who represent a large case with over 20,000 "lives." The 
office looks pretty good. Ariel can't hear what the touring group is 
talking about. and she does not try. She is, for a moment. struck by the 
way they walk, slowly, with assurance and enduring smiles. She 
notices their sweeping gazes and their wide gestures as they ambulate 
around the office, discussing, pointing, laughing, nodding. There is a 
managerial elegance about the way they look at the landscape of her 
working world. She thinks fleetingly of long distances, of airports and 
earphones, of meeting rooms and signatures, of statistics and charts. 
The visitors and their guides pass by Ariel's desk, ethereal beings, 
angels gliding by in the aisles. Ariel stoops over her work, her 
knuckles busy with their staccato on her keyboard, her gaze intently 
scanning characters on her screen, her spirit huddled over the 
partitioned field of her deskspace. Suddenly, the gliding is 
interrupted. One of the visitors, the benefit representative, has just 
recognized Beliza's nameplate. They have talked on the phone quite 
often, but have never met face to face. Beliza stands up politely: nice to 
meet you. They shake hands and exchange a few giggling words: they 
are colleagues. Then Beliza sits down, and the group glides on. 
It's only quarter to two. The afternoon seems to drag on for Ariel. She 
is a bit tired and wants to go home. Five more easy claims and she will 
start processing difficult claims and taking care of other business until 
it's time for her to leave. This week, she has not done enough junk, 
but today she must do some. The supervisors have threatened to 
resume desk searches: making sure that junk claims are not 
accumulating on processors' desks. Gayle comes over: "Can you take a 
look at my screen?" "What did I do?" asks Ariel. .. I can't understand 
your note." Ariel goes over to Gayle's desk and explains her what she 
had done. 
"I already made production," Ariel says triumphantly as she draws her 
37th circle. She quickly opens her mail and makes a few phone calls, 
including one to her boyfriend. "See you tomorrow." Joan gets to leave 
at three. The first junk claim Ariel has been processing turns out to be 
a "Q," that is, a claim that will have to go through the review process. 
When a claim is done, the system gives the processor a batch number 
that will become the reference number for that claim. This number 
can end with a "Q" for "Quality Review" or a "D" for "Disbursement." 
Ariel does not know the exact system that allocates Q's. She believes 
that Q's are allocated on a somewhat random basis, but that certain 
plans have a higher percentage of them. She does not know exactly to 
what degree the appearance of a Q is determined by the type of claim 
that she is processing or by the way that she is processing it, but she 
heard that her supervisor can manipulate the system function that 
allocates Q's in order to send specific claims to quality review. Ariel 
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has been getting a greater number of Q's than usual. As she gets this 
one, she complains aloud: .. What? Another Q? That's terrible! I just 
spent 25 minutes on this claim!" She does not like to get Q's even 
though she does realize that having a large number of claims reviewed 
diminishes the importance of errors since they will then constitute a 
smaller percentage of correct checked work. Still, you never like to 
have your work checked, especially after spending so much time on it. 
Of course, D's too can be incorrect. and be sent back for a 
recalculations if there is a complaint. But processors do not get 
penalized for recalcs. 
It is ten to four; Ariel will be leaving in 20 minutes. She decides to 
stop dealing with her junk and to prepare her work for tomorrow. She 
goes to Sara, the assistant-supervisor, to ask her for some work. When 
claims arrive at Alinsu, they are opened by the clerical unit and sorted 
by plans. Large plans result in homogeneous piles and small plans are 
gathered in mixed piles. Ariel pleads for an easy pile, reminding Sara 
of the difficult work she did in the beginning of the week. Sara gives 
her a pile from from the City Hall. That's an easy plan. Ariel thanks 
her: tomorrow she will be able to make production early and then to 
catch up on her junk. She returns to her desk and prepares the pile 
for the morning: only few foreseeable problems. 
Five past four: it is time to leave. Ariel has processed 41 claims, l 7 of 
which were completely routine, 20 of which she perceived as 
involving some difficulty or complication, and 4 of which were junk. 
She answered 26 phone calls, 7 of which were unpleasant. She 
initiated 9 calls, 5 of which required follow-up and 2 of which meant 
having to deal with an uncooperative interlocutor. She fills out her 
production report: "How much time can we write off for the meeting 
today?" "Forty-five minutes." She quickly clears her desk. grabs her 
purse and her coat. "Don't forget that on-hand reports are due today," 
Annette reminds her. Oh, right, she had almost forgotten. She sits 
down and starts counting the numbers of unprocessed claims she has 
in various piles on her desk and writes an entry on the form for each 
"receive dates." They need to know how old the claims are. It's 
already twenty past four when she is done. Poor Annette, she will still 
be here for a while, struggling to make production. Why doesn't she 
quit? Ariel guesses that it's hard to accept that you can't do 
something. She rushes to Harriet's desk to sign off. 
What a crowd waiting for the elevator at this late hour! Ariel starts 
talking with Lisa. Is her brother still going out with Shirley? She had 
heard they broke up. Oh, they are still together. Good for them. The 
elevator reaches the lobby and the contained crowd gushes out. Did 
she know that Norma Wong was quitting after ten years? Really? Yes, 
she had found a new job with Casus Casualties. They had asked her 
how much she was making. She lied and they offered her more. Not 
bad! In the lobby, some processors become quiet and some of them 
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talk till they reach the door. But as they spread through the parking 
lot, they fall silent on their eager ways home. 
The freeway is already a bit slow. Hanging over the hills toward the 
city, Ariel looks at the grey haze of smog: the sky looks like it has 
dragged the hem of its gown in the dust. It only seems to be getting 
worse. Pollution really worries her. What about cancer? There was that 
old lady whose husband was dying of lung cancer and who called her 
three times to ask the same question about hospital deductibles. What 
is going to happen? She would even pay a bit more for gas if she knew 
it would help. But it would probably go into someone's pocket. As she 
turns on the radio and starts tapping the beat on her steering wheel, 
she thinks of the computer system she uses, of the new one to be 
installed soon that is supposed to do so much more, of the elevator 
that talks to you: "Well, I'm sure they Will figure out something." 
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The world 
of claim processing: 
institutions 
communities 
and participation 
Like any large office, the claim processing center is a small world of 
its own, with its structure, its customs, its lore, its allegiances, its 
antagonisms, its routines, its problems, its dramas, its comedies, its 
rituals, its rhythms. It has its heroes and it has its untouchables; it has 
its glorious stories and it has its petty gossips. Obviously, the details of 
the unfolding of this small world become, for better or for worse, an 
important part of the lives of the people who spend a large part of 
their waking hours working there. 
In this chapter, I try to capture some of the dimensions that make this 
office a place where one can develop a specific understanding of the 
world. I make a distinction between the institutional setting that the 
company provides in its official function of employer and the 
communal setting that the claim processors construct for themselves 
to go about doing what they are expected to. I am especially concerned 
with issues of participation in meaning, that is, of engagement with 
the possible meanings of activities that is afforded by this articulation 
of social structures and human beings. In the course of this 
description, I introduce, informally at this point and sometimes just in 
passing, most of the analytical categories that will be discussed in the 
rest of this dissertation. 
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The claim processing office: people and 
structure 
Claim processors do not live in the limelight: their station is humble. 
Their job is not considered prestigious, neither inside the company 
nor in society at large (as seems to be the fate of many feminized jobs). 
Claim processing has a low status even though it is at the core of the 
organization of work in the office. Other functions-less prestigious 
clerical services, and more prestigious technical and managerial 
functions-are there to make processing possible, to facilitate it or to 
ensure that it is done correctly or at the required speed. The 
meagerness of the processors' salaries is commensurate with the 
reputation of their function: "I could get a job anywhere for what this 
pays," one of them was telling me. 
Claim processors 
One of the first things that strikes the visitor entering the claim 
processing office is that it is almost entirely populated by women. A 
closer look reveals a few males here and there, but most of the people 
sitting at the rows of desks are females. This disproportionate majority 
is not limited to the rank and file. Those occupying isolated desks, 
obviously in supervisory positions, are also mostly women; and the 
office manager in her corner office is a woman. Needless to say that 
the proportions change drastically as soon as one considers upper-
management beyond the local office; but the local doing, supporting, 
and supervision of claim processing is mostly a woman's job. 
There is among the employees a candid self-consciousness about this 
gender-specificity. To my surprise, it caused me on a few occasions in 
my conversations to witness spontaneous instances of the most 
common gender stereotypes endorsed by their very victims. The 
young woman who commented about pettiness in the quote above, and 
and who happened to be studying psychology at a local college after 
work, simply attributed the amount of gossip in the office to the fact 
that employees are mostly women. When she sensed my surprise, she 
quickly changed her explanation to "being close together." But 
opinions can be more enduring. One oldtimer, a woman in her fifties, 
asserted with full confidence that being among women was the chief 
reason they have so many problems in the office. It was at a lunch 
gathering of twelve people and no one offered any objection or 
corrective despite my bewilderment, which I was admittedly trying to 
keep to myself. I went on to ask why they thought mainly women take 
these jobs, and I could not get any hypotheses beyond statements that 
men just were not interested in this type of work. 
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Another striking feature of the group of claim processors is that they 
are mostly either teenagers or in their twenties. For many of them, 
this is their first or second full-time job out of high school. A few claim 
processors are middle-aged, or even elderly, but they are clearly 
exceptions. Though the supervisors are usually slightly older than the 
average claim processor, most of them are very young women. I was 
surprised to learn that the instructor of one of the classes I attended, 
who had become a claim processor after graduating from high school, 
was under twenty-one years of age at the time she was in charge of the 
class. The overall impression of the claim processing center is thus 
one of a pool of young people. There seems to be some interest in 
hiring older employees. A middle-aged woman who had recently 
joined the office told me that she was asked during her very first job 
interview whether she was interested in being a supervisor, a question 
she attributed to her age. (She was interested then, but had changed 
her mind now that she had had a chance to see what the job of a 
supervisor is like.) It will become clear that there are structural 
reasons claim processors are usually young at Alinsu, such as the 
recruiting strategy of not requiring prior experience, and the linking 
of all wage increases to performance, which provides little reward for 
seniority. Given management's complaints about high turnover, one 
wonders why the company does not do more to retain its employees. 
My incomprehension in this regard was shared by all the processors I 
talked with, and even the office manager agreed but told me that she 
had her hands tied as far as that level of policy was concerned. 
Most of the employees are white, with a few African- and Asian-
Americans. I have neither witnessed nor heard about any racial 
tensions, but processors with similar ethnic backgrounds do tend to 
congregate into distinct cliques. This is in contrast to males, who 
remain isolated and never constitute an explicit group (except for a 
small group of Asian-American males). 
There is a range of socioeconomic backgrounds with a concentration 
··on the lower middle class. Very few employees have a college 
education, but a good number of them are working there while 
attending college or some other school. The claim processing job itself 
clearly belongs to the lower middle class: low wages but a clean, 
comfortable environment; low status and production quota, but a 
white-collar occupation centered on the processing of information 
rather than manufacture; fairly limited career prospects in practice, 
but in theory at least some possibility of upward mobility based on 
individual achievements; an impersonal pool of workers, but a 
sanctioned respect for private life and individual rights; no union and 
little sense of solidarity, but a shared sense of respectability, a 
pervading canon of politeness and friendliness; no class struggle, but a 
hopeful, if unromantic and even begrudging at times, acceptation of 
the game, an overall claim of "fair treatment" shared-with numerous 
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reservations and complaints on both sides, but nevertheless shared-by 
employer and employees. 
Units 
The office is divided into "units." A unit consists of a supervisor, an 
assistant-supervisor, and a group of employees varying between 10 and 
30. These units specialize in the type of insurance they handle. The 
claim processing center handles two types of insurance. The 
traditional health plan pays benefits as "indemnity": the subscriber 
receives services from a doctor or provider of his or her choice and 
the plan reimburses medical bills at a given percentage, usually 80%. 
More recently, Alinsu has developed a new type of "managed medical" 
plan under which subscribers have to go to a restricted number of 
"preferred providers" if they want to receive the maximum benefits 
available to them (usually full coverage with only a nominal fee per 
office visit). Hoping to attract more patients, these preferred 
providers have signed contracts with Alinsu, which set their fees for 
eligible services below the usual levels. There are different training 
classes for these two types of insurance, and most claim processors 
have only learned to handle one type or the other. 
There are between 5 and 7 units doing actual claim processing. Within 
their own type of insurance, units also specialize in a number of 
"plans," that is, they handle the claims submitted by the employees of 
specific client companies. The number of plans assigned to a given 
unit can range from one, for a very large client, to over a hundred. 
With some exceptions, individual members do not specialize in the 
various plans assigned to their unit. 
In addition to these claim processing units, there are four support 
units. One unit provides clerical support, such as mail handling, 
sorting incoming claims, etc. Three provide technical support: one 
does the ongoing quality review and the other two, one for each type 
of insurance, provide assistance to claim processors with difficult 
questions and resolve special problems requiring investigation. 
Units used to be in different offices, but now, because of the open 
layout of the space, they are no longer isolated. Familiarity, ties of 
friendship and rivalries, news and gossips, conversations about work 
as well as other subjects, and a sense of common existence are not 
confined by unit boundaries. Given the specialization of each unit, 
questions and discussion about specific claim processing problems 
. usually remain within one's unit. 
As I was doing my fieldwork, the number of units doing claim 
processing was changing because Alinsu, in hope of decreasing 
turnover, had opened a new office in a small town eighty miles away, 
where the labor market was perceived as more favorable for tedious, 
low-paying jobs. Many employees were in the process of moving there. 
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In fact. the unit I joined for a while was the consolidation of three 
dwindling units; the merging created some transitional problems as 
client ftles were being transferred to the new office. These unusual 
difficulties made the unit somewhat less representative of the office as 
a whole, but at the same more typical as existing issues were 
exacerbated. After my departure, even this unit dissolved and 
processors were assigned to different units. 
Officially, the move was only to be partial: traditional indemnity claims 
were to be processed in the small town, and the new type of managed 
medical claims were to remain in the metropolitan office. As became 
clear from the conversations I heard or participated in, however. a 
good number of claim processors suspected on the basis of recent 
cases in other parts of the country--and I personally have no evidence 
one way or another--that Alinsu planned eventually to close down the 
metropolitan office completely and to move the entire operation. 
When I started my fieldwork, there were three assistant-managers 
(two women and one man). each in charge of a specific group of two or 
three units. The office was managed by a team of two women of equal 
rank within the company. During my stay in the office, one manager 
and one assistant-manager moved away to take charge of the new 
claim processing center. 
Administratively, the office is under the jurisdiction of a regional 
office, located in another distant city, which itself reports to the 
national headquarters. In addition to organizational supervision, the 
regional office provides high-level claim consulting for cases the local 
technical staff cannot handle. The regional office also handles other 
related functions such as pre-authorization and underwriting. I will not 
need to speak much about the broader organization. 
The claim processors do not have many occasions to be in contact 
with the regional office. Occasionally, they are requested to dress well 
and to keep their workspace clean because of a visit by some manager, 
whose name they may or may not have heard. They can also read about 
managerial feats, plans, transfers, and promotions in the internal 
publications they receive. Except for supervisors, whose function and 
status straddle management and unit membership, claim processors 
do not feel much connection with even the local management. 
"For one thing, I don't really know [them]. Sure I say hi to 
them, but they don't really make themselves, you know, 
known to us. Like we just know their names, we don't 
know what kind of a person they are, we don't, we don't 
know anything, they just. they're just there. We don't 
really know what they do, we don't really know anything 
about them." 
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What happens beyond the confmes of the local office, then, is 
extremely distant and vague in their minds, and mostly irrelevant to 
their sense of their existence in the office. For instance, while I was 
there, an important change in top management took place, with 
significant consequences in terms of policies and overall direction for 
the division to which the office belongs. But the only reason I knew 
about this high-level shuffle was that it was mentioned in an internal 
publication I read (and which was distributed to all employees). At that 
time, I did not understand the corporate significance of the change, 
which I understood much later while talking with an upper-
management officer. To my knowledge, the corporate shuffle never 
even once became a topic of conversation among claim processors. 
Authority and discipline: "It's like an all-
girl school" 
The atmosphere of the office is an interesting mixture of undisputed 
authority and self-conscious attempt at liberalism, of strictness and 
friendliness, of cold regulation and individualized concern. A number 
of processors have used the image of a school to describe the relations 
of authority and discipline of their workplace. One of them grew up in 
an all-girl private school: 
"It's like an all-girl school, with all the little rules, etc. Six 
months ago you could have anything you wanted on your 
desk. You should have seen some of those desks with 
stuffed animals all over. Then management came and said 
they could not have these stuffed animals. They thought it 
looked unprofessional. . .. Uke you can't come in with 
shorts. They take disciplinary actions for this or that." 
The image is indeed quite appropriate to capture both the structure of 
authority and the response to it, not only for the training classes, but 
"on the floor" as well. During her lunch break, a claim processor went 
to see a friend of hers who was working in the clerical support unit. 
They talked for about twenty minutes while her friend kept on 
working. 
"[Her supervisor) timed us and came down to tell [my 
supervisor). [My supervisor) didn't care, so I didn't get into 
trouble. But she had timed us. That kind of thing goes on 
here all the time." 
, There is something definitely infantilizing to the overall structure of 
authority and discipline. During a unit meeting, a senior technical 
person in her ftftles was' ex.plaining a technical issue. She called the 
processors' attention by starting with: "Girls, ... and boys, huh ... , guys, 
34 
kids, ... ". This theme of infantilization will be reinforced in the coming 
sections when I describe the incentives used to motivate the 
processors and the perception of their skills. 
Although it is possible to make too much of the school image, the roles 
and forms of authority of managers, assistant-managers and unit 
supervisors are in many ways akin to those of principals, headmasters, 
and class teachers. There is a collegial atmosphere of knowing 
adulthood among the people who hold these functions. I heard stories 
of processors being summoned to the manager's office for 
misbehaving, for instance, for harassing a colleague who they thought 
had been unjustly favored. Units have some freedom to organize their 
own work: who handles which claims, who answers the phone when, 
· etc. They have their own ways of doing things, their own styles, but 
according to processors, this depends mainly on the supervisor. 
Though units hold meetings in which they discuss their problems, 
decisions are not taken communally. In spite of the mostly friendly 
relation maintained within their units, supervisors set the atmosphere 
and clearly represent the company's authority. Yet, and like many a 
high school teacher, the supervisor is not really perceived as owning 
her authority: 
"She is just a glorified processor; she does not have any 
power, can't hire and fire or take any serious decision 
without the consent of the home office." 
But the supervisor is a figure of authority nevertheless: 
"And then you can see who is like, friends with their 
supervisor too .... And you don't want to get too involved 
with those people because they are going to talk on you." 
Most claim processors were somewhat ambivalent when I asked them 
whether they considered their supervisors to be their friends. One 
claim processor, who had been in the office for only two years, but 
could be called ambitious and defmitely had a career-oriented view of 
her own position, was explaining to me that friendliness can only 
come once respect has been established. She thought that it was 
dangerous to mix up friendship and business. The mother of one of 
her close friends, for instance, occupied a managerial position at 
Alinsu. but she was emphatic that she never talked about business with 
her. She thought it improper for a supervisor to go to lunch with her 
subordinates below her assistant, mainly because of the need to appear 
impartial. She claimed that, even though there was no official policy 
about lunch arrangements, there was a tacit understanding that 
supervisors don't go to lunch with their subordinates, and indeed I 
have never seen it happen, except on officially organized events. 
Above all, the school image captures the discreet but pervasive need to 
inculcate discipline. This is done by a confluence of explicit rules of 
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conduct with a diffuse appeal to a tacit morality, which is clearly 
thought to originate beyond the walls of the office but of which 
management is the guardian. For instance, an oldtimer told me that 
management had asked her to .. be good, because others look up to 
[her] ... There is a maternal care at the same time as there is an 
intransigent insistence that one has to submit to the duress of the 
claim processing destiny. I remember on a few occasions classes I 
attended and diatribes I heard bringing to my mind images of certain 
women's communities in which the obliteration of the clitoris is a 
ceremony imposed on newcomers by the very persons who had to 
endure it. These were fleeting images, overly dramatic and not to be 
taken literally, of course. But there exists a form of maternalism which 
at once reproduces conditions of oppression and creates ties of 
solidarity across hierarchical and generational boundaries through a 
sense of shared destiny and moral continuity. 
Some processors, mainly those with substantial work experience, 
resent the infantilizing character of the way they are treated. For 
instance, one of them had to make up time on rare days when she was 
late in spite of the fact that she often comes in early. She insists on 
the stiffness of the rules, which she thinks is in part cause for what 
she sees as the irresponsible attitude around the office. 
'Tm sorry. I am a responsible adult. I feel like a 
kindergartner when they do that. And I don't like that. 
That irritates me. Especially in view of the fact that I do 
come in early. I never take my afternoon break. And there 
is no give-and-take still. .. 
But for the most part, processors, many of whom are just out of school, 
accept this treatment as a natural and necessary part of their work 
lives. Most of them even accept the need for external structures of 
discipline as a protection against their own weaknesses. They claim 
that they need this type of "support" in order to do what they have to. 
When some of them were telling me the story of a processor who got 
fired right there and then because she had complained about Alinsu as 
an employer on a radio show the weekend before, they endorsed the 
company's action. When I asked them whether they would like to 
work at home with an electronic connection to the office, many of 
them commented that they would never be able to muster the 
discipline necessary to meet production quotas. I also remember 
trainees saying that they had requested to be placed in positions 
where they would have to concentrate. 
Melissa: "I asked for a specific desk. Because I want to 
have my own desk, my own section by 
myself. Cause when I'm with people, then I 
start talking and I don't do my work. And 
when I just, like, focus on my work and do 
my work, then I'm fine." 
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Judy: "Right. That's why I picked a place right by the 
supervisor too, so. huh, I wouldn't talk. I'm 
right next door, this should be ..... 
Processing claims: procedures and 
processes 
At Alinsu, claim processing is considered a routine job by upper 
management. When I was requesting permission to do my study, some 
managers at the corporate office had deemed it necessary to warn me 
about the factory-like nature of the claim processing centers. They 
described claim processing as an assembly line and came close to 
calling it mindless. Yet when I tried to process claims myself, I found 
the job to be far from routinized (something that is probably also true 
of most assembly-line jobs in their actual practice as opposed to their 
descriptions; and I will argue in a little while that even whatever 
mindlessness the job may be said to have is very mindfully made part 
of survival strategies). The processors show some awareness that the 
sophistication of their job is not fully recognized. 
!here is a lot involved, a lot involved, right? And I think 
they think it is just like that, like a little candy line where 
you pinch the candy as it goes by to keep the shape, and 
that's all you do." 
In fact, the job is quite complicated: it requires a high level of 
concentration, accuracy, and organization: and achieving proficiency 
takes time and assiduity. Claim processing in practice continually 
involves making decisions and resolving problems as a large portion of 
the claims present one irregularity or another, ranging from an 
unusual name given for a procedure, to a seemingly excessive charge 
for a personal item such as paper napkins during an hospital stay, to a 
disputed resolution about a complicated bill for multiple surgeries 
requiring a preliminary second opinion by another surgeon. The job is 
also continually changing as procedures and policies keep being 
modified, and medical practice keeps evolving. Dealing with 
customers on the phone calls for both tactful grace and solid nerves. 
And combined with these demands, production and quality 
requirements can make life seriously stressful and necessitate the use 
of strategies and shortcuts to meet quotas. 
Proceduralization and localization 
While I found claim processing to be a complex activity, I also found 
that its organization makes it very localized. Procedures and rules are 
effective within the process itself, and claim processors can do a 
reasonable job with a minimal understanding of the worlds in which 
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their work functions. Claim processing as it is understood in the office 
does not require, for instance, a knowledge of the underwriting 
principles that ensure that contracts being implemented are 
profitable. Nor does it require any deep understanding of the medical 
practices that the claims are about since claim processing rarely 
involves direct judgments about medical practice. 
During the classes I attended, we very rarely talked about these 
related practices; the focus was almost exclusively on applying the 
procedures of claim processing. We went through examples of claims; 
we were told how to interpret the information on claims of the type 
under study; we were given a few definitions of terms; we were shown 
the different cases that can present themselves; and we were 
instructed about encoding schemes. Early on, this had the advantage 
that trainees could be involved in actual processing after only a few 
days, but as the classes went on and after the classes were over, this 
exclusive focus on procedures made for a narrow horizon. 
Being proficient at claim processing consists in being able quickly to 
determine the benefits that should be paid according to the plan as it 
was on the date on which medical services were rendered. The goal is 
to apply the rules and the procedures in order to pay any benefits due 
in accordance with the contract with the minimum of complication. In 
this respect, health claim processing differs from casualty claim 
adjusting (such as auto and homeowner insurance) where claims must 
be scrutinized very carefully and are often contested. Health claim 
processors usually do not judge the reasonableness of medical practice 
and very rarely question or contest a doctor's decision.2 When a claim 
seems to present a problem, the claim is referred to the technical unit 
where a technician takes the case over. Production quota prevent 
processors from being substantially involved in the resolution of these 
difficult cases and to understand in some detail how these more 
difficult decisions are taken. Usually. the technician merely returns 
instructions about appropriate actions to the processor who completes 
the administrative part of the processing. 
"But for us, that's sufficient, because they read the 
operative report, and they can tell, by reading that, that it 
was necessary ... We can read the operative report, but it 
does not mean anything to us because we don't have two 
thousands in back to reference." 
2 When I asked a claim technician why doctors' decisions, such as the need for repeated 
office visits, were never questioned, she told me: "Question the medical profession? You 
must be kidding!" This is the way the situation is perceived on the processing floor, in 
spite of the fact that Alinsu seems to have a reputation for being very stringent and 
competent in its attitude toward the medical establishment (from private 
conversations with a management consultant who has done work for the insurance 
industry). 
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Some processors complain about this narrow focus, claiming that it 
prevents them from doing as good a job as they could if they had a 
better understanding of the context of their work. 
"Also, if they can't follow up, they're gonna make mistakes. 
If they are just a little cog, you make mistakes. Because 
you're doing what you do, this is what I do, but you don't 
know where it's going from there, what's gonna happen to 
it. And eventually, if people don't have that feedback, 
they're not gonna do it. You know, when it comes up, and 
they get this, they're gonna say 'Oh, I don't know what to 
do with this.' Toss it." 
But for the most part, claim processors go along with the institutional 
conditions under which they are instructed to work. They accept the 
primacy of production and the claim that production requires a 
narrow focus. One processor reacted with the following explanation to 
my impression about visitors being from another world (see preceding 
chapter): 
"If you turned around and asked every time. somebody was, 
you know, behind you or something, you would not get 
your production done. If they'd stop, and then I can ... , they 
want us to produce, that's that, we're here to produce. If 
they stopped every time a visitor came by and introduced 
us or something, you know, then, it's five minutes here 
and five minutes there. You think, 'oh it does not add up' 
but it does, you know, on production. I mean, they are not 
going to let you take the time off, which is, I mean, but it 
all adds up, you know, if you stopped every time someone 
came in." 
There is therefore on the part of management a confusion between a 
structurally localized function and a routine one (a confusion the 
processors sometimes share in their own self-image). This confusion 
is in itself interesting because it reveals both the distance that 
separates the two worlds and a sort of mind/body view of the 
corporation, which makes it difficult to attribute intelligence to the 
fingers. 
Fonnats to process claims 
Currently different computer systems are used to process claims 
under the two types of insurance: indemnity and managed medical, but 
Alinsys-2, the new system that Alinsu has just designed will eventually 
handle both types of insurance. Claim processing is not mechanized at 
this stage, even though Alinsu has plans increasingly to automate the 
process. The current computer system is not very sophisticated and 
only very moderately complex to use. It is basically a form-filling 
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system with some content checking in the form of caution messages 
and calculation capabilities; the form-filling system is supplemented 
with a database that provides on-line access to a series of files 
containing information about insured individuals, claim histories, 
providers of medical services, procedure codes, etc. This system 
implements an idealized, linear view of the job, moving processors 
from screen to screen, prompting for information, until benefits are 
calculated. 
Knowing how to use the computer system is an important part of 
knowing how to process claims. The fact, for instance, that there are 
two different systems for the two types of insurance has resulted in 
two different training classes, even though there is much overlap 
between the two insurance types, both in the concepts that must be 
mastered and in the processes that must be learned. Indeed, the 
systems have even become normative frames for thinking and talking 
about the job. Processors often describe their work in terms of the 
functions of the system they use. They say: "Now you can PRCL," 
instead of "Now you can process the claim, or "I will need to learn 
PROSYS," instead of "I will need to learn managed medical," or "PF4 
did not give you anything?" instead of "The claim history did not 
contain the information?" 
Along with the computer system, a number of documents support 
claim processing, including calculation sheets that facilitate specific 
operations and memos that inform processors of changes in policies 
and procedures. There are also thick training manuals, but the 
instructor of the first class I took reassured the trainees who seemed 
worried when they saw the size of these manuals: 
"Don't worry, we are not going to use them much in 
practice. We don't usually use them, but Corporate wants 
all claim processors to have these training manuals." 
In contrast, when she distributed a small binder containing memos 
about specific procedures and encoding schemes, she said: 
"This is going to be your bible." 
The memo shown in Figure 3.1, illustrates both the complexity of the 
procedures to be followed to determine the eligibility and benefits of 
certain claims and the way this complexity is handle by decomposition 
into local steps.3 (Note that this memo was distributed throughout the 
office only one month before it was used in the class.) 
3 In this figure, as fn most of the figures fn this thesis, some details had to be blacked 
out to preserve anonymity. 
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MltHOAANDUH l"OR1 
Jun• 12, 1999 
SUBJECT: MRI'; - Initial Ditermination 
P'ROH1 - (Claim Approver) 
When evaluating MRI claims you will need to obtain all or part of the 
following information1 
1. Determine if the the Manufacturer of the MRI equlpnwnt l• 
eligible. (see attachment A) 
2. Datarmina if th•r• i• an ell9ible diagno•i• that would warrant 
the MRI (eee attachment B). 
3. Determine if the charge i• for a global fae, profe••ional 
component, or technical ca..ponent. 
4. Determine the nu~er of sequences taken. 
5. Deteriaine unit value (•e• attachment C) 
6. ~ina correct conversion ~Schedule SWllftlary -
~onveraion Factors in the ~pecifice manual). 
1. Determine the allowable char~e. 
a. NON PARTICIPATINO PROVIDBRS: refer to attachment D, 
b. PARTICIPATING PROVIDERS1 unit value x correct conversion factor. 
If the 111anutactur•r of the MRI equipment i• not ell.9ible, or if body part 
undergoing the MRI exam la either ineligible or conditionally eligible, the 
claim mu•t be referred to the technical •ervice unit. 
However, if the manufacturer of the MnI equipment i& eligible, and tha MRI 
exa"' 1"' of an eligible body part, the claim can be paid. The allowable 
charge will be input man~ally through the override function. 
Figure 3.1. The cover sheet of a memo used in a training class. 
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Claim processors do not work directly with the .. contracts, .. the legal 
documents that spell out the liabilities of Alinsu in its relations with 
client companies. They work with summaries of covered benefits 
prepared locally by a claim technician who specializes in producing 
these plan descriptions for use by the processors handling individual 
plans. An extract from one of these plan descriptions, which are 
known as .. MAT," is shown in Figure 3.2. 
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Corp. 'poz.rcra .. 
.. 
MAT RBVISID: 11-17-89 
COia Modified 
B-day Rule 1-1-89 
CHJ:CX HJU~ 
•LIQIBILITYI on Lin• 
TIRMIHATION1 Ind of the Month 
PRZ-IXIST1 Y••- Standard 90 Daya 
CLAIM orrxcsa -
CASI: TYH 1--
PLAll TYH1 .SI*!• Bade 
CONTU~­
D•MTAL ...... 'f::" 
(7) s/D 
••-~ff, 2-15-86 - All bra. ••c•~ SO•• 
-
HONLY 
•• add to eff, 6-1-88 •• 
\ 
.. 
• SAia $300.00 I 30 Day• 
MAJOR MBDICAL 
$150.00 ded I $450.00 r .. ily I 80' (15' if ppo) to f4250.00 or $3750.00 if 
1 hoap. ded. ha• been taken or $3250.00 if 2 hoap. d•d. (Actually Sl000.00 
OUt-Of-Pock•t lnclucll119 IUI & any Hoapltal deductlbl•C•I I DOe• llOT include 
outpatient paycb I ti.l I 100' for r ... indar cal yr./ 3 Month Ded. carry 
over I NO MM carry over I $1,000,000.00 MM Naxi11111• I ***** Th• $4.00 
co-pa~-t $2.00 for 99nario dr119•t for pra•erl~iona purchaaed 
through Bealthc:ara•a -u .. rTica prHcri .Lon r09i:• i• not 
ali9ibl - • 91bl• dru9a lfOT purchaaed throu9hlliliiilf Haalthcar• r .... in 
payable under th• plan 
(7) l/D Ho•pital1 SSPR r. Miee I 100\ I Unlimited Daya I $100.00 par 
confln ... nt deductible••Deductible doea ll0'1' apply to 
~oapitals eff, 12-15-86 •••NOTI an additional 
illl"!l"'not required if re-admitted within 30 day• I 
~ 20\ non-c011lianca reduction (lff. 7-15-85) I 
'T::'f:c1ea Pre-Admit Teatin9 within 7 daya, facility 
t-• tor outpatient •ur9ery at the boapital, or an 
aliglble aurglcal canter, ~lance f .. • .for local 
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(OVU) 
Processors are aware that they are working with a simplified version of 
the real binding document, and the legal contracts as well as the 
explanation booklets published for insured employees are available for 
them to consult. Processors express some ambivalence about working 
with a simplified document, which is symbolic of the ambivalence they 
feel about the position and organization of their function in relation 
with its content. On the one hand, they like the freedom that 
simplification seems to afford them, but on the other hand, they feel 
somewhat deprived. 
Maureen: "[We] don't really go into the contracts. I have a 
friend who works for [another insurance 
company], and when you work there, OK, 
let's say you handle X company and B 
company, you have their contract right 
there at your desk. These are the only 
contracts you handle, those two, and you 
have the contracts there, so somebody calls 
up and you have a dispute, you can look at 
the contract and just say 'well, your 
contract says this.' Well, all we have is a 
plan description, you know, it's not ... , so you 
are not really dealing with the real 
intricacies of this, you know what I mean. 
Where we just have the plan, well, they have 
the contract and it spells everything out. So 
we have a real problem with that." 
Etienne: "Are the contracts difficult to understand. Are 
they written in legalistic language that ... " 
Maureen: "I don't understand'm, you know what I mean. I 
don't have to deal with them that often, so 
to go look at them, it's all like, you know, 
the Arks, it's all like Greek, you know. Why 
don't they just say we'll pay this, we'll pay 
that, you know. It's all the legal stuff, you 
know, herewithto, and towithhere, and ... 
you know, instead of just saying pay this, you 
know. But I mean, I think that gives you a 
better understanding of the plan, and you 
know all the ins and outs, where it's ... we 
just have like a simplified form, you know, 
and it does not put all the information you 
really need to know on there. So if you got a 
call in, well, you'd have to go check the 
plan, the plan description to see what 
there ... , where it's really saying." 
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Professional discourse 
The localizing effects of the formats that organize claim processing are 
felt most clearly in the professional discourse that is sustained in the 
office. With regard to claim processing, it concerns almost exclusively 
the local definitions of terms, the procedures. and the encoding 
process. There is essentially no public discourse about the nature of 
the job and its place in the context of both _the business of the 
company and the debate about healthcare. On occasions, a person will 
come to a meeting to speak about a more global business issue. For 
instance, an assistant-manager came to _one meeting I was attending to 
give a report about her trip to a large client's annual benefit open 
enrollment session. She described the competition the Alinsu plan 
was receiving from a local HMO and her estimate that Alinsu would 
probably lose about 10 percent of the employees. She mentioned that 
the main reasons these employees changed their benefit plans was 
that Alinsu does not have preventive coverage. Nobody in the meeting 
asked the question why Alinsu's indemnity plans mostly do not cover 
preventive care, what kind of calculation or philosophy give rise to this 
attitude, and how much business the company will have to lose before 
it changes direction. 
The assistant-manager reported that the chief complaints she had 
received from enrolled employees were about phone calls that did not 
go well. Everyone is aware of that problem. 
"Oh people are so, oh, it's so bad now the phones. I'm 
embarrassed the way some people answer the phone 
[laughs]. I'm embarrassed the way they tell the poor 
insured. It's terrible, it's terrible. Phones are really bad. 
Alinsu does not realize that. but they are creating a lot of 
animosity with these insureds by the way the phones are 
being answered. It, it makes them mad." 
Answering the phone is a substantial part of the responsibilities of 
claim processors, not only in terms of the time they spend, which on 
bad days can approach 50 percent, but more importantly in terms of 
the energy they invest. When I asked some of them if they would like 
to work at home, their first reaction was positive on the assumption 
that there would be no phones. They feel that they are the target of 
expressions of a dissatisfaction whose causes are beyond their purview 
and that they do not have the information or the time to convey a clear 
understanding to dissatisfied callers. 
"After four months, they put you on the phone. I was scared 
to death." 
I will illustrate in the next chapter how the localized nature of the 
professional discourse can become an important factor in making 
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phone answering unsuccessful and frustrating. The company started a 
campaign to promote the theme of .. costumer service." They 
organized some phone awareness training sessions in which they 
showed and discussed video clips of people who are treated rudely by 
service providers, at the bank, at the store, at the gas station, and who 
decide not to come back. These sessions did not have very much effect 
on the processors I asked. In the Appendix, I will argue that 
broadening the professional discourse would have more substantial 
long-term effects. 
Control and incentives: production and 
quality 
Claim processors are obviously there to earn a living. They all complain 
about their wages, but even though they know that there are 
companies that pay better than Alinsu for similar positions, it is not 
the case that most of them are actively looking for another job (though 
a good number are). In general, they do not talk much about more 
global structural disparities in income. Of course, when they see what 
doctors charge, they do note the income difference, but they express 
this with a kind of unassertive bitterness. 
"God, whatever happened to the Hippocratic oath? 
Whatever happened to serving mankind? Granted they 
should make their profit. They went to school for 12 years, 
they have to pay back their school loans. But do they have 
to pay it back the first month?" 
Altogether. there is very little public political concern among them 
and they do not see a need for unions or collective bargaining. When 
they complain, it is mostly from the local point of view of their own 
achievement within the reward system of their office. 
That money is the main connection giving meaning to their presence 
and involvement is acknowledged by everyone, employees and 
management. Practically, this is instituted in a number of incentive 
schemes. Not all incentives are financial, of course. As in most 
workplaces, there are incentives that provide personal recognition 
rather than financial rewards. There are common forms of 
recognition, including the "employee of the month" certificate, which 
comes with a small gift such as a pen with one's name inscribed on it; 
a bulletin board displaying cardboard stars with at their center the 
pictures of employees who worked a whole year with "perfect 
attendance" (attendance is actually considered very important by 
management and close monitoring of attendance especially in the first 
few months is the reason many new employees are fired); frames 
displaying letters of thanks sent to employees by satisfied customers; 
and various internal company publications featuring articles about 
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employees' feats and listing promotions. The most prestigious 
personal recognition is the "400 club, .. which one joins by processing 
400 or more claims in one week. My short experience as a claim 
processor suggests to me that this is quite a feat indeed. The 
knowledge and ability of some people was in fact described to me in 
terms of the number of times they "made the 400 Club." One 
employee in particular is famous all over the office for making the 400 
Club quite regularly. The names of the members of the 400 Club are 
inscribed on a brass plate with one star for each week they reached 
the 400 threshold. These personal incentives, however, are not taken 
very seriously, unless they are backed by a financial reward or the 
prospect of one. This has led to an elaborate system of reward 
structures, which instills the financial incentives into the daily rhythm 
of work in a very pervasive way, even though it is only partially related 
to the processors' own sense of a good job. 
Measurements: production and quality 
When claim processors talk about work, the topic that comes up again 
and again, almost obsessively, is that of "production and quality ... 
These are the two ratings by which their work is evaluated. according 
to which promotions, or .. levels," are awarded, and which, if they fall 
consistently below expectations, will cause them to be put "on 
warning" and eventually to be fired. 
The rate of production is officially defined as a number of claims per 
hour and computed by the company as an average on a weekly basis. 
But in the experience of processors, production is primarily a daily 
goal. Daily production quotas range from under 30 claims a day for 
trainees to over 60 for experienced processors. At each level, 
processors can be put on either of two quotas depending on whether 
the .. caseload" is considered "normal" or "difficult" with an average 
difference between the two of about five claims daily. Processors 
monitor their daily production with the use of "circle sheets." These 
are lists of numbers printed on a sheet of paper on which they circle 
the "batch numbers" corresponding to the claims they process. Work 
is interrupted with quick calculations such as divisions of the number 
of claims processed-so far by the number of hours worked. 
Expressions such as .. I'm making production," or "I didn't make 
production," or "I need ten more claims to make production," or "Did 
you make production?" punctuate the activity of the office as well as 
the breaks like an ongoing litany: they are met with wholehearted 
sympathy, an immediate recognition of an undisputably shared 
concern. 
Quality is the ratio, expressed as a percentage, of the number of claims 
in error over the number of "Q's" as the claims checked by quality 
reviewers are called. After the training period, the quality requirement 
is 95%. Q's are not generated as a fixed random sample. Instead, they 
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are selected on the basis of various criteria, which can vary from week 
to week and which include the type of claim, the amount, the 
information entered, or the plan under which a claim is paid. claim 
processors seem to be able to predict whether a claim is going to be a 
Q to some degree, but not very accurately Some errors can be disputed 
and result in a no-error void (which does not count against quality but 
still has to be reprocessed without counting toward production anew). 
Since not all errors result in a void, the quality measure focuses the 
processors' attention to specific areas. 
The computer system produces weekly individual computer printouts 
that are distributed to each processor. These reports detail one's 
average production and quality for the last week, four weeks, and 
thirteen weeks. Maintaining high quality and a production sufficient 
either to keep their job or to get promoted is the cause of much stress 
for most processors, especially newcomers. 
!hey have to have a way to do quality here, because we are 
working with people's money. And of course, they want 
high production. But it's very hard to get both, and keep 
the employees." 
The stress caused by the pressure to produce is given as a main cause 
for the turnover, which is extremely high. For instance, six months 
after the end of the second training class I attended, only two of the 
eleven trainees remained. All others had either quit or been fired. 
While the office manager told me that this case was somewhat unusual, 
she admitted that turnover was a serious problem. When I expressed 
my surprise at this state of affair for which there seemed to be simple 
solutions, she said that she had her .. hands tied" as far as 
measurements, requirements, and salary scales were concerned. 
Promotions: levels 
One's position in the company, and therefore one's salary, is 
determined by one's .. level." Levels are known as numbers among 
claim processors, who commonly use statements such as .. I am a level 
6" to identify themselves. Each level also corresponds to a different 
position title, but these titles are only used on certain official 
documents and to sign letters sent to customers. Outside of claim 
processing, functions are described by titles. such as .. clerical," .. claim 
consultant." or .. assistant-manager." even though each of these also 
has a level associated with it. 
Moving up one level is considered a very important goal. To qualify for 
the next level, a candidate must perform at the production and quality 
requirements of that next level for 13 consecutive weeks. Claim 
processors start at level 4, which is considered a training level. 
Trainees can only remain at that level for a year. Past that time. they 
will be put on warning, and eventually fired if they don't qualify for 
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promotion to level 5. Once they are .. level S's," they are not required 
to move to higher levels in order to keep their job. The highest level 
that one can reach as a claim processor is level 8. Up to that level, 
promotions are awarded through the computation of production and 
quality, and there is no direct competition for positions. Positions of 
level 9 and above are no longer considered .. claim processing.. and are 
made by selective appointments when there are openings. 
Moving from one level to the next entails an increase in salary ranging 
between 18 and 25 dollars a week. In addition to the monetary 
reward, levels are important in determining who gets chosen for open 
positions and who will perform certain special tasks, such as 
answering questions, teaching a training class, or taking care of 
special claims. Any task that frees one from direct production 
requirement is usually considered desirable. Obviously, there is some 
status associated with higher levels, though this is not 
overemphasized. Processors usually know the levels of the people they 
interact with, such as the members of their own units. When someone 
moves from one level to another, the person who makes the 
announcement, usually the assistant-manager, gathers the unit around 
the supervisor's desk, and everyone cheers and applauds. 
Other financial incentives: raises, bonuses, and special deals 
Independently of their levels, processors can get yearly raises. These 
raises are awarded individually on the basis of employee reviews. While 
reviews are perceived as important, they do not have the pervasive, 
rhythmic, pressuring characteristic of the production/ quality /level 
system. Reviews take place every six months for the first two years, 
and annually after that. They consist of a questionnaire, the 
"performance appraisal guide," filled out by the employee and of an 
interview with the unit supervisor or the assistant-manager. The 
interview covers a review of production/ quality as well as attitude 
during the period, a discussion of areas in need of special attention, 
and the setting of goals for the future. Reviews result in one of three 
levels of pay raises: low, average, or high. Some processors argue that 
these reviews are an unfair substitute for regular cost-of-living 
adjustments since they always tie pay raises to performance and one 
even suspects that this is "a way of cutting cost: if they give you bad 
reviews, they can give you small raises." This issue has given rise to 
some resentment among oldtimers. Indeed the pay raises of 
continuing employees are always based on their original starting 
salaries, but Alinsu has had to adjust starting wages to the cost of living 
in order to keep attracting new recruits. Oldtimers therefore often 
find their wages insufficiently different from those of newcomers. 
Processors can earn quarterly bonuses if they consistently exceed 
their quotas. The computation currently underlying the award of 
bonuses (they used to be straight $1,000 bonuses, an oldtlmer 
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complained, but now their amount is tied to the actual extent of 
overproduction) is much less clear in the minds of the processors 
than the computation resulting in moves across levels. Since many 
processors already perceive the production/ quality /level system as 
taxing, the bonuses are not foremost on their minds, but for a few of 
them, mainly oldtimers, they are a way to gain some extra income on a 
fairly regular basis. Bonuses are announced in the same way as level 
promotions, with the assistant-manager calling the attention of the 
whole unit: .. Please join me in congratulating Bonnie Darwin who just 
got a bonus of $350. Congratulations. You are moving right along. We 
are real proud of you." Everyone applauds. Someone shouts: .. Lunch! 
Lunch!" 
Claim processors can work overtime on weekends when the "on-
hand" (backlog of claims to be processed) is high, and many of them 
do. Whenever the load is so high that some overtime work is needed, 
special events are organized to offer special deals to those who 
participate. For instance, on one occasion, the deal had been that in 
the unit from which the most people would show up on a Saturday of 
overtime, these people would earn half a day off to be taken when they 
chose. (As it turned out, there had been some miscommunication and 
the processors had understood that the whole unit would get the half-
day offl Only those who came did.) 
A few times during the year, the load gets so high that management 
has to organize a .. push weeks." During such a week, everyone 
processes claims, sometimes even supervisors, and special incentives 
are put into place. I witnessed one of these push weeks, when the 
backlog went up to 11,000 claimsjust for our unit. There were two 
incentives for that week: first everyone was invited to work overtime, 
each day and over the weekend: second, claims over 20 percent over 
production would count twice (but in order to keep quality high, each 
void would count as three). I had expected to find the office very tense 
that week, but most processors in our unit had given up on the bonus 
and were just working for the overtime. Figure 3.3 shows the sheet 
that was distributed to claim processors to calculate their 
performance during push week. 
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Doing well: satisfying measured. requirements 
The system of automatic promotions based on unambiguously explicit 
measures of individual achievement ranks high on the reasons 
processors give for taking the job initially. In spite of the unattractive 
starting salary, they like the fact that there is a well-defined path to 
advancement and that they can feel. they have control over it since 
advancement is perceived as depending only on one's effort. One 
newcomer processor had held a previous position as a salesperson in a 
department store where she felt that her efforts there were not being 
recognized. By contrast, she liked the fact that at her job at Alinsu 
there is a constant feedback on how well she was doing: 
"They give you incentive to keep going. If you do good they 
tell you. That keeps you working harder, and to know that 
you have a goal." 
But more experienced processors do not share her enthusiasm as they 
start to see mismatches between the measures used for evaluation and 
actual work. 
.. A lot of things are done through a little incentive here and 
there .... Production is the all important thing. Actually, 
those things, Alinsu makes it that way, because your quality 
and production is where you get your levels." 
They complain that the official production/ quality measures only very 
partially reflect their involvement with the job and the quality of their 
work as a service to the customers. 
One important event that took place toward the end of my fieldwork 
was the announcement that quality review managers were in the 
process of redesigning the quality measure, about which there had 
been too many complaints. For one thing, and most importantly for 
claim processors, the measure was unpopular because it was 
considered unfair. Since the Q's were not a constant random sample, 
but a selection of specific claims, the number of Q's one received 
during a given week was very variable depending on the types of 
claims one had to process. One single void could therefore turn out to 
be excessively significant on a week during which one had got only 
very few Q's. 
From the standpoint of management, there were many areas in the 
processing of claims that the quality measure did not cover. For 
instance, information about diagnostics had become more critical as 
the client companies had placed more importance on the collection of 
statistical information. Generally, claim processors were glad that 
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some effort was made to improve the quality measure, which they all 
agree was badly designed; but they were not overjoyed. Their sense of 
their own station is a mixture of resignation and suspicion, which 
prevents them from being very assertive or very hopeful. In fact, many 
of them were openly skeptical about the possibility that the new 
measures would change their lives substantially. 4 
Mismatches between measures and work create serious conflicts, 
which are in fact one of the main reasons the job is considered 
stressful. For example, processors constantly have to curtail their 
commitments to customers who call on the phone because phone 
answering is not an explicit part of their production or quality 
measures. They are torn between their own sense of what would satisfy 
a customer and the requirement to fulfill their quotas. (Management 
recognizes this issue. When following the merger of three units, the 
number of phone calls became unmanageable in my unit, processors 
were allowed to write off 5 minutes per additional phone call beyond 
75 calls per week. Note how the resolution is always in quantitative 
terms, however.) 
These local conflicts are reflections of more global conflicts, having to 
do with market competition, with the needs of client employers, and 
with perception of customer expectations. But there is no recognition 
that these are global conflicting demands. and claim processors are 
not invited to participate in the resolutions of these more global 
conflicts: they just inherit these contradictions in disguised forms and 
become their unwitting battleground. Thus there, to say the least, 
some irony in this distorted reproduction of global contradictions 
through local evaluation structures since the perceived purpose of 
these evaluation structures is precisely to shield the local work from a 
need to be involved in the actual resolution of global conflicting 
requirements. 
Identities of non-participation: normative 
structures 
I have described three dimensions of the institutional setting that 
structures the world of claim processors. I have talked about 
structures of behavior with their explicit and implicit rules of conduct; 
I have talked about structures of processes, with their rules of 
procedures; and I have talked about structures of evaluation, with their 
rules of control. 
4 When I was there, the new measure was only being tried as a pilot test 1n one unit. I 
have not yet gone back to ask the processors what difference if any it has made for 
them. 
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Normative structures 
Even though these dimensions concern very different issues, there is 
something common about all three. In each case, the connection that 
claim processors have with their participation in the social world is 
mediated by external normative structures, in the construction of 
which they play very little part, and over which they have no sense of 
ownership. The fact that advancement is calculated on the basis of 
their individual achievement makes them feel that they have control 
over their. participation in the fruit of their labor, yet this control is 
only localized to the ways of belonging defmed by these overarching 
normative structures. 
These structures are everywhere. Think of national standardized tests 
or of the lists of criteria of consumer reports: they become 
definitional. The prevalence of these normative structures in modern 
capitalism has been the subject of numerous studies. Weber claims that 
they constitute a form of rationalization which is at the core of the 
bureaucratic institutions he sees as characteristic of modern social 
systems(Weber, 1922, cited in Giddens, 1971). In a different vein, but 
along similar lines, Foucault (1975) shows how since the era of 
Enlightenment, structures of power have metamorphosed. Analyzing 
correctional institutions, he contrasts the confrontation between the 
"body" of the monarch and the body of the accused with the more 
recent depersonalized application of legalistic measures. The solemn 
need to punish then gives way to a more pervasive yet less conspicuous 
need to reform: brutal conquest is replaced by morally enforced 
enlistment. At the heart of this transfiguration of power relations is 
the creation of overarching normative structures that mediate and 
define these relations. 
Lukacs (1922) and Latour (1986) insist on the computational purposes 
behind these reifled structures as they enable rationality to become a 
calculus based on "supertmposable" representations. Latour describes 
the development of capitalism as the development of centers of 
calculation where these representations are manipulated, affording 
power over the limitations of time and space. Latour also insists on the 
ability of these "immutable mobiles" to travel across contexts while 
retaining something of a constant meaning. But this mobility requires 
the erasure of the practice out of which the representation has arisen 
(Star, 1983). Therefore it is in the nature of such reifled structures to 
distort what they are about in order to make it transportable to 
another world in which it can become part of the calculus of a alien 
rationality. These are contradictions inherent in reified control 
mechanisms. 
These normative structures interlock across hierarchical 
organizational levels. To borrow La.tour's elegant phrase, they form 
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"cascades of structures." In corporations, all the way upstream to 
bottomline considerations, managers receive their own directives with 
attendant measurements of a similar nature, and these are reflected in 
the way they design the context in which their subordinates 
understand their functions and their performance. Similar processes 
are in place in public education where control structures for teachers, 
for schools, and for districts are, in a succession of interlocked loops, 
based on overarching normative structures for determining curricula 
and controling student performance (see McNeil, 1986). 
Identities of non-participation. 
The organization of the setting in terms of these overarching 
normative structures gives a sense of a disconnected community, 
which does not participate in serious ways in the meanings of what its 
occupation is about beyond its local set of activities. For the claim 
processors, these normative structures have a double effect. On the 
one hand, they impose an external defmition of correct behavior, of 
the content of activities, and of the quality of work that supersedes. or 
even displaces altogether, the processors' own sense of these issues. 
On the other hand, they are quite opaque since they gain their 
effectiveness from localizing the need for action. Their opaque 
character then limits the processors' access to resources for an 
understanding of situations that would enable them to develop their 
own sense of what their job is about, within the corporation and within 
the broader health care system. 
Participating as a full member in the practice of such a community 
gives rise to a sense of self as only marginally involved, something I 
will call an "identity of non-participation." Even though processors 
complain about their lot in its details, they basically accept the system 
as it is in its general form. For instance, they take the measures of 
production and quality quite seriously and apply them to their need to 
feel that they are knowledgeable and capable. Meeting production 
requirements is not only a financial concern: it becomes a yardstick of 
one's individual capacities. As the unit I had joined was going through 
changes and the rate of phone calls was unusually high, one processor, 
like many of her colleagues, was having difficulty maintaining her 
production and quality at the required level: 
"Right now, I am more frustrated than bored. It's so hard 
to feel yourself go down. I don't think of myself as a 
dysfunctional person, but I sure feel like one ... 
In calling the phenomenon I observed identities of non-participation 
rather than just experiences of non-participation, I want to draw 
attention to the far-reaching ramifications of this sort of syndrome 
when it is endemic as in the situation of the claim processors. An 
identity is an enduring definitional construction of the self, which is 
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deeper and longer-lasting than fleeting situations. Non-participation 
does not seem to be a mere situation, but it becomes part of one's life, 
a way of life, an essential ingredient of a worldview in which 
processors find their place and define themselves as social agents in 
the context of their work communities. As one is involved in the 
details of claim processing, and in the social organization of these 
details in the life of a specific community, it becomes difficult to think 
of different ways of participating and of belonging. Admittedly, at this 
point in my fieldwork, this choice of term is based on an intuition 
which needs to be documented further. Not only are identities of this 
sort not something that one can expect the persons involved to be 
very articulate about, but identities of non-participation are obviously 
not just localized in the claim processing center: they did not just 
arise there, but are something that processors bring with them in one 
form or another from their schooling experience (Eckert, 1989) and 
their previous jobs; it merely gets reinforced in various ways by their 
experience in the claim processing center. Further ethnographical 
study will be required to explore the degree to which these identities 
of non-participation extend to other parts of their lives and how they 
are articulated with other circumstances, such as their membership in 
other communities. 
This notion of identity of non-participation is very close to what 
Marxist theorists call alienation. In Marx (1844), alienation is a 
relation of objectification between individual workers and the product 
of their work, which is determined by the ownership-or non-
ownership-of the means of production. It is certainly not my purpose 
here to deny, or even to downplay in any way the importance of 
economic relations and of relations of ownership, which are no doubt 
crucial, and all too obviously a source of disparity in reward and as a 
consequence of disengagement. But I prefer to use my own term. On 
the one hand. the term alienation is a bit too loaded historically and 
theoretically for me to feel comfortable using it at this point, and on 
the other I want to situate the problem in the local construction of 
identity. By proposing the term identity of non-participation. I am 
trying to avoid the two extremes of individual relations between 
workers and the product of their work, on the one hand, and of class-
wide relations of non-ownership on the other. As I proceed, I will 
attempt to give embodied force to the concept of identity of non-
participation in the context of forms of membership in localized 
communities in which ways of belonging are constructed in day-to-day 
practice and in situated relations with other communities and their 
own practice. Indeed, claim processing is the practice of specific 
communities to which being a claim processor implies that one 
belongs. Out of the communal construction of the world that such 
communities are inherently involved in, there arises a localizing 
coherence to being one among claim processors. 
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Meanings of meaninglessness 
The relation of non-participation in the global meanings of one's 
activities is not necessarily uncomfortable or undesirable. In the claim 
processing office the "meaninglessness" that derives from the 
mediation of normative structures does not cause the existential 
malaise one might expect after reading the preceding sections. For 
the most part, claim processors are neither rebellious nor cynical: in 
fact, most of them-and I would event venture to say all of them-care 
about doing a good job in ways that I found quite surprising 
considering the status of their position and the reward structures they 
live by. But that willingness does not become overtly conflictual as it 
operates within the confme of a circumscribed defmition of their 
commitment. It does certainly become internally problematic at a 
deeper level ;:is most processors experience boredom (in the middle of 
their relentless and stressful business), depression, and brittle self-
esteem. 
Vivian: "I don't bring it home, but it's like, while I'm 
here, I you know, I get depressed." 
Judy: "Oh, yeah, while I'm here, I get so depressed." 
The processors' basic willingness to get involved and their fits of 
depression are crucial points to keep in mind here, in case my 
discussion of the issue of meaninglessness was to confirm prejudices 
commonly held about people occupying low-status positions by giving 
the impression that these workers are careless, lazy, unintelligent: 
"the kind of people who want a mindless job." In the complex, 
mutually constitutive relations between individual qualities and 
structuring circumstances, my emphasis 1s defmitely on the latter, in 
their wide-spreading, deep-reaching, yet never simply causal 
ramifications. 
Meaninglessness as.freedom: leaving one's job behind 
Meaninglessness, when identities of non-participation are viewed as a 
licence to non-involvement, can be a source of freedom. For most 
processors, the fact that they can leave their job behind as soon as 
they walk out of the office is an aspect of their relation to their work 
which they value highly. "I don't want it to be, like, my life is my job," 
one of them said to me. "I'm off. That's it!" said another. They have 
nothing to carry with them, nothing to think about when they go 
home. There, they can find themselves: they can lead their own lives, 
do their own things. What they describe as the worst possible situation 
is when the stress of work becomes such-as it sometimes does-that 
it spills over into their private time and they start thinking about claim 
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processing when away from the office. Indeed for them, the sense of 
themselves they gain through a definite separation between work and 
themselves is a precious island of meaningfulness, which they are very 
clear about wanting to preserve ... It's not worth it," they say. They care 
for it in such a way that the meaninglessness of the job does not invade 
their sense of identity to a threatening level. 5 Many processors 
explained to me that they are not interested in moving on to 
supervisory positions precisely because they are concerned that the 
stress would erode this freedom. This cultivation of meaninglessness 
as preservation of self is not something they talk much about, but it's 
in the air, a tacitly shared understanding. It manifests in the 
instantaneous legitimacy obtained by remarks about looking forward to 
the weekend or wishing it was four: it manifests in the way they inject 
into their working relations spontaneous conversations about their 
private lives, their hobbies, their favorite 1V shows, their 
relationships; it manifests in the way they walk out and say good bye at 
the end of the day, in the way they hurry toward the parking lot, and 
scatter toward their cars, becoming at once silent and animated as 
they go their separate ways. Not many of them sustain tight bonds of 
friendship with colleagues outside of the office. 
Interestingly there is a reciprocal understanding on the part of 
management. The manager of the office one day called me into her 
office to talk to me about my presence in the office. Her main concern 
was that she did not want me to intrude in the employees' breaks: 
"It's their time," she declared. Whether someone had complained or 
whether the manager had just seen me carrying a notebook when 
going to break with my classmates, I will never know. What is striking 
is the complementarity of the attitudes of the employees and of 
management with regard to their respective involvement into each 
other's purpose. An unexpected balance seems to have been achieved 
between the respective needs and interests of employers and 
employees as they currently perceive them: you give me your time and 
I'll give you money; you don't need to be interested in me and I don't 
need to be interested in you. Identities of non-participation are an 
essential ingredient of this compromise of meaninglessness. 
Meaninglessness as resistance: managing one's learning 
We often think of the absence of learning as resulting from lack of 
intelligence, lack of perseverance, lack of interest, or plain minimalist 
laziness. The trainees in the classes I took, especially the first group, 
5 In fact. they enjoy a freedom that I sometimes envied in my position as a graduate 
student, whose work is never finished and whose thesis hangs overhead like a constant 
threat both to one's future and to one's sense of self. Conversely, when the processors 
saw me come and go, making my own schedule, they thought that I was lucky to enjoy 
such freedom. But of course, little did they lmow ... 
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which was composed of part-timers, seemed to me to be very good at 
managing their own learning. They were very concerned about sorting 
out what they needed to know and what they did not. My first reaction 
was to conclude that they wanted to invest the minimal effort for the 
money they were going to receive, and I was admiring how hard they 
worked at that and how well they succeeded in maintaining their 
vigilance. But I have also observed them when they were talking about 
other more personal subjects, their cars, their weekends, bars, 
drinking age, and their inquisitiveness did not show the same · 
restraint, the same control. Thus I have become persuaded that in 
managing their learning in the class, they were not just being 
cognitive minimalists, but that they were managing the construction of 
an identity they could live with. It was important, not only to be as 
comfortable as possible, that is, to minimize their .. effort, .. but also to 
maintain a distance, not to invest oneself, not to become a claim 
processor. Ironically, making sure that they were learning just how to 
do the job as defmed for them and strictly how to satisfy the 
requirements was in itself an art that required much effort. 
A small but symbolic incident will illustrate my point. I had asked the 
trainees if I could bring my taperecorder during break and record 
some of their conversations or ask them some questions. They all 
balked quite violently, agreeing unanimously: .. No way! We don't talk 
about work during break." I was very shocked by the directness and 
strength of their reaction, but it was communicating interesting 
information in itself. 6 I have in fact observed that they do talk about 
work quite often during their breaks. They just do not want to think of 
their breaks in those terms. Admitting that they talk about work on 
their own time would be admitting that they have identified 
themselves with work, that the clear separation they work hard to 
maintain is threatened. 
I mainly observed this active management of learning during the first 
class I attended. The trainees were part-timers who had other careers 
and ambitions outside of Alinsu and who knew each other because they 
had been working with clerical support for a few months before 
joining this class as a group. The instructor was always ready to 
volunteer information beyond the purely procedural process to be 
performed and the trainees were therefore the ones who organized 
their degree of involvement. In the second training class, the 
instructor was much more in control of the curriculum and kept the 
focus on the procedural aspects of the job. There was thus little 
negotiation about what needed to be learned. The trainees were also a 
different group: they were new employees who did not know each 
6 And this was admittedly a blow to my fledgling identity as an ethnographer, both 
because they did not want to talk to me and because they associated me with work, 
something I had worked hard to avoid. My intention was not to talk about work but to 
get to know them better. 
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other previously and were trying to become full-time employees. The 
confluence of the authority of the instructor and their own position of 
dependence meant that they were much more docile. As the class 
proceeded, the same phenomenon of managed learning became 
apparent, but at the level of the newly formed friendship groups and 
almost exclusively outside of the class. 
Meaninglessness as a relation of disconnectedness 
While I have in this piece of research concentrated on the world of 
claim processors and tried to adopt their perspectives as much as 
possible, I have had enough contact with management to note that 
identities of non-participation are a reciprocal phenomenon in the 
corporation. I have mentioned earlier the fact that claim processors 
see management as something very distant and mostly irrelevant to 
their lives. But of course management does not participate in the 
world of claim processors any more than the processors participate in 
the world of management. In fact, I suspect from my conversations 
that they have only the vaguest idea of what is going on there. Th.is was 
confirmed to me one day when I was talking about my research with a 
retired high-level executive who had had a long career in the 
insurance industry. As I was relating some of my observations to him, I 
apologized for describing things that I reckoned he surely knew much 
better than I. Candidly, he corrected me: 
.. Now look, if you've spent several months with those 
people sharing their life and doing what they do, you know 
something I have no idea about." 
Indeed, so much of the local work that makes the place function is 
simply invisible to anyone who has never been involved in the daily 
practice of claim processing: the ,little tricks and improvised solutions 
people invent to cope with shifting situations, the bending of the rules 
that exceptions commonly require, the relations between people that 
make is possible to communicate rapidly and effectively, among 
processors as well as with individuals outside of the office, such as 
benefit representatives at client companies or bookkeepers at doctors' 
offices. 
I was talking about the problems of phone answering with one claim 
processor and she expressed her own puzzlement at this distance 
between management and workers: 
.. See, you can see it, and all these little people can see it. 
Why don't the bosses see it?" 
This profound and reciprocal disconnectedness is something very 
striking to the newcomer to the corporate world, though it seems to 
be largely unremarkable to most actors in the workplace. Neither the 
suggestion box, which nobody uses, nor the company's internal 
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publications, to which little attention is paid, do much to bridge this 
chasm. There are obvious asymmetries-of prestige, of power, of 
income-which translate into different degrees of allegiance to the 
corporate structure. These asymmetries are anchored in the 
distinction that management is supposed to take care of global issues 
while the workers are supposed to take care of local ones. But one 
finds at the level of management the same phenomenon of social 
localization. In each world, that of the broad glance and that of the 
focused hand, there is the same sense of locality. It is not in what 
people do that the essential differences lie: in both cases, they solve 
problems, negotiate the meanings of situations, create useful relations 
with others, etc. The essential difference seems to lie in the fact that 
they live and work in such different worlds. 
Normative structures such as the ones I have described play an 
essential role with respect to this reciprocal disconnectedness. I have 
discussed the effects of the mediating role of evaluation schemes, 
procedural calculation sheets, and other devices in the construction of 
identities of non-participation among claim processors. Conversely, 
data gathering techniques and evaluation schemes play a similar role 
in translating work into figures that represent productivity and quality. 
The figures they produce become the material of calculational 
activities. But to fulfill that purpose, the practice out of which they 
arise must be erased (Latour, 1986). This process of erasure, from 
which they gain power in calculations, is also their weakness because 
it limits their ability to represent how well the actual business is taken 
care of. Normative structures act as a specific type of "boundary 
objects" (Star, 1989; Star and Griesemer, 1989) between the 
communities of workers and the communities of management. They 
can carry information across while obviating participation in a 
common practice. They articulate without connecting. They make it 
possible to globalize the local while at the same time localizing the 
global.7 
Meaninglessness as content 
Meaninglessness, as the content of identities of non-participation, can 
take many forms beyond the ones illustrated here. It is often at the 
core of asymmetric expert/ client relations (Schon, 1983). Through 
the generalized use of normative structures, it can also be said to 
underlie many of the bureaucratic measures we have devised in order 
to avoid direct confrontational power relations. More broadly, it is the 
foundation of the process of commoditization, used by Marx as the 
7 The term "boundary object" was coined by Leigh Star in the context of her study of 
professionals and amateurs cooperating in the collecting of museum specimens. The 
concept will become a pivotal category in the argument of this thesis and will be treated 
more analytlcally in the next chapter and in Chapter 7. 
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pivot of his analysis of capitalist production (Marx, 1867) and 
generalized as a process of cultural alienation in subsequent literature 
on the subject (Lukacs, 1922; Hart, 1982). In a service industry 
dealing with painful situations such as diseases and death, 
meaninglessness can also be a protection of one's sensitivity. Most 
processors reckon that, if they mess up a claim, it will become a 
problem for someone who may be sick or in financial troubles, and 
they claim to care about that. 
"And it's going to affect other people. And it's going to 
affect the poor person, who's, they are not going to get 
their money, or it's gonna be cut." 
A few trainees even reported feeling proud of the importance of their 
function. 
"I don't know, it makes me feel important, you know. I'm 
taking care of someone's money, paying someone's bills." 
While still for the most part trying to do a good job, senior processors 
are less candid. After having had to deal again and again with 
devastating stories of customers and their saga in both the medical 
and the administrative aspects of the healthcare system, they have 
learned to consider people as cases: 
"It's kind of screwy, but you should not think of the person. 
You have to think of the company." 
This gave rise to a fundamental contradiction in the compromise of 
meaninglessness in the service industry. I remember, for instance, the 
time when an assistant-manager came to a unit meeting after visiting 
the enrollment day at a client company where she had received 
feedback on Alinsu's performance. Complaints concerned mainly 
phone answering (see next chapter and appendix for further 
discussion of this problem). She asked the processors to be more 
careful with people's feelings . She said she knew, having been a claim 
processor herself, that people are not always very polite and what it is 
like to be confronted with complaints. 
"If you feel that you have done your utmost, offer them to 
talk to someone else, like your supervisor or your 
assistant-supervisor. Sometimes, the mood changes 
dramatically. Just remember that you are talking to 
someone with flesh and blood, and who has feelings. They 
have problems and they are trying to solve them." 
She concluded her exhortation by reminding the processors that 
Alinsu was now pushing "customer service" as the main theme. I 
remember seeing the processors listening attentively, enjoying-as 
they get to write such time off production-a moment of respite from 
the pressures of their daily quotas. No one disagreed. Phones are a 
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problem. And customer service is important. What this visionary 
corporate directive meant down in the trenches seemed less than 
clear, however. What kind of gaze had conceived it? What kind of voice 
had uttered it? How was its inspirational thrust to be shared? Was the 
politeness of claim processors the key to customer service? Was it the 
glue that would mend threatening cracks or the veneer that would 
keep them harmless? Was this their role, was it their only role, in the 
grand scheme of things? They seemed satisfied not to know. And why 
should they know? The compromise of meaninglessness had become a 
business problem. 
In investigating these possible .. meanings of meaninglessness," I have 
not tried to place judgments of value on the situations under scrutiny, 
even though the term meaninglessness admittedly has negative 
connotations. The causes and effects of the compromise of 
meaninglessness are too complex for a simple value judgment. Rather, 
I have tried to show that meaninglessness becomes a way of life. 
Indeed, I have tried to argue that it is not just an absence of meaning-
a deplorable vacuum as it were-but a constructed constituent of the 
content of social relations. 
Identities of participation: constructing a 
community 
So far, I have mainly described institutional structures. But no one 
lives in institutions. Institutions are cultural inventions, social objects 
that cannot connect with life directly. Like languages, they require the 
formation of human communities, whose shared practice gives them 
embodied existence in the social world. Claim processing is no 
exception. The second half of this chapter is about the community that 
the claim processors have formed in order to realize for themselves, 
for their employer, and for other interested parties, the multiple, 
interrelated purposes that bring them· together. I argue that this 
community constitutes itself in part as a living response to the 
institutional conditions under which it evolves. It generates a practice 
which makes claim processing work and it constructs a way of life in 
which identities of participation are possible. 
Communal memory: keeping track of infonnation and change 
Expecting a routinized job, one is surprised to find the extent to 
which change is a part of the life of claim processors: change is 
continual and ubiquitous. As the instructor of one of my classes was 
bringing to the trainees' attention a recent modification to a rule they 
had already learned, I heard her actually warn them in no ambiguous 
terms: 
"If you can't take change, forget it!" 
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The policies, contracts, and procedures are always changing; laws are 
modified; medical practice is evolving, new treatments become 
available, experimental procedures become standard; and the 
processors themselves always invent little ways of improving things, 
some for themselves and some which they share. Thus what makes the 
job difficult is the enormous amount of details to remember and to 
watch for: rules about special cases, endless lists of codes and 
abbreviations. For instance, Figure 3.4 shows a list of non-covered 
items, one list among the dozens-or hundreds for oldtimers-that 
processors have seen and that they must remember. 
Of course, it is not a matter of memorizing everything, but a matter of 
remembering the relevant topics when a claim comes up and of being 
able rapidly to retrieve the precise information. Processors keep cards 
and file folders in which they collect and organize this information, 
but they do not rely on themselves only. Crucial to their welfare in the 
face of this flood of changing details is the tacit understanding that 
retrieving information is a shared responsibility. And much of the 
informal talk about work taking place among processors involves 
exchanges like the following. 
Maureen: "Patty, Transco is end-of-the-month or date of 
termination?" 
Patty: "I think it's end-of-the-month." 
Ken: "What was that memo about a new law for 
chiropractors?" 
Myriam: "Yeah, it was about colonies. They can't do 
them anymore." 
Linda: "It's beyond the scope of their practice." 
Questions of these types are continually addressed from one processor 
to another or just thrown up in the air for anyone to answer. They 
rarely require opening statements or introductions, reflecting a state 
of open, ongoing conversation, with specialized rules for tum-taking 
(Linde, private communication; Sacks et al., 1978). 
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As processors participate in this ongoing exchange, come up with 
questions, answer them, overhear conversations, learn from them, 
intervene in them, correct them, and comment on them, a work unit 
functions as a communal memory. The free exchange of information is 
a striking feature of the community of claim processors. Eckert (1989) 
argues that exchanging rather than hoarding information is 
characteristic of working-class communities, as opposed to 
hierarchies such as those existing among the "Jocks" in high school 
and in corporate life, where trading information offers leverage for 
positioning o~eself. In the case of the processors, an important factor 
is the absence of direct competition for promotion, which means that 
there is little perception of advantage in hoarding knowledge. But 
overwhelming is the realization that the task would be impossible and 
unbearably stressful if processors could not count on each other. 
Because the job can be described in the abstract in individual terms, it 
is easy to overlook the degree to which it is the social fabric of the 
community that holds the processors' capability to do their work, as a 
group and as individuals. This process of communal memory is 
reflected in a sense of solidarity within the work units. For instance, I 
heard a supervisor one day talk with a claim technician about a point of 
contention, and the supervisor ended up saying as an argument against 
the technician's point: "We got voided on it." What she meant by that 
statement, to which the emotional content of the allusion to the void 
gave much strength, is that one processor in her unit had once done 
what the technician now suggested, but got a void on her claim then. 
The supervisor's use of the first person plural shows that she was 
taking the unit as a whole to be the locus of knowledge concerning 
what was being debated. 
Community life and processing practice 
One day, as I was processing a claim, I drew an oldtimer's attention to 
the fact that with the type of service I had encoded (psychiatric care), 
the code for the place of service I was trying to enter (out-patient 
hospital) was refused by the system. She looked at my claim briefly, 
and then just told me to try other location codes until one worked. My 
face must have betrayed my surprise at this light attitude toward the 
handling of information, because she exclaimed with a friendly smirk: 
"Welcome to claim processing!" 
Keeping the processing moving is the most important goal, both for 
individuals whose production is measured in number of claims, and for 
the company, which calculates its costs in terms of processing cost 
per claim. So when there is a difficulty, the art of claim processing is 
to find a legitimate way to get the charges reimbursed to a reasonable 
extent. For instance, choosing procedure codes for medical treatment 
can involve trying to find a code that will allow a greater allowance, 
66 
requiring one to develop a good sense of how much is reasonable. This 
juggling of facts and built-in constraint to produce quickly a reasonable 
story and what makes a story reasonable are not things that are taught 
during the training class. Even instructors would often acknowledge to 
us that we had to learn it .. the right way" for now but that once we got 
to the floor, we would get all the short-cuts. 
Indeed in order to keep processing moving, the community of 
processors have devised short-cuts that enable them to satisfy their 
production requirements. For instance, they are taught during their 
training classes to fill out certain forms, which contain information 
about claims they process. These forms serve as cover sheets for 
microfilmed records, but much of the information they contain is 
redundant with the claim record attached to them. So experienced 
processors do not fill out their forms completely; they wait until they 
have completed the entire claim. When they hit the key that indicates 
they are done, the computer system gives them a batch number, 
which if it ends with a Q or a D tells them into which bin to put their 
processed claim. They complete the forms only if the claim is a .. Q." 
Everyone within the first few weeks after moving to the floor learns 
that it is not really necessary to fill out these forms completely unless 
the claim is going to go for review. Processors claim that they would 
not be able to fill their production quotas if they did not resort to 
these types of unofficial short-cuts. 
Sometimes the short-cuts that are discovered are in direct 
contradiction with the purpose of the job, even though they comply 
with normative evaluation structures. For instance, there is a rule that, 
if a completed claim comes out as a "Q," recalling that claim to make a 
change to it will count as a void, that is, an error on the processor's 
quality rating. The rationale for the rule is that processors should pay 
the same attention to all claims, that is, not pay special attention to a 
claim that is going to go to quality review, and thus pay less attention 
to claims that will be paid directly. One unofficial technique that 
trainees learn-often as early as in their training classes-is that if one 
notices a mistake on a Q claim after one has completed it, it is better 
just to let it go, because then there is a chance that the quality 
reviewer will overlook the error. An error that is discovered outside 
the internal review process, say, through a complaint by a customer, 
does not count against the processor. Similarly claims that do not 
result in any benefits being paid usually do not go through review, even 
when processed by trainees. I do not know the exact reason for this 
since I have not talked to management yet, but from my conversation 
with processors, I can surmise that this is done on the assumption 
that a non-payment in error will be protested by a customer and that it 
is always easier to send people additional money than to request a 
return of disbursed money. As an oldtimer told me: 
.. I say, an underpayment is always better than an 
overpayment. Make them happy, send them more money, 
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you know, it's hard as hack trying to get it back from 
them, you know." 
Many participants are aware of this distinction between canonical and 
non-canonical practice (Brown and Duguid, 1990), especially those 
who are both practitioners and teachers. In one of my classes, the 
instructor was discussing the case of pre-existing conditions. Some 
plans limit coverage on health conditions that have been diagnosed 
and for which medical treatment has been received before the 
employee joins the plan. The instructor both insisted that everyone 
should understand the concept and the procedures, but hinted that 
there were many cases for which it was not worth checking this issue 
in too much detail because Alinsu would usually end up paying anyway. 
After negotiating at length with the trainees how much exactly they 
needed to care about this, she turned to me and said privately: 
.. Well, as a trainer, I can't tell them that nobody does it. It's 
one of those things, you know, where it's understood that 
just nobody does it." 
The proceduralization I have talked about earlier is therefore very 
incomplete. And even though the high-level rhetoric is definitely in 
the direction of a routine view of the job, there is support for the 
functioning of these unofficial aspects of the practice, or at least little 
active opposition. There seems to be a tacit recognition of their 
usefulness. Whereas schools tend to oppose the non-canonical 
practices of the communities in their midst (Eckert, 1989), the 
business world cannot thwart them too actively because there is a job 
that must be done. In this sense, the corporate world is sometimes 
forced to be wiser than schools by its need to be effective in its stated 
purpose. 
Still business seems merely to have learned to live with these non-
canonical practices, even while often maintaining an official line to the 
contrary. This official insistence on hierarchical control of processes 
makes it difficult to recognize non-canonical practices and to support 
their development to their full potential. I think that the highly 
hierarchical style of management I have observed, typical not only of 
Alinsu but, I am told, of most corporations in this country, is an 
enormous problem, given the importance of improvised practice in 
getting any job done (see Appendix). It is somewhat ironical that in a 
country that prides itself on defending the effectiveness of free-
market mechanisms as opposed to the inefficiencies of bureaucracies 
in centralized economies, the internal organization of corporations so 
much resembles that of the sociopolitical systems they are meant to 
denounce. 
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Through these exchanges not only does the community function as a 
communal memory, but its idiosyncratic practice serves as a context 
for constructing a view of the world in which local meanings are 
sustained. Of course, there is the internal jargon typical of the practice 
of all communities. The following is a completely ordinary sentence · 
heard in the office, which few readers can be expected to understand. 
"We get so many recalc on out-patient hospitals. Like often 
we receive the PC visit later and there is a dup or the 
patient calls and complains about out-of-network benefits." 
But beyond the local jargon, and in part through it, the practice of the 
community implies a view of the world. Even though claim processing 
does not require a significant understanding of related practices, such 
as underwriting or medical care, there is a substantial involvement in 
the languages of these other practices. Terms such as "pre-
authorization," .. cost-containing features," "third party liability" are 
part of the local vocabulary. Similarly, claim processors acquire a large 
repertoire of medical terminology. During their training, they take a 
course in medical terminology in which they are supposed to learn the 
meanings of many of the etymological roots out of which medical 
terms are constructed. 
The mechanical mnemonic-associative method used to teach them 
this terminology is symptomatic of the way in which institutional views 
of expertise can ignore the rooting of knowledge in the practice of a 
community. During the terminology class, the students watch a 
videotape. For instance, for the root "gastr-"-which happens to mean 
"stomach"-the audionym of a "gas truck" is introduced, because it 
sounds like "gastr." The picture of a gas truck appears on the screen, 
but the truck has a stomach for a tank. The students then are 
expected to use this association to remember that the root "gastr-" 
means stomach. At each session they are presented with 25 of these 
intentionally illogical associations. While some are rather direct, like 
the gas truck example, some are rather far-fetched. For the root 
"per-" the audionym "purr" is introduced with a picture of a cat, 
which "purrs" and "throws out" a family out of a house. "Throw out" is 
proposed as a reminder that "per-" means "throughout." In the 
course of our training, we attended a number of these sessions, but it 
was very difficult for the trainees to get anything from viewing these 
tapes, and they were not able, nor willing, to pay much attention. 
This pedagogical approach is in absolute contrast to the way in which 
this terminology gains a local meaning in claim processing. It is typical 
of many such courses that the instruction only attempts to connect a 
element of the curriculum to a verbal definition, not to a usage. When 
our class attended these sessions, there was no practice involved with 
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the learning of these roots and their defmitions, and no attempt to 
connect the use of these roots to usages the students may already be 
familiar with. But if trainees did not learn much from these courses, it 
is certainly the case that an experienced claim processor commands a 
substantial medical vocabulary, as these terms come up continually in 
the claims they process, in the memos they read, and in the 
conversations they take part in or overhear. In these circumstances, 
however, this vocabulary is grounded in the local practice with its local 
needs, as in this question heard during a training class: 
.. Do you know what corneitis is? I just want to know if it 
has something to do with the jaw ... 
The following exchange, overheard as two equally experienced 
processors were talking from their desks across a partition, also 
illustrates how medical terms find a local interpretation: 
Patty: 
Maureen: 
Maureen, do you know what is 
.. incompetent cervix"? The insured put this 
as a justification of ultrasound. 
I'm pretty sure that it's eligible, but we . 
should have this from the doctor, not just 
the insured. 
An "incompetent cervix" is no longer an organ with a specific 
condition: it has become "pretty surely eligible ... In this 
transformation, terminological usage-medical or other-takes a life of 
its own as it enters the world of claim processing, borrowed from the 
practices around which processing is organized. These terms act as 
"boundary objects" (Star, 1989) between practices, which allow the 
different perspectives on them to meet for specific purposes. In the 
world of claim processing, these borrowed terms are not primarily 
grounded in the practice where they originated, but become grounded 
in claim processing itself, in all the rules and procedures of claim 
processing, in what is covered and what is not, in what to watch for, in 
what to refer to the technical unit, etc. 
C»mmunity life: identities of participation. 
When I asked processors what they will remember about this job once 
they are old and retired, the first answer most of them gave me was 
that they will "remember the people." This answer reveals their 
personal inyestment in and allegiance to the local community they are 
forming with their colleagues. Processors feel invested in their 
community even though they do not always find what is going on there 
pleasant or desirable; this young woman was complaining about the 
gossips that she felt were pervading the place: 
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"People get petty around here. They have nothing better to 
do. Everybody is here, and it's a matter of interest. You 
come and you work here 8 hours a day: it's your life. They 
know everything that's going on. They do it out of 
boredom." 
This characteristic of the office by which the social life is filling in the 
void left by the non-involvement in the job is likely to be a factor that 
makes the processors liken their work experience to their experience 
in high school. 
Meaninglessness-as freedom, resistance, or disconnectedness-has 
become part of the local culture. The life of the community is 
articulated around the reality that the processors' job does not involve 
their sense of self in any profound way. Indeed, I would propose that 
one important reason the identities of non-participation generated by 
the institutional structures do not give rise to an existential malaise 
among claim processors is that these identities are part of an identity 
of participation in the local community. Faced with the institutional 
conditions of its existence, the community constitutes and 
reconstitutes itself as a living response to these conditions, as an 
entity which can perform its function and in which membership is 
existentially non-problematic. 
Rituals of participation 
There are in the office a number of rituals that maintain a sense of 
participation-rituals of both meaningfulness and meaninglessness in 
their intertwined reality. These rituals provide material for the 
construction of an identity as member of the community. The regular 
unit meetings have a special status in being both working events, 
during which business is discussed, and communal rituals, which help 
maintain a certain level of cohesion among the processors. These 
meetings are usually quite relaxed: there is almost a family atmosphere 
to them. Even though the topic is almost exclusively business and unit 
supervisors keep control of the agenda quite tightly, there is room for 
participants to engage in community building. They are usually allowed 
to bring up any issues they care to and discussions are rather open. 
Claim processors get involved in these meetings and seem to enjoy 
them (though they would probably enjoy anything that would free them 
even for a short time from the pressures of production quotas). 
Units meetings are far from being the main glue that holds the 
community together. The sense of solidarity that comes from sharing 
comments about one's work progress is an example of a more diffuse 
and pervasive ritual. Like the continual crossing of antennas performed 
by ants as they go scurrying about their infinite business in its silent 
orchestration, questions and comments about production and quality 
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are part of the state of open conversation that characterizes the life of 
the community: the topic obtains automatic legitimacy. 
Renee: "Today's been quite a day. I've hardly got 20 
claims done. It can't just be a simple 
question." 
Patty: .. I have to do 20 claims in one hour to meet 
production ... 
Renee: .. I took care of my junk today." 
Patty: .. I took care of Darlene's junk." 
Renee: .. It can't just be a simple question ... 
Someone: "There is no such thing anymore." 
(from behind 
the partition) 
A few moments later: 
Renee: "'Well, I'll be fired this week, for sure." 
Patty: "You are going to have to wait in line." 
Someone: "See, everyone is behind this week." 
(from be hind 
the partition) 
Along similar lines, a very interesting aspect of the office world is the 
way in which the processors' private lives are made present in their 
work experience. Since I have argued that claim processors find 
themselves primarily outside of work, one way of making this 
separation clear is to weave their private into their work life. Within 
reasonable limits-not necessarily set explicitly but clear to everyone 
and rarely crossed-such intrusions are not only tolerated, but 
accepted and nurtured as a natural part of the life of the office. As 
there is admittedly little material for developing a serious sense of 
identity in the work of the office, there seems to be a recognition that 
there has to be some allowance for a social texture in terms of private 
life. This seems to be a modern concession in the compromise of 
meaninglessness. Thus processors do not bring their personal life into 
the community with a guilty sense of conflict between personal 
interests and work, but as an essential part of their being a member of 
this community. 
Rita was trying to get insurance for her family's old pick-up truck but 
since her husband had a number of speeding violations on his driving 
record, she was getting quotes over the phone that she could not 
possibly afford. Her problem was taken on by her claim processing 
neighborhood, and everyone became involved, suggesting companies, 
thinking of possible strategies, letting her use their phone while she 
was waiting for a call to be returned on her own line. 
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Personal desks are fascinating symbols of this intersection of life 
trajectories: photos of family, friends, stars, and pets cohabit with 
notes about new developments to watch for in claims: shopping lists 
hang side by side with lists of diagnostic codes; sports articles singing 
the glory of a favorite team are covered with reminders of phone calls 
to return; postcards from vacations surround work trophies; and 
quotations from texts, religious, humoristic, artistic, compete with 
resolute self-exhortations to process a few more claims per day. On a 
few occasions, I have seen striking flower arrangements sent by a 
boyfriend or a husband, standing almost defiantly beside the terminal. 
These occasions always attract numerous conversations and generous 
explanations as the whole unit always takes a genuine interest in the 
cause of such public demonstrations of affection. 
Communal events are another way in which private life is woven into 
work life. Celebrating birthdays as described in the preceding chapter 
is a regular and important ritual. f even stayed after work one day to 
help some processors decorate a colleague's desk for her birthday the 
next day. The annual halloween celebration was an office-wide event 
that included contests for the best costumes, the best unit decoration, 
and the best desk decoration. The costumes and decorations were 
quite elaborate and occupied everyone's mind for days before the 
event. Nylon spiderwebs hung from the ceilings and covered the desk 
areas, along with the traditional orange and black streamers. Signs 
warned of witches and ghosts. At one unoccupied desk, a plastic 
inflatable skeleton sat on its swivel chair, stooping lifeless, its white 
hands taped to the keyboard. On its back, a note read: 
"Processor burn-out: 
this could happen to you." 
Private desk had become haunted cemeteries and goblin playhouses. 
On Halloween day, the office was taken over by a crowd of 
unrecognizable characters including a comical old couple and the 
terrible specter of death itself. There was a parade and a distribution 
of prizes awarded by a specially selected jury composed of 
representatives from each unit. 
Christmas was of course the occasion of many events, which I will 
describe in some detail, in their order of significance. The qualitative 
differences among these events. considered as ways of constructing 
mutual relations, generated very different responses on the part of the 
processors. 
The official Christmas lunch offered by the office was not considered a 
major event, except for the fact that it allowed an extra 15 minutes in 
addition to the regular half-hour lunch break. Indeed, it did not leave 
much room for the nurturing of interesting identities. At 11 :00 we 
went upstairs to the lounge, to find a buffet table laid out with a make-
your-own-sandwich meal. The local managers were standing behind 
the table as employees came by to get their food. When my unit joined 
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the line, I started to feel a bit embarrassed at the prospect of having to 
pass in front of these managers to get my pittance; I was wondering if 
we were going to have to thank them. But fortunately for me the line 
was becoming long, and before we reached the table the manager 
decided that it would be faster to form two lines, one on each side of 
the table. The management group moved away from the table, 
watching us from a comer of the room and chatting among 
themselves. They were not partaking in the meal-at least at that 
time-they were just feeding us. The distance was awkward. Our unit's 
assistant-supervisor was in the line with the processors, but our 
supervisor did not come. I did not quite dare ask her why, but I 
suspect her ambiguous status would make it difficult for her to choose 
between going through the line and standing with management. 
Of more significance was the Christmas party organized by the claim 
processors, which was not subsidized by Alinsu and took place in the 
evening at a local restaurant. Both workers and management attended 
with their significant others, but the two groups remained largely 
separated. People spent the party in small groups of four to ten, which 
were fairly steady through the evening and largely reflected existing 
ties of friendship. After the meal, we invaded the dancing room, where 
some entertainers invited members of the audience to come on stage 
and sing popular songs accompanied by a video version of the music, 
which provided the lyrics in subtitles. The Alinsu crowd was slow to 
volunteer at first, but once the idea got rolling, they encouraged each 
other and really got into the game, though no one from management 
sang. All who dared participate received warm rounds of applause from 
their colleagues and some of the performances by Alinsu attendees 
were actually quite good. The game allowed employees to show a 
different side of their personality and to relate to each other in a new 
way, including a tinge of sexuality that does not usually find expression 
in the office. The following week, the performances were the topic of 
many conversations. 
Among the Christmas events, however, none was on everyone's mind 
and the topic of every conversation like "kringeling" was. This is a 
game in which everyone in a unit draws someone else's name and 
during the week before Christmas gives that person a gift every day, 
while trying to remain anonymous. The purpose of the game is to 
guess who your "kringeler" is. The game was played by each unit in 
the office. Everybody was into it and seemed to enjoy it immensely. 
Some people went to amazing ends to make sure that their kringelees 
did not know who they were, like creating fake calls to go see the 
receptionist, or asking someone else to help them in order actively to 
mislead their kringelee. "Who is my kringeler?" was the question of 
the week, supplanting in intensity the regular "Have you made 
production?" Processors were making lists of possible kringelers in 
their attempt to guess who theirs was, and the information on these 
lists was traded in serious bargaining sessions. A processor who was 
giving me a ride after work found a computer-printed note from her 
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kringeler on the windshield, wishing her a nice evening. She liked the 
gesture, but immediately started to eliminate kringeler candidates 
who in her opinion would not know how to use the system to produce 
such a note. There was something personally interpersonal as well as 
communal about this game that made it really quite exciting for 
everyone. 
On the last day of the week, there was a communal finale. In the 
morning, kringelers surreptitiously left a present for their respective 
kringelees under the unit's Christmas tree, still without signature. We 
also each brought some finger food and snacked the whole day (while 
working, of course). After lunch, the whole unit gathered around the 
supervisor's desk where the tree was standing. Each person took turn 
taking one guess at who her or his kringeler was, getting another try 
only after one round was completed. Once someone had guessed, she 
could get her present. There was much excitement, laughter, and 
applause. The game was played so well that almost nobody guessed 
right the first time. Gifts were quite substantial, not only the last gift. 
which was supposed to be the finale, but also during the week: bottles 
of wine, pens, sweaters, gift certificates to restaurants, etc. 
Decorating one's desk, organizing celebrations, or bringing snacks are 
distinctive ways of contributing to making the place comfortable. Food 
plays a significant role in the life of the office, not only because units 
frequently organize potlucks, for occasions such as Christmas or 
Valentine's day, and because processors eat a fairly large amount of 
snacks, candies, chips, cookies while working (an activity in many 
cases associated with worries about one's figure), but also because the 
exchange and distribution of snacks are an integral part of the social 
life of a unit. In the unit in which I did my processing, there was 
always a box of candies on the desk of the supervisor, and processors 
would help themselves liberally as they passed by on their business. 
It was mostly replenished by one processor, a Japanese-American 
woman, who had taken upon herself the function of snack provider. 
This function had become a central part of her identity in the 
community of claim processors. She always came to work with bags 
full of goodies, and there was much traffic to and from her desk (she 
also supplied aspirine, bandaids, menthols, gum, etc.). I happened to 
sit beside her for some time, and I personally found this ever renewed 
supply quite extraordinary, but neither the provider nor the munchers 
seem to view this situation as worth commenting about. When I 
remarked about her unusual function, she simply replied that the 
processors need that to feel happy. 
"That's what you have to do when you just about live here. 
[ ... ]They always need something to eat. They can't process 
unless they're eating something. They are kids. Lots of 
kids." 
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Such communal rituals have often been associated with the presence 
of women in the workplace. Women have been observed in many 
studies of the workplace to be the ones who pay attention to personal 
events such as· birthdays and holidays (see for instance Kanter, 1977). 
I would suspect that in male circles other events or forms of 
celebration bring people together in ways they find meaningful beyond 
the confines of the workplace; perhaps sports and beer replace 
birthdays and cake. At any rate, the few males in the claim processing 
center did not seem the least adverse to participating in these 
celebrations and the attendant gustatory gratifications, even though 
one of them told me that he just went along. Still the question of 
gender cannot be ignored. While I was there, the wife of a male 
employee became pregnant and I heard some talk about wanting to 
give him a baby shower, but not being sure whether this was 
appropriate or how to go about it (They ended up giving him a baby 
shower after I had left). 
These rituals of participation complement the indigenous practice 
described in the preceding section, with which the claim processors 
identify. Combined with the institutional setting and in response to it, 
they provide the texture in which the claim processors develop their 
relations to each other and to the systems of production to which they 
contribute. Such rituals may not seem very rich for developing a sense 
of self with respect to a community and a society at large, but they are 
what has arisen. Given the low status, the meager salaries, the level of 
stress, and the tense relations with callers on the phone, these 
communal creations are extremely-perhaps surprisingly-benign. A 
colleague of mine was telling me about her experience working over 
the summer in a New York bank where similar circumstances had led 
the tellers to create among themselves a very oppositional culture of 
resistance (Eckert, personal communication). They had developed a 
ritual of participation that they called "handling the client." This 
meant getting back at nasty customers in even nastier ways, but 
without being rude or leaving any way for the customer to point to any 
misbehavior on the part of the teller. A very skilled practice, which 
provided a rich texture for developing an identity in the community. 
There is definitely resentment among claim processors. At one point, 
some processors played on this common sense of antagonism and 
achieved some success by compiling a list of customers and physicians 
with funny names. In the exchange below, Renee was holding a 
photograph of an insured employee she had received in the mail as 
documentation for an injury: 
Renee: "Don't you like to know what an insured looks 
like?" 
Maureen: "Yeah, so you see them on the street and kill 
them." 
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But the processors' resentment is merely rampant and much less 
daring than that of the tellers. In fact, when they have to answer the 
phone and have to talk with displeased customers, they take it quite 
personally. Callers who have not received the money they counted on 
can be rather nasty and, not infrequently, even abusive. I have seen 
processors get very upset and troubled, sometimes even in tears. 
because a phone call had turned sour. I remember my neighbor at the 
office, a well-balanced, usually very poised and serene, middle-aged 
woman, mother of two adolescents. After a long struggle with a caller 
who was arguing about a deductible, she put the person on hold, just 
to take a breath. Her body was shaking, her fists were tight and she 
was holding back her tears, repeating: 'Tm so angry; I'm so angry." 
There was no support in the local culture for turning against the caller 
in a defensive move. But though there was compassion and comraderie 
among her peers and even from her supervisor, there were, as I 
explain in the appendix, no institutional mechanisms for channeling 
her care and her effort at understanding back into the corporation in a 
constructive way. 
Sense-making landscapes and 
communities of practice 
In this chapter, I have tried to map the "world of claim processing" 
with analytical dimensions that start to afford a grasp on the "sense-
making landscape" of the claim processors. I have furnished the office 
as a place of learning by giving it social and epistemological texture: 
identities of participation and identities of non-participation, 
normative structures and rituals of participation, institutions and 
communities. By sense-making landscape I mean the organization of 
circumstances under which the processors feel concerned or 
unconcerned by what they are doing and what is happening to them 
and around them. This landscape of understanding is intended to 
capture the ways in which they attempt, neglect, or refuse to make 
sense of their world and to participate in new meanings. I am careful 
to avoid terms like "horizon" because I do not want to convey the 
connotation of a linear division of the world. On the contrary, I want to 
convey a complicated, textured set of interrelated differentiations 
whose ramifications extend over large areas. I have argued that the 
sense-making landscapes of the members of a community are 
constituted by combinations of identities of participation and of non-
participation. Once considered in terms of community membership, 
these two forms of identity are not exclusive opposites, but interwoven 
dimensions. One can, of course, have an identity of non-participation 
with respect to one's own community or, perhaps more precisely, to a 
community in which one aspires to belong. But an identity of 
participation in one's own community can also imply an identity of 
non-participation in related communities, as I have claimed it is the 
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case for the processors. Therefore, in the complex landscape of a set 
of related communities of practice, an identity of non-participation 
can be a constituent of an identity of participation. 
To further define the notion of sense-making landscape, I have 
outlined a contrast between institutional structures and the 
communities that are formed within an institution, and I have 
discussed two related, general types of functions that a community 
fulfills in its mediating role between individuals and institutions. 
On the one hand, a community constructs a local practice, which, 
among other things, makes it possible for the demands of the 
institution to be met: it invents and maintains non-canonical ways of 
negotiating the canonical with the shifting reality of actual situations: 
it provides local resolutions to conflicts generated by institutional 
settings such as the contradiction between measures and work; it 
supports a communal memory that allows individuals to do their work 
without bearing the whole burden of what needs to be known over 
time and allows newcomers to enter the practice through a process of 
peripheral but increasing participation; and it generates local 
perspectives that allow the world to be perceived in consonance with 
what needs to be done and language to be used effectively. The word 
practice in this context is thus not used in the sense of learning by 
repetition, as in "practicing scales on the piano, .. but in the sense of a 
shared way of doing things, as in "reasonable medical practice." 
On the other hand, but in ways that are of course not clearly distinct 
from its practice, a community provides material for the construction 
of identities: it defines relations among members by providing ways of 
participating; it articulates their relations with other communities, for 
instance by absorbing meaninglessness into constructive cultural 
frameworks such as individual freedom or resistance or by separating 
and yet weaving together private identity and work identity; and 
perhaps most important, it provides "existential coherence" that is, it 
strives to construct and maintain a local coherence of membership 
that makes participation existentially nonproblematic. 
A consequence of this double function of communities is that the 
practice and the community cannot be separated. I will therefore use 
the term "community of practice" to capture this dual unity.8 It is thus 
important to underline that the sense-making landscapes of claim 
processors are not just defined by their functions as claim processors, 
but are shaped by their perception of themselves as belonging to this 
community and being part of what the community is about. The idea is 
8 This term was originally coined by Jean Lave, and we used it in the development of 
our theory of learning (see Lave and Wenger, in press). I will refer to the concept of 
community of practice often in the following chapters and discuss it in more detail as 
an analytical category in Chapter 7. 
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that people learn what it takes to belong, not just what it takes to 
perform certain functions. Among claim processors, it is certainly just 
as important to know and understand the latest gossip as it is to know 
and understand the latest memo. Belonging is a requirement for 
performing the functions supported by a community, just as 
performing functions is pa.rt of belonging. 
I have made some observations about the rituals of participation of the 
community of claim processors being benign, as compared to the 
world of New York bank tellers, or even as compared to the 
experiences most of us had in schools, where giving the teacher a 
hard time is often a more salient part of the social dynamics of the 
student community than is participation in the official agenda. There 
is also an almost complete absence of hazing among claim processors. 
All these observations of course point to deeper questions of why the 
processors are not more cynical and why they accept the game in 
these terms. These are questions to which I admittedly do not have 
answers yet. Investigating them would obviously take us beyond the 
walls of the office into the articulation of the community of processors 
with the world at large, not only in relations of service, production, 
and employment, but with respect to the formation of persons in the 
context of general issues of gender, culture, and economic class. 
Recruitment certainly plays a crucial filtering role in insuring some 
homogeneity among employees. I went through some of the test and a 
mock interview that new recruits have to go through. In our later 
conversation, my interviewer told me that what she is looking for are 
people who "are going to stick with it." She found it difficult to 
articulate what criteria she was using to decide on that question. She 
mentioned looking for stability of character and lifestyle and for a 
personable demeanor, and watching for over and under qualification as 
well as other ambitions. But she thought that overall she could usually 
tell. Still, there are definitely variations of background among claim 
processors. I suspect that some class differences manifest as different 
attitudes toward the production/ quality game, for instance. There are 
a few very "successful" processors, who accept the production game, 
understand it and play with it; many fairly successful who bear with it; 
and a significant number of processors who just don't make it. Even 
though I have no evidence that this is in any regular way correlated 
with class background, I have seen at least one working-class young 
woman who did not fit in the polite, personable atmosphere of the 
office and just could not meet production; she was fired. 
Answering these broad questions is too large an enterprise for this 
thesis. I am only proposing the beginning of a theoretical framework 
to move in that direction. The gist of the argument I will try to make 
is that this kind of analysis is essential to answering questions about 
what processors know, what they understand about their work, the 
social systems in which they participate, and the technology with 
which they engage. 
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Interestingly, sense-making landscapes and identities of participation 
and non-participation are relations between communities and persons, 
not just characteristics of a person in isolation. Therefore, the 
pedagogical consequences of seeing characterizations such as 
ignorance, for instance, as identity of non-participation are different 
from those of seeing it as a state of mind. The pedagogical 
consequence is that the company or the schooling institution must 
take the position that this is what needs to be changed. It is not 
sufficient to provide more information or change curriculum. Since a 
person's intentions are directed at becoming a member-a specific 
kind of member at that-the richer the social landscape, the higher 
the chances that individual can articulate inspiring forms of 
membership. 
Obviously, issues of authority and control are fundamental given the 
competing interests and asymmetries of power among involved parties 
in most communities of practice. In these cases, resistance becomes a 
lever of identity construction. This l:?uggests two types of attitudes on 
the part of holders of power and authority. On the one hand, one can 
impoverish the social landscape to the point where resistance is 
reduced to its minimal expression. To some extent. I think that this is 
what has happened with the claim processors, not just in the context 
of the office, of course, but in the society in which they have grown up. 
This affords control. but it squelches creativity by diffusing and 
diluting social energy. On the other hand, one can enrich the social 
landscape to the point where the productive practices become the 
material of identity construction. This runs the risk of increased 
resistance to structures of control, but it gains allegiance by 
supporting the development of creative senses of self. I will even 
suggest that modem democracies now face choices of this kind. 
The use of the term "social" here and in this thesis in general is 
perhaps in need of clarification. An ethnographer was trying to 
investigate a scientific community, and a member of that community 
told her that it was too bad she had just missed the company picnic 
that Sunday because there was a lot of social science going on there 
(Star, 1990). The view of the socialness of human existence that I am 
adopting is more fundamental than that, even though I spent much 
time describing birthday parties and Christmas games. The focus on 
communities of practice is part of an attempt to situate all human 
activity, knowing, and construction of self in the sociocultural context 
of the practice of specific communities. So when I speak about a rich 
social landscape, I do not refer to lots of company picnics-which in 
fact might even be signals of a limited social landscape to the extent 
that they are substitutes for actual engagement-but to the possibility 
of deeper engagement in communal practices that align the dynamics 
of identity construction and interpersonal relation$ with the stated 
purpose of the community. 
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In the following chapters, I will discuss in more theoretical terms the 
analytical categories I have merely suggested here and attempt to tie 
them together into a coherent analytical framework. Each of these 
chapters will address one central category and its related concepts. I 
will start this theoretical construction by addressing more directly the 
issue of the implications for learning of a technologized world. To this 
end, I will analyze in some detail a simple example of a normative 
structure that became a serious problem for the claim processors. This 
will illustrate the epistemological problems that can be associated with 
boundary objects between communities of practice when they take the 
form of normative structures. 
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The black-box 
syndrome: 
ownership of meaning 
community boundaries 
and boundary objects 
In light of the framework I have sketched in the preceding chapter, 
the social world is organized in locally coherent ways so that limited 
participation in the field of possible meanings associated with specific 
activities and related objects is rarely directly perceived as an 
immediate problem that threatens the success of these activities in a 
readily documentable fashion. The global inefficiencies and missed 
opportunities that usually result from such limitation either remain too 
vague, too diffuse, or too broad to be addressed effectively, or happen 
to serve-often at multiple levels and in multiple ways-the local 
interests of powers that prevent, actively or passively, their becoming 
actual issues. In other words, communities cope, and life goes on. 
But there are cases in which the lack of participation in the broader 
meaning of activities leads to specific breakdowns that call for 
attention. During my fieldwork, I gathered a strong sense of the 
pervasiveness of identities of non-participation and a deep intuition of 
their long-term danger from a global perspective, but in addition I was 
lucky enough to witness one specific breakdown where the lack of 
understanding of a procedure that claim processors were asked to 
follow became an obvious problem in their daily work. I will first 
describe the incident in some detail and then use my analysis of this 
example to introduce and explore dimensions of what I call "the 
black-box syndrome." 
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The ~'c, F, and J thing" 
There are circumstances under which a person is covered by more 
than one health insurance plan. For instance, a patient who is retired 
and aged 66 is eligible for medicare (which for purposes of 
coordination is considered as just another insurance coverage). This 
patient, though retired, may still be on the plan of his former 
employer, and for the sake of the example, let us assume that he is 
also on the plan of his spouse, who is 64 and still an active employee 
somewhere. If each of these three plans paid 80% of medical expenses 
for a given occurrence, this patient would then receive benefits far in 
excess of the actual medical bills. To prevent such overpayments, 
insurance companies that provide group coverage have signed a 
nation-wide agreement to coordinate the benefits received under 
multiple coverages. The agreement states that the total of benefits 
paid should never exceed the total cost of medical care received. 
Under this agreement, when multiple insurance carriers cover the 
same person, they are ordered into primary, secondary, tertiary 
carriers, etc., according to a set of specific rules, which claim 
processors must learn to apply. The primary carrier pays the full 
benefits in accordance with its plan as if it provided the only coverage. 
The secondary carrier then adjusts its benefits so as to make sure that 
coverage does not exceed 1000/o. If the benefits still do not fully cover 
the charges, subsequent carriers take turn coordinating their benefits 
until 1000/o coverage is reached. In the most usual cases, the primary 
carrier pays 800/o of the charges, and the secondary carrier covers the 
remaining 200/o. In such cases, additional carriers, if any, would not 
have to pay anything. 
Processing COB claims 
The coordination of benefits (COB) with other coverages that an 
insured person may have is an important task of a claim processor in 
health insurance. It can become rather complicated and both 
processors and customers often have difficulties understanding all the 
intricacies of these coordination clauses. An instructor told us that 
COB cases can become so complicated, with issues of multiple 
employers or child custody, that .. we end up paying benefits even 
when we are not primary." 
In order to contain costs and offer less expensive plans to employers, 
some insurance carriers have devised special plans with restrictive 
COB clauses that do not provide for 100% coverage in case of 
coordinated benefits. This is the case of what is officially known at 
Alinsu as .. COB by reduction," as it applies to a client company's 
retired employees who are eligible for Medicare. 
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The basic idea is that under this COB clause employees who are 
eligible for Medicare and those who are not yet should receive the 
same total benefits. This means that whenever Medicare is primary, 
the secondary coverage provided by .Alinsu merely supplements the 
benefits received by an insured from Medicare so that the total 
benefits are at least as high as they would be if Alinsu was the only 
carrier. Take prescription drugs, for instance, which Medicare does 
not cover. Since Alinsu does cover them, Alinsu as secondary carrier 
under the COB by reduction clause will reimburse drug bills at the 
percentage of its own plan, usually 800/0. But if both Medicare and 
Alinsu reimburse a type of service at 80%, say office visits, then there 
will be no additional benefit under the COB by reduction. It is so called 
because processors determine Alinsu's liability and then reduce it by 
the amount of Medicare payments. In sum, under this coordination 
clause, Alinsu merely covers the difference between the two coverages: 
additional benefits are paid only when the primary carrier has 
provided less benefits than Alinsu would have in the same 
circumstances, had it been the primary carrier. 
In the class I took, the instructor spent very little time on this subject 
because she thought that most of us would not have to process these 
claims for quite a while after our training. She did want to address the 
topic anyway because she explained that it was "good to know what it 
was all about." What she meant by that was entirely procedural, 
however. Basically, what we did was to go through the worksheet 
shown in Figure 4.1, which is the worksheet used by claim processors 
to calculate the benefits payable under these restrictive plans. We 
performed the operations of the procedure line by line with a few sets 
of fictitious numbers. Learning how to do that was straightforward 
enough, but understanding what the procedure is about is less obvious, 
and the instructor spent no time attempting such an explanation, not 
even at the level of the basic "fairness" idea. 
In fact, a close look at the series of operations reveals that things are a 
bit more complicated than the description provided above. The 
entries marked C, F, and Jon the very right refer to numbers that are 
kept in the customer's ftle after each COB operation and must be 
retrieved onto the corresponding lines. Why must these three 
accumulative amounts be kept from claim to claim and updated each 
time on the customer's ftle? The reason is that the coordination is not 
computed on a claim by claim basis, but in an "aggregate" fashion, over 
a period of an entire year. That is, the two coverages, Alinsu's and 
Medicare's are compared as aggregate amounts accumulated since the 
beginning of the year, so that over a given year, a person receives 
exactly the benefits that Alinsu would have paid as primary carrier 
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Benefit Reduction Worksheet 
A • 1\99 · Prev Alinsu Benefit $ ___ _ (C Pnv. Stant.) 
s. Al Ben current c1a111 
c. Tot Al Agg Benefit 
o. Aqq Prev Medicare Benef lt 
E. Medi~are Ben current Claim 
F. Total Medicare Agg Ben 
G. Al Total liability (C - F) 
H. Al Prev Payments 
I. Ben now due (enter o if 
negative figure results) 
J • Total Al Paymnts released 
(H + I) 
... 
= 
.. 
$ ___ _ 
f •• c, F, J Must be noted in clai~ant file for future 
calculations. 
Figure 4.1. The COB worksheet 
(F Prev. Stiant.) 
(J Prev. St111nt.) 
even though for certain services Medicare's coverage may be higher 
than Alinsu's. 
Answering the phone 
On the floor, I found out that this type of coordination of benefits was a 
problem. The processors did not understand at all what the procedure 
of the COB worksheet was about from the standpoint of the insurance 
concepts and mechanisms it was implementing. As a consequence, 
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they reported that they did not like processing these claims at all, and 
often complained about the fact that they did not know what they were 
doing. They were surprised by the results they obtained from the 
procedure: 
"It works both ways to where ggoA> of the time they get no 
benefit. It's a lot of work for nothing .... You see, I am so 
confused on this, and I have to pay these claims." 
In fact, even though they were more or less able to perform the 
calculations of the procedure correctly by simply following the 
instructions on the worksheet, most of them usually asked a more 
experienced processor for help when they had to do such a 
calculation. As it turned out, I discovered to my surprise that the 
person who usually helped them, a very experienced and 
knowledgeable oldtimer, did not understand the underlying principle 
either. (To her credit, I should say that I came to suspect that most 
people in the entire office did not really understand this procedure.) 
She had only acquired a very general but vague idea of how it worked, 
but what allowed her to help others was that she had gathered enough 
confidence in the procedure itself to trust that the numbers she 
arrived at were correct. In short-and this is probably too crude a way 
of saying it, but it makes the point-she had learned better than her 
less experienced peers productively to live in ignorance. 
The waste of time and the discomforts generated by the processors' 
uncertainties or the fact that they did not like to do things they felt 
they did not understand was not the main reason the problem actually 
caused a noticeable breakdown in the process. If all the processors 
had to do was to calculate blindly the benefits to be paid, their 
community would probably have recovered from these difficulties and 
organized itself to cope with yet another activity whose global meaning 
was outside of their purview: it would have become part of their 
identity of non-participation. But the most serious problem came from 
the fact that in addition to processing, processors have to answer the 
phone and talk to customers who do not understand the benefits they 
receive. Extreme proceduralization may work as long as a simple form 
of efficiency only is required: but in the absence of other forms of 
understanding it does not by itself provide sufficient material for 
conversations in which the meaning of activities must be negotiated. 
To appreciate why dismayed customers were calling-and more 
generally to appreciate the problems faced by the service industry-let 
us do an "insurance word problem" of the school type. Indeed because 
of the aggregate computation, past claims influence the processing of 
current ones in a way that make the calculation of benefits often 
appear completely arbitrary to customers-and to claim processors as 
well! The following story will illustrate what can happen: it is fictitious 
but if it differs from actual cases, it is on the side of being too simple 
rather than too complex. 
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A certain Mr. McGregor is eligible for Medicare, retired from his job, 
but on the benefit package ofhis wife whose company contracts with 
Alinsu with the COB by reduction clause. He has a condition that 
requires the regular use of expensive prescription drugs. In January, 
he submits a claim for an office visit for $50, which is covered at 80% 
by Medicare. Since Alinsu also offers 800A> coverage for such visits, he 
receives nothing from Alinsu. In February he submits a claim for $250 
worth of prescription drugs, an expense which is not covered by 
Medicare at all. Alinsu reimburses this bill at its regular rate of 80%, 
but Mr. McGregor understands that his plan has a yearly deductible of 
$150, so he expects to receive $80, 80% of $100. Fortunately for him, 
his office visit of last month, while not reimbursed, did count toward 
the deductible. He receives $120: 800A> of $150, which is his bill of 
$250 minus $100 of deductible leftover. In April, he submits another 
drug bill for $250 and receives the full 80%, which is $200. In June, 
he has to go to the hospital for a surgery and incurs a total bill of 
$5,000, which is covered at lOOOA> by Medicare with a hospital 
deductible of $500: Medicare pays $4,500. If Alinsu had been primary, 
it would have covered this bill at 80%. Since Mr. McGregor's yearly 
deductible with Alinsu has already been satisfied, Alinsu's benefits 
would amount to $4,000. Because this is less than Medicare's 
payment, Mr. McGregor receives nothing from Alinsu for the claim he 
submitted. So far, so good. In July, Mr. McGregor submits another 
claim for $250 of drug bills, which, to his dismay is denied entirely. 
And so is his next claim for the same amount of the same drugs in 
September. Mr. McGregor is upset, but he is not of the aggressive type 
and not one to doubt the computerized bureaucracies of such large and 
successful companies as Alinsu. As a consequence, by the time he is 
ready to submit yet another claim for $250 dollars of drug bills in 
November, he assumes that this type of drug is no longer covered. He 
calls Alinsu's 800 number to inquire and is informed that his drugs are 
still covered, that his claims were calculated correctly because there 
are "certain amounts to balance on an aggregate basis," and that he 
should keep sending his bills in. He complies with skeptical hope, and 
to his surprise, he receives a check for the amount of $100, which is 
less than the full coverage he had hoped for but more than the denial 
he had come to expect. 
To make my point, I should leave it as an exercise for the reader to 
figure out why Mr. McGregor receives $100 in November; but sheer 
cruelty need not belong to an author's rhetoric arsenal (without 
counting the risk of frustrating beyond recovery readers who have 
power over my destiny). The tricky implication of comparing 
liabilities as yearly aggregates is that patients can accumulate what 
could be called "negative credit." For the June operation, Alinsu's 
liability would have been $4,000: this is $500 less than the Medicare 
benefits. Not only does Mr. McGregor receive no benefit from Alinsu, 
but unknown to him, these $500 constitute negative credit in the 
sense that the Medicare aggregate has now risen above Alinsu's and 
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will need to balance out; it will need to be compensated by claims for 
which Medicare's liability is lower than Alinsu's. So for the next $500 
that Medicare coverage is lower than Alinsu's, the latter will deny any 
additional benefits. This is what happens with both the July and the 
September drug bills: the liability for Medicare is still higher than for 
Alinsu, when both are viewed as aggregates since January. But 
unknown again to our patient (in both senses), each of these two bills 
reduces the negative credit by Alinsu's liability, or 80% of $250, which 
is $200, for a total reduction of $400 out of $500. Therefore, when 
the November bill comes in, he receives $100, that is, 80% of $250, 
which is $200, minus $100 of negative credit left over. Given that I 
have carefully chosen the events and numbers for the example to be 
simple, it is easy to see how in real life a customer would be 
bewildered by these seemingly unexplainable variations in the 
treatment of apparently similar claims. 
Consequently, there were numerous phone calls. Processors even 
anticipated them. The following statement was made by a processor 
who had just processed a claim for which the COB by reduction had 
resulted in no payment. 
"You know this is gonna get you a phone call, you just know 
it. It never fails." 
Furthermore these phone calls were known to be difficult, both 
because people were usually upset not to receive the benefits they 
expected and because the processors felt that they were not able to 
explain what had happened to the callers . 
.. And anger, lot of anger. I don't blame them for being 
angry." 
In these phone conversations, the proceduralization obviously broke 
down: you just cannot tell people that you added lines A and B and 
lines D and E, and then subtracted line F from line C, etc., even if that 
is in reality what you did. The procedure does not convey the required 
information . 
.. I know my car runs, but I could not tell you how. And 
that's not good enough when people call and want to know 
about their money! But it's embarrassing when you call and 
you say 'Well, I don't know how, but that's how much 
money you got. Sorry.' I mean, it's embarrassing not to 
have the information ... 
Alinsu's first solution was to draft a letter of explanation, and to have 
the processors simply offer upset callers to have this letter sent to 
them. But everyone, processors and customers alike, found the letter 
very hard to understand. 
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The letter, which is shown in Figure 4.2, presented the issue at the 
very high level of an intention of fairness of treatment between 
employees with Medicare and employees without. Unfailingly this 
letter just served to generate yet another phone call, since it usually 
did not satisfy customers and it ended by offering them to call in if the 
situation had not been fully clarified . 
.. And the poor man got the letter, and that even confused 
him more. So then he had to speak to a processor .... That 
letter is terrible!" 
There was a lot of tension around this issue. I even read a letter from 
an outraged man who complained that if the "yardstick" by which 
claims are evaluated was completely random and could not be shared 
with customers, then Alinsu had free reins to do whatever it pleased 
without any possibility of control by outsiders. The customer was so 
upset that he was threatening to report this to his congressperson. At 
that point, the case was referred to the technical unit for further 
action. 
Eventually, the problem became such that a special unit meeting had 
to be called and a person from the technical unit came to act as 
instructor. This was the first time that I saw a concerted attempt to 
provide global explanations about the COB procedure. But to my 
surprise, the explanation was mainly a historical justification for the 
aggregate nature of the calculation: how the office had at first 
misunderstood the procedure as described in corporate directives and 
calculated it on a claim-by-claim basis, and how the error was 
eventually discovered and corrected. The instructor also announced 
that they would soon get to include on the explanation of benefit sent 
to customers along with their check a "memo" (a short pre-written 
paragraph) showing the three aggregate amounts. But there was no 
discussion of why the aggregate method was better than a claim-by-
claim calculation. Toward the end of the meeting, the unit supervisor 
reassured the processors that the COB procedure was actually easy if it 
was done precisely and if the C, F, and J numbers on ftles were 
correct and up-to-date. She was aware enough that the difficulty was 
not with the procedure itself to ask again whether everyone 
understood that the amounts are aggregate, and everyone signaled that 
they understood that. 
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Dear lkName!x: 
This will acknowledge :ycur inqub:y and provide an explanation to the recent 
claim consideration for lkPatient's Namelx. 
An individual who is eli9ible for Medicare coverage is co'll'l!!rad und4tt a 
SupplQl'IQntal Medicare rider to the regular plan of group benefits. 'Ibis 
rider is called a 'Benefit Reduction appi:oach to Hadic:are. The Benefit 
Reduction approach provides the same level of benefits for individuals 
covered under Medicare as are available to enployees who are covered under 
the regular plan of benefits. 
It works this way: 
1. In determining a claim payment, the first step is to calculate the 
amount that would be paid if the person had no Medicare coverage. 
2. 'I'tle above amount is reduced by the benefits available under the 
individual's Medicare coverage. 
nepending on the order and manner in Maich claima are· subnitted, an E!q)loyee 
could receive a better i~fit by being covered under the supplanental 
Medicare rider than would other ~loyees. "nlis might oc:c:ur ~ Medicare's 
benefits are greater than those available under the regular gr:oup plan. To 
try and maintain the same level of benefits for all 8'1ployees, the Benefit 
reduction Medicare Ridel" is calculated on an &199z:egate basis. That 18, pz:ior 
-=l:1b\s 'lr~ ..:onsidared along with the current charges received so that, in 
total, the level of benefit that the anployae receives, between the 9roup 
plan and Medicare, ls the sa:ne level of benefit that he or she would nonnally 
have received in t:.~ ttbsence of Medicare. 
Our recent claim hal'k31ing for this individual reflects adjustments made in 
keeping with the above calculation of benefits on an aggregate basis. 
We hope thi:s has an~red any questions ycu rnay havca had. If we· can be of 
further assistance, please feel free to .write us at the above address or give 
U5 a call. 
Sincerely, 
lkNamelx 
lkTitlelx 
!kClaim Unit!x 
!kPhonelx 
Figure 4.2. The COB letter. 
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But the processors I asked did not think that such understanding was 
sufficient to handle phone calls. 
Maureen: .. It's just, you know, you can't get them to 
understand. An aggregate, we're keeping 
track for the whole year. All they 
understand is that they didn't get their 
money." 
Sheila: .. Especially on drug bills, because Medicare 
doesn't even have a, ... shouldn't even 
account in drug bills. It shouldn't make any 
difference, you know." 
Altogether, they did not find that the meeting had helped them with 
their fundamental problem of having just the proceduralized 
understanding. 
"Well, it was boring because they gave all the answers, but 
no clue as to why or how." 
The jargon of the office came to reflect the processors' experience of 
being disconnected from the basic concept and only having access to 
the surface features of the procedure. Instead of referring to it as 
.. coordination of benefits by reduction," they just called it .. the C, F, 
and J thing." 
Proceduralization: relations between 
communities 
The fact that the unofficial name of the process, the "C, F, and J 
thing," uses parts of the representation to stand for the process is 
indicative of the nature of proceduralization. On the COB worksheet, 
the sequence of steps is prescribed only in terms of line numbers and 
arithmetic operators. The point is that such an extreme case of 
proceduralization localizes decisions in terms of the available 
representation to the point where interpreting the representation 
into an activity does not require an understanding of what the 
representation is intended to be about. It is true that on this particular 
worksheet the lines are labeled with meaningful designations, but 
neither in our training class nor in the unit meeting that was called on 
the subject did the instructor ever use these labels in order to make 
the meaning of the procedure clear as the step-by-step 
implementation of the COB by reduction concept. The labels were 
basically ignored because they were not necessary to the correct 
performance. 
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Admittedly, all this is nothing extraordinary. Most of us have had to fill 
tax returns or other similar forms, which are composed very much in 
the same style as the COB worksheet. But there is an important 
observation to make. Someone somewhere designed that procedure 
and did so with a certain understanding of what the COB procedure 
was about. The designer, however, decided that processing would be 
made simpler if that understanding could be set aside during the 
process of using the worksheet. The important observation is not 
whether it was one specific person-it may have been a group of 
people-but that whoever designed that procedure was not one of the 
claim processors. It was someone outside their community of practice, 
someone belonging to another community of practice to which the 
processors have very limited access. As far as I could tell, the locus of 
understanding of the procedure's intended meaning was indeed very 
far removed from the processors through a succession of 
administrative layers. 
In this sense, the worksheet was in a very profound way a boundary 
object between distinct communities. Moreover it was a very special 
type of boundary object in that it embodied decisions made in one 
community about the degree of understanding to be involved in 
activities in another community. The fact that the decision to 
"simplify" the process with a step-by-step procedure did not arise out 
of the processors' own practice is more important than the 
simplification itself. What I am trying to argue is that proceduralization 
itself is not where the problem lies. It lies in the fact that the process 
of proceduralization becomes a relation between two separate 
communities. The production of meaninglessness inherent in the 
production of normative structures, such as the procedural 
prescription of the COB worksheet, implies specific relations between 
communities who have different degrees of participation in and access 
to this process. They constitute then boundary objects that obviate the 
need for a "boundary practice." 
Any artifact by its physical nature as an objectification of human labor 
transcends the process of its production (Marx. 1867; Latour 1986). 
The process of erasure characteristic of the production of the COB 
worksheet is inherent in the production of any form of objectification. 
We must distinguish then between erasure for conswnption inside a 
community of practice (anchored or working abstraction, which arises 
out of, implies, and supports participation) and erasure for 
consumption outside a community of practice (displaced abstraction, 
which is a substitute for participation). Any practice produces 
abstractions, both fleeting and enduring, but these abstractions have 
very different significances inside or outside of the practice in which 
they are produced. The "traveling" of objects is therefore as essential 
a feature of their meaning as their structure. 
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Even though a representation is proceduralized, it is not true that the 
only significance of proceduralized representations is to be 
interpreted procedurally, or for that matter that, in practice, it is 
usually interpreted only as a sequence of local steps. In addition to a 
procedural interpretation it has a cultural interpretation, which is 
distinct, though no independent. There is a mutually constitutive 
relation between procedural interpretations and cultural 
interpretations, which will be explored further in the next chapter. 
This dialectical duality reflects the fact that representations, like 
artifacts in general, are both instruments mediating productive activity 
and symbolic devices mediating the construction of understanding. A 
representation or an artifact develops a meaning of its own in each 
community in which it is relevant. Because cultural interpretation is 
localized within communities of practice, it reflects relations between 
communities as the object travels. Indeed I have tried to make the 
case that even the meaninglessness characteristic of the cultural 
interpretation of proceduralized representations does not usually 
survive as such, but that it is absorbed into cultural pigeon holes in 
which it itself finds meaning as a specific relation of non-participation 
between communities. 
Even in attempts to provide a cultural interpretation that gives a 
broader meaning to a procedure, the distance between the two can be 
a problem. During the meeting that was convened to clear the 
confusions surrounding the coordination of benefits by reduction, it 
was interesting to note that the explanation of the procedure and the 
explanation of underlying idea were always kept separate. For instance, 
instructors never went through a year of computations to show how, as 
the respective aggregate liabilities of the primary and secondary 
coverages fluctuate independently, payments are sent whenever the 
primary aggregate coverage of Medicare sinks below the secondary 
aggregate liability of Alinsu. Thus they never showed step by step how 
the procedure realizes the concept. As a result, when I asked some 
processors to tell me what they understood about the procedure, I 
often got answers that were not incorrect but reflected the distance 
between a vague conceptual notion and their procedural experience: 
they would tell me that .. there is this amount and that amount; and it 
has to balance out somehow." 
The following exchange, which took place during a group interview, 
summarizes the whole situation quite well. I should perhaps clarify 
who the interlocutors are, lest my intentions be misunderstood. The 
two processors who speak are not novices struggling with the novelty 
of an unfamiliar situation. They are both considered highly successful 
and are very respected in the community. One of them is an oldtimer 
who spends much of her time helping others. The other, though less 
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experienced, is climbing the promotion ladder very rapidly with an 
eye to supervisory positions and has already been put in charge of a 
delicate client; she received official praises and a large bonus while I 
was there. Nor are these two persons lacking intelligence (whatever 
that means): I have seen them work and solve difficult problems, I 
heard them talk on the phone handling very delicate matters with 
callers, I have received very useful help from them as I was struggling 
to process my claims, and I have engaged in numerous interesting 
conversations with them on a variety of topics. 
Etienne: .. So what do you understand about it?" 
Sheila: .. I understand it, I just don't know how to 
explain it to a caller. I know how to do it on 
the computer, everything just fine. And I 
can do, you know, when it's not 'C, F, and 
J' ... ,I can explain that just fine. But when it 
comes to 'C, F, and J', it's like you said in 
the meeting, you can't tell them 'I 
subtracted this line from this line,' you 
can't do that. And I don't know what to tell, 
that's the only thing." 
Etienne: .. So you really don't understand the meaning of 
what Alinsu is trying to do there?" 
Sheila: .. Not really." 
Etienne: .. Not really? And the meeting that [the unit] had 
did not help?" 
Sheila: .. No, because she did not tell us why we were 
doing it, she just told us 'this is how you do 
it.' And I don't really think she told us 
why." 
Maureen: .. She never went into it, just that it was an 
aggregate thing for the whole year. So I 
guess that's all you need to know: there is 
an aggregate." 
There is of course the possibility of providing information. What about 
printing a rationale for the procedural steps with each line of the 
worksheet? While measures of this type can be useful, they are not 
likely to be sufficient. The letter talks about the procedure in broad 
terms of fairness of coverage. But even at that level, I have never heard 
a processor use the fairness concept to provide a coherent ' 
explanation. Even though many of them must have read the letter, the 
information had found no place to fit. In the next chapter, I will argue 
that information requires a shared practice to become useful. Once 
there exists such a shared practice, a procedural representation can 
be extremely useful in focusing conversations that connect it to a 
cultural interpretation. 
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This notion of cultural interpretation as distinct from but related to 
procedural interpretation is quite important because it places human 
activities in the context of a complex system of differentiated cultural 
empowerment. There can be cascades of proceduralized 
interpretations like there are cascades of normative strnctures. These 
cascades would create what Leigh Star calls .. layered representations" 
in the context of her study of processes of delegation (Star, 1990). 
While each level of procedural interpretation may require special 
abilities and knowledgeable skill, I suspect that in the end real power 
usually lies in cultural interpretations. 
The black-box syndrome 
There were a number of other specific instances involving issues 
similar to those of the COB worksheet but did not lead to such an 
acute problem. They had been absorbed into a more diffuse 
atmosphere of non-participation. In revealing the problems of 
identities of non-participation, the COB worksheet is a particularly 
clear example of a general phenomenon, which I will call the "black-
box syndrome.,. In technological jargon, a black box is a device which 
performs some useful function, but whose internal mechanisms are 
not available to inspection. Arguably, the world in which we live is 
increasingly becoming a set of black boxes. 
Think of doors. Opening a regular door by pushing it seems 
understandable enough, at least at the level of what we call common 
sense. We have physical intuitions that allow us understand the 
process by which the various moves we make end up opening the 
door. And even if we wanted to understand more about how the handle 
performs its function, we could just take it apart, and again call upon 
our intuitions about physical causality to understand the way in which 
lowering the handle retracts the latch. 9 
Now think of airports and supermarkets: doors slide open invitingly as 
soon as you stand in front of them. My son used to love running past 
these doors to see if they were going to open. But for him, and for 
most people, all he could see was a small black box on top of the door, 
somewhat mysteriously pointed toward him. If he observed a bit 
9 Of course, some physicists may argue that we don't really understand how doors 
function if we don't have a concept of torque that would explain why a door's handle is 
always on the side opposite to the hinges. But then, as much as I respect physicists and 
share their curiosity, I would argue that they are talking about a specific kind of 
understanding, which is based on very specific criteria for what constitute valid 
explanations. This type of technicalized understanding of the physical world, often 
driven by issues of measurability and glorified socially by engineering feats, almost 
exclusively has currency within their community and those in direct contact with it. 
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better, he would see a red light coming on whenever he was within a 
certain distance of the black box. How that little black-box relates to 
the opening of the door, however, is not available to inspection. And 
even if I was to explain to him what I think is taking place, there 
would be little in the situation that could be used to mediate his 
construction of an understanding. Even the small red light carries 
little information about how the system functions, except in indicating 
the range of sensitivity of the device. For my explanation, I would have 
to bring to bear into the conversation a whole lot of material about 
electricity, infra-red rays. etc., which is not available for inspection in 
the device itself, but belongs to specific sections of the culture of 
technology, in which my son is hardly a member yet, and in which I 
am for the most part only a very peripheral member. Even if we were 
to take the device apart, there would still be an overwhelming portion 
of the material necessary for an explanation that would not be 
physically available in the situation to support our conversation. 
Specialization in the division of labor has thus given rise to an 
interesting paradox typical of technological advances: as our growing 
understanding allows us to produce increasingly complex artifacts to 
suit our needs, we also create a world that we find increasingly 
difficult to understand. Doors open by themselves, cars cruise at a 
fixed speed with ideal fuel consumption, computers watch the stock 
market. Everywhere, we make use of convenient "black boxes," whose 
inner functionings remain a mystery; and for the most part, we enjoy 
this "simplification" because trying to know and understand 
everything all the time would get in the way of the main activity we are 
engaged in. There is a price for the convenience, however. We can 
call people instantly on the phone, but we have lost easy access to the 
deep intuitions about how things work that come naturally with 
simpler systems, for instance, from seeing the courier deliver some 
message or even from a chance of observing a manual telephone 
exchange. With these convenient but complex black boxes, it becomes 
increasingly difficult to develop a deep sense of how the environment 
functions, or malfunctions, and thus increasingly difficult to 
participate actively in that environment and deal with breakdowns. 
The issue is not just one of humanistic idealism, of knowing for its 
own sake. Our ability to navigate in our world is at stake. Buying a car, 
or even selecting a pair of jogging shoes, if one wants to be an 
informed customer, has become a major endeavor for anyone. 
Programming a VCR or using a complex copier presents a challenge 
many of us shy away from. It is not only a matter of this type of ' 
technology. Insurance rates are determined by very sophisticated 
actuarial calculations, and most of us would be really hard-pressed to 
explain why it is fair to pay $800 a year in car insurance. And voting 
with all the cards in hand on a proposition to reform the insurance 
industry or to protect our environment demands more investment of 
time and energy than most of us can afford. 
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The COB worksheet is a very useful example to introduce the notion of 
black-box syndrome because it is not a sophisticated electronic gadget. 
It does not even involve the computer system the claim processors 
work with. In fact, it hardly belongs to the category of what would 
commonly be called technology. And yet it reveals the deeply socio-
epistemological nature of the problem of the generalized production 
and use of technology broadly defined, of which the gadgets we first 
think of as primary examples are merely acute-but not necessarily 
most threatening-manifestations. 
Even though I prefer to stay away from definitions at this point, the 
term .. technology" must be clarified. For the purpose of this thesis, I 
am construing technology very broadly as understanding made 
instrumental through mediating artifacts-physical or symbolic. These 
should afford mastery over circumstances with some degree of 
proceduralization and be externalizable and sharable.IO This defmition 
is not meant to classify everything unambiguously, because its 
interpretation may depend on the use that is made of an artifact. But it 
would include the COB worksheet, the space probe Voyager, my 
favorite recipe for cheesecake, the wheel, Taylor's scientific 
management, compact discs, and weather models. It would not 
include a beautiful sunset or the concept of justice, and probably not 
Van Gogh's sunflowers (even though some technology was definitely 
used in producing the painting) or the Koran (even though it tells 
people how to live). Borderline cases would include the general theory 
of relativity or this thesis. 
Identities of non-participation: towaTds a political economy of 
meaning 
My earlier analysis of the COB worksheet has transformed the issue of 
a person understanding a form into an issue of relations of 
participation in meaning among communities of practice. This 
1 O In numerous theoretical endeavors concerned with the mediating function of the 
world in human activity and understanding, such as activity theory (Wertsch, 1981, 
1985) and critical psychology (Gamer, 1986: HoJzkamp, 1983, 1987), there is usually a 
distinction between tools and symbols. The argument goes like this. A tool has a more 
direct relation to its use than a symbol. The physical sound of a word, for instance. has 
a more or less arbitrary relation to its meaning. whereas the shape of a tool does not 
have an arbitrary relation to its possible use(s). Obviously a tool can be used for other 
purposes than those intended by the designers. A hammer can be a good paper weight. A 
tool also has symbolic value beyond its instrumental use. Vygotsky ( 1934) also claims 
that a distinctive characteristic of the symbol is that it is reversible and can become an 
instrument of self-control for its user. I am not sure that the distinction is that crucial. 
at least for the argument I am developing here. More important is the common 
mediating function in the situated construction of meaning in practical activity. 
98 
transformation is a crucial shift in perspective whose consequences I 
need to elaborate in the context of the black-box syndrome in general, 
so as to make clearer its broadly social dimension. 
This social analysis of the black-box syndrome is likely to remind the 
reader familiar with sociological studies of the deskilling issue, which 
has been a central controversy in the sociology of the workplace. 
Especially since Braverman's book came out (Braverman, 1974), 
sociologists have argued back and forth whether or not increased use 
of technology implies a generalized deskilling of the workforce. The 
question as I pose it in terms of cultural identities of non-participation 
is somewhat different: it is not just whether particular jobs require 
more or less skill. While this can of course be an aspect of the issue, 
and while there have been clear cases, in the history of the workplace, 
of specific attempts to deskill certain jobs, the general deskilling 
question is far from settled (Attewell, 1987a; Barley, 1988). In the 
case of the claim processors, for instance, it would be very difficult to 
say in any interesting way whether a claim processor today needs 
more or less skill than a claim processor working before computers 
were introduced (see Attewell, 1987a, 1987b for a discussion and 
some quantitative analysis). 
The black-box question concerns the production of artifacts in 
general, and its consequences, as it increasingly populates our world, 
for us who grow up and live in it: for our experience of the world and 
of ourselves, and for our mutual relations. Increasing technological 
artificiality implies that the world as we experience it reflects more 
knowledge, more understanding. This understanding is of a specific 
sort that can be transformed into technological advances. In this 
sense, the black-box syndrome does in no way have as its central 
premise that the world is becoming more mysterious or more 
incomprehensible in any absolute sense, or that people in the past had 
better or worse understanding than today, or that living used to 
require more or less knowledge, or that knowledge was more or less 
evenly distributed. The significance of this analysis does not lie 
primarily in a comparison with the past, which had its own forms of 
the black-box syndrome. It lies in an understanding of the current 
historical forms of the issue. 
Intensifying complexity and division of labor mean that we are 
increasingly dealing with objects and processes that are not only 
artificially produced, but originate outside of our own communities of 
practice. And even the so-called natural world is not only culturally 
interpreted, but transformed into an object of technical knowledge, so 
that it has authoritative interpretations whose ownership belongs 
outside of our own communities of practice. So whatever 
understanding is embodied in our world, it is not owned by everyone, 
but it is owned in various degrees by someone. What the view of the 
black-box syndrome I am trying to develop takes as its central concern 
is that the mystery of the world in technological societies is clearly 
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becoming a reflection of relations between people, between 
communities of people. 
Ownership of meaning then becomes crucial. I hope that what I have 
said so far makes it clear that the expression "ownership of meaning .. 
does not imply the existence of a single meaning attached to a given 
procedure or artifact, but multiple meanings shaped by relations 
among and within the communities involved. The communities of 
practice in which meaning takes form are themselves shaped by 
specific interests and specific power structures. With the division of 
labor in a commoditized market, technological complexity inevitably 
implies differences in power relations. Complexity thus becomes a 
medium for the playing out of power relations. 
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Glass boxes 
and 
cultural transparency: 
injo1·111ation 
participation 
and negotiation 
This chapter discusses the notion of cultural transparency as an 
analytical category that places knowing as an activity in the social 
organization of the world. At this point in my research, this discussion 
is more philosophical and speculative than those of the preceding 
chapters. This short essay is intended to give a sense of some 
foundational issues associated with a theory of understanding viewed 
as cultural. transparency and to lay down some of the basic ideas that 
will provide a framework for further exploration. 
Glass boxes and integrated learning 
My interest in the topics of this thesis was originally motivated by a 
simple question: can black boxes become glass boxes? Is it possible to 
reverse the trend toward a black-box society and to use the very 
artifacts that populate the black-box nightmare to realize the glass-box 
dream, to make our world more intelligible, to open new windows of 
understanding, and thus to integrate learning back into the activities 
that are the purpose for which one wants to learn? 
The glass-box dream was based on the observation that information-
processing technology presents new opportunities, not only for 
automating processes, but also for conveying new information about 
these processes. On the one hand, the duality of procedural and 
cultural interpretations of representation implies that the very process 
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of encoding and automating provides what Zuboff calls opportunities 
for "informating," that is, for offering a "textualization" of processes, 
which can play a crucial role in the social organization where it is 
located (Zuboff, 1988). On the other hand, research in fields such as 
intelligent tutoring systems, user interfaces, intelligent databases, and 
computer graphics, are exploring the possibility of using computer 
technology for communicating information in ways that more 
traditional media could not afford: new modes of presentation of 
content as well as new ways of integrating communicative 
interventions in the activities involving the use of information-
processing tools (Wenger, 1987, 1988b). 
Cultural transparency: fields of meanings 
The term .. glass box" implies a notion of visibility, of access to 
perception. One thinks of exhibits of transparent dishwashers or of 
stylish plexiglass telephones and loudspeakers. As useful as it may be 
in conveying the general idea, the metaphor of a glass box can be 
misleading in suggesting that all that is required is merely to bring 
internal mechanisms to view. The cultural significance of artifacts is 
much broader than their own structure and even the simplest artifact 
gives rise to a vast and complex ji.eld of meanings. For all its physical 
translucency, the empty Coca-Cola bottle dropped by an airplane and 
found by the African Bushman of the movie "Tile Gods must be crazy" 
told him little of the melting furnaces and the molding process, or of 
the careful promotional design and the popularity of soft drinks, the 
Coca-Cola Company and Wall Street quotes, the classic formula and the 
caffeine controversy, the vending machines and the red and white 
trucks, in short, the "real thing." 
These fields of meanings are multilayered and are composed of 
multiple interrelated viewpoints as objects enter in different ways into 
the practices of multiple, interrelated communities, each of which 
allows multiple forms of membership. They are textured further by the 
differences in legitimacy and universality claimed for the perspectives 
of various communities. Fields of meanings also open, as new meanings 
are created in each new situation: they are not something that exists 
"out there" but relations that situate knowing persons and artifacts in 
the world as constituted by the combined production of multiple 
practices. 
The degree to which fields of meanings in specific circumstances 
become realized as understanding, I will call "cultural transparency." 
The term is meant to emphasize the relational, culturally defined, 
locational, perspectival character of knowing in practice. The term 
transparency is also useful in providing a handle on the culturally 
mediated character of our existence. There is indeed an interesting 
duality inherent in the concept: transparency combines at once the 
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two characteristics of visibility and invisibility. This is not a simple 
polar opposition since these two crucial characteristics compose 
transparency by a complex interplay, their relation being one of both 
mutual exclusion and mutual implication. A window's invisibility is 
what makes it a window, that is, an object through which the world 
outside becomes visible. The very fact, however, that so many things 
can be seen through it makes the window itself highly visible, that is, 
very salient in a room, when compared to, say, a solid wall. 
In parallel with the notion of cultural transparency, there is also a 
notion of "procedural transparency," by which procedures become 
invisible as such. A pianist can hardly concentrate on interpreting the 
music as long as fingering comes in the way. Some claim processors 
called the COB worksheet "self-explanatory," so long as one did not 
have to explain it to someone outside. They see a great importance in 
being able to process the claims. 
Etienne: "How do you think you gained that 
understanding? Was it from the training 
class?" 
Sheila: "Actually from doing the claims, I think. 
Actually the processing itself." 
Mary: "Yeah, more repetition, more times you do it." 
Maureen: "In training they give you the, whatever, just a 
feel for it. And then you go down there, and 
the more you do it, kind of, the more you 
understand. They don't actually tell us the 
contracts." 
Etienne: "Is it from doing it or from conversations with 
people?" 
Sheila: "Doing it, and then if you don't understand, you 
talk to somebody about it and they can 
explain it to you. And then you do it and you 
say 'Oh yeah, that worked, you know, I get it 
now,' or something." 
There is a deep wisdom in the processors' assessment: being able to 
get on with activities is an essential condition for grounding 
understanding. There is thus an interplay of conflict and synergy 
between visibility and invisibility in procedural and cultural 
transparency that creates subtle pedagogical dilemma for creating 
glass boxes in practice. Invisibility of mediating devices is necessary 
for allowing focus on, and thus supporting visibility of, the subject 
·matter. For instance, it is a well-known principle of interface design 
that individual commands should correspond as closely as possible to 
units of action in the human perception of the activity. In other words, 
representational artifacts must become invisible for the learning to be 
fully integrated in some ongoing activity. The invisibility of a perfect 
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proceduralized fit to the activity as perceived, however, may bring 
back all the black-box problems associated with proceduralization. 
Visibility required for cultural transparency may then imply interfering 
to some extent with the intended processes of ongoing activities. It 
was the phone problem that revealed the opaque nature of the COB 
worksheet. In return, the visibility onto the content and context of the 
mediated activity can help make the device invisible by making its 
relation to action more transparent. For instance, understanding how a 
computer system functions internally-extended visibility-can make it 
easier for a user to tailor the use of the system directly to specific 
actions-increased invisibility. The relation between procedural and 
cultural forms of transparency is at the crux of the glass-box question. 
Their epistemological and social articulations and the forms of power 
and empowerment respectively associated with them are issues that 
underlie much of the discussion of this thesis. 
The unified character of the duality of visibility and invisibility must be 
underscored, as it would be easy to attribute transparency to one or 
the other of these two characteristics. For instance, critical 
psychologists distinguish between immediacy and mediation in one's 
understanding of the world (Garner, 1986), a pair of concepts very 
similar to the pair formed by invisibility and visibility. But critical 
psychologists view these two aspects of understanding as two distinct 
ways of relating to the world; one even gets the impression that they 
hold the belief that mediatedness is a better, more evolved way of 
perceiving the world. But like visibility and invisibility in 
transparency, mediation and immediacy are not mere opposite; 
neither are they two distinct ways of being in relation with the world. 
The two are always essential to each other. There cannot be 
immediacy without the differentiation produced by activity and there 
cannot be mediation without the "being there" that grounds it in a 
field of meanings. What critical psychologists refer to in their 
distinction is important, but it has, I surmise, more to do with 
relations of localness and globalness, which are not in their essence 
characteristic of individuals but of communities of practice. 
The argument of this chapter is that fields of meanings are composed 
of both fields of visibility and fields of invisibility, and that cultural 
transparency is a result of the interaction of the two in practice. The 
problem of access to resources for understanding and learning has 
thus two distinct but related aspects. One aspect concerns how the 
information that constitutes visibility is managed, stored, 
appropriated, distributed. This aspect has to do with the material and 
political organization of communities of practice, with the degree to 
which they have created artifacts that mediate their practice, with the 
degree to which these artifacts encode information about this 
practice, with the degree to which these artifacts are available, to 
whom, and under what conditions. The other aspect concerns how the 
information available becomes meaningful, how it becomes action-
enabling knowledge in specific ways, for specific persons. I will claim 
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that this has to do with the trajectories of participation and the forms 
of membership that serve as material for the construction of identities 
in the communities of practice through which a person comes in 
contact with artifacts. 
Information: fields of visibility 
Creating fields of visibility by making information accessible in a 
suitable fashion is a difficult task that occupies much of our collective 
energy, from our daily conversations to flashy advertisements, from 
the evening news to the compilation of textbooks or esoteric technical 
reports, from political speeches to the yellow pages. In a somewhat 
narrow but real sense, claim processing is an information-processing 
function: what processors do is to take some information submitted 
about medical services and transform it, using other available 
information, into information about payments due for the printing of 
checks, which are physically issued somewhere else. The thrust of 
much of what is happening in the office is to make accessible the 
information necessary to perform this transformation. There are 
manuals of all kinds, thick ringbinders, lists, reference books, medical 
dictionaries; and the computer system, which contains large data 
bases. Hospital and medical offices keep records that are only a phone 
call away. Beyond this careful management of information to be 
processed, there are less structured forms of visibility: the open 
configuration of the office means that claim processors can hear each 
other's conversation and observe each other's activities; even the 
manager's office, while walled from the rest of the open area, has two 
large windows that allow the claim processors to see what she is doing 
(and vice versa, of course, but this is a different story). 
Whether or not their primary purpose is to organize information to 
make something visible, all the objects we create have long stories to 
tell, which, as objects come into view, go far beyond their stated 
purposes. But these stories mostly dwell hidden in the frozen silence 
of their crafted souls. As artifacts are produced, more or less 
substantial portions of their stories can be encoded explicitly in their 
structure, taking advantage of the duality of procedural and cultural 
interpretations. Since information-processing systems appear to be 
particularly well-suited for this purpose, let us use them as tokens and 
dream for a little while of information-processing glass boxes and their 
potential for integrating learning in activities. 
At one level, systems could be made to reveal how they function, how 
and why they were designed in a particular way, what they can and 
cannot do. In addition to being generally instructive, such learning 
helps the users of a system take full advantage of the system's 
capabilities, develop a better sense of its limitations. and decide what 
to do when it breaks down or does not perform according to 
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expectations. Think, for instance, of an expert system for claim 
processing designed to reveal or demonstrate its inference processes, 
or explain them in terms of the constraints and assumptions that gave 
them their current form. A system's transparency onto itself could 
even provide access to assumptions and mechanisms that are meant to 
give it its glass-box nature. Its inspectability could extend to decision 
procedures of a "pedagogical" nature, including internally generated 
models of users and histories of interactions that are maintained for 
supporting learning adaptively. 
At another level. because systems are designed to be useful for specific 
activities, they reflect knowledge about these activities. Imagine a car 
diagnostic system that explains its reasoning by reference to an 
animated graphic simulation of the car under consideration, thus 
helping mechanics refine their understanding of a new but mysterious 
information-processing device. The conceptual structure of the subject 
matter can also be made visible as a user is able to interact with a 
system directly in terms of the concepts one would use to think about 
the activities at hand. A graphic simulation of a car, for instance, could 
present mechanisms in terms of concepts like signals, torque, 
pressure, or rate of change, which could be made visually concrete on 
the screen. An automated claim processing system could introduce 
medical or actuarial terms and concepts, and help make them 
concrete through repeated use. When I came up with the concept of 
"negative credit" to explain to some processors what I had understood 
about COB by reduction, they usually found it very useful, because 
negative credit has an existence through time that allowed them to 
connect the concept of aggregate calculation to the variations in 
treatments of claims that they observed when using the worksheet. 
The concept of negative credit could be made concrete with a 
graphical simulation of the relative variations of primary and secondary 
coverages over a year, which could be presented whenever a processor 
was surprised by the results yielded by the worksheet. 
In accord with the visibility /invisibility duality, one can distinguish two 
directions in which this conceptual transparency functions. On the 
one hand, the models of the world that artifacts present can make use 
of concepts in order to be transparent: via the use of models, one can 
interact with processes directly in terms of the concepts a community 
already uses to reason about a problem. On the other hand, models of 
processes can be used to make concepts transparent: via the use of 
models in activities, one can grasp the meaning of concepts with 
respect to the processes they capture. These concepts thus can be 
understood and remembered in terms of situations, now enriched by 
representational devices that can reify the conceptual structures 
underlying ongoing activities. 
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At yet another level, systems always exist in contexts of production 
and use that make them part of the social world.11 These processes of 
production and use could be made inspectable through explicit 
representational devices. In this sense, using a system reflects back 
into the world, and the glass box actually becomes an articulate mirror 
of the environment. For instance, the need for certain security 
measures typical of many computer systems clearly reflects relations 
between groups of people. Similarly, the structure of filing or 
accounting systems could make clearer the structure and functioning 
of the organization. For instance, the system used by claim processors 
always records who processed a particular claim: this information is 
used regularly by processors who handle later claims and need to ask 
some questions about the earlier ones. Insofar as the system offers a 
.. textualization" (Zuboff, 1988) of the process of its use by a 
collectivity, it provides a tool for communal reflection (and, of course, 
for control at the same time: this is a thorny issue). Certain computer 
systems, for instance, allow users to see who is on the system or what 
others are doing, information available precisely because the system is 
embedded in a social context. Through facilities for communication 
and collaboration, the design and use of a system reify assumptions 
about the nature and functioning of the social organization of a user 
community, which can provide a reification of changing patterns of 
usage and of learning processes within the community. 
This last possibility is interesting because information-processing 
systems are often at the articulation of communities of practice with 
the institutions in which they exist. There is a sense in which 
institutions are artificial objects like any other, and present the same 
issues of transparency. Eckert (1989) describes the way in which 
school as an institution becomes a black box for the disenfranchised 
students, who then form distinct communities of practice that center 
on marginalization. Interestingly some of these students then become 
claim processors and carry their experience of marginalization into 
the workplace where they are more than ready to develop identities of 
non-participation. For the claim processor also, Alinsu is largely a 
mystery, in spite of the slick introductory video they have seen on 
their first day, of the company periodicals they receive, or the phone 
lists they keep. Yet, this mystery is one that they do not see it in their 
power to unveil. Power is not exactly the word; power is not like a 
definite substance, which they are just missing in a definite quantity in 
order to change their lives. Power plays a pivotal role, but it is a 
diffused one. It is rather that they do not see this unveiling in their 
trajectories, in their destinies; in their selves, as it were. 
11 I am careful to use the word "part of' and not "member of' to emphasize a distinction 
which I think is crucial with respect to the ability to create meaning. More on that at 
the end of the chapter. 
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Participation: fields of invisibility 
From a perspective centered on cultural transparency, any form of 
objectification-no matter how instrumental-is also a representation. 
In this regard, our civilization seems like an explosion of visibility: new 
objects are produced and pop into view at an amazing pace: new 
commodities, new contraptions, new concepts, new expressions, new 
techniques, new reports, new institutions, new theories, new styles. 
There is more to see, more to hear, more to taste, more to pay 
attention to, more to choose from, more to absorb. A paradox of the 
black-box syndrome is that the explosion of visibility we are witnessing 
is not necessarily empowering by making us feel like we know more. 
Visibility and invisibility follow each other like light and shadow: 
objects-etymologically "thrown in front"-seem to hide as much as 
they reveal. 
Objectification is always a congealing of activity; by being transformed 
into its product, activity must be erased at the same time as it 
becomes represented. Therefore, the production of visibility through 
representation is by its very nature a process of freezing practice out 
of itself, of decontextualization. But objects cannot carry their own 
meaning; meaning must be attributed to them through human activity 
in practice. Therefore representation is always, as it were, a loss of 
meaning. As a consequence, to remain meaningful, representations 
require a proportional amount of non-representation. Using some of 
the terms introduced so far and anticipating a bit, we could express 
this idea in the form of a conjecture for a law of conservation of 
meaningfulness: 
visible 
invisible = 
mediation 
immediac = constant 
The idea is that the more one represents, the more one must 
presuppose a non-represented context; the more one says, the more 
one leaves unsaid. This process of desituating and resituating makes 
communication on the one hand difficult, in continual need of repair, 
and always potentially misguiding; and on the other hand, always open-
ended, unpredictable, and generative of new meanings. The two 
results are not even mutually exclusive. What the conjecture suggests 
is that it is not the degree of articulation, but the forms and successful 
continuation of coparticipation in practice that make the difference 
between the two potential results. 
Note that the conjecture as stated, if valid, must be valid even if one 
assumes-most optimistically-that representations are fully well-
intentioned, that is, that they are intended to further understanding, 
to increase transparency, or at least that they are not intended to 
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obscure or to cover. (The distinction between the two may not always 
be clear, especially since the representational results of one's 
activities are not always-or even usually-intentional). In practice, it is 
certainly not the case that representations in general are intended to 
increase transparency. But if they are not, the conjecture holds a 
fortiori. 
As a corollary, if the need for assumed context always has to be 
proportional to the level of decontextualization of representation, 
increasing abstraction will imply increasing participation in the 
practice out of which the abstraction arises. We would then expect to 
fmd that highly desituated, decontextuaUzed abstraction always has the 
property of being localized, of existing in local niches of intense 
participation. This means that a proportionally specialized community 
of practice is necessary to support such cultural forms, something 
corroborated by the localized, tightly cohesive nature of esoteric 
scientific communities. This says something interesting about 
understanding: to become global in a meaningful way, understanding 
cannot be abstracted, disconnected. It would be the mark of true 
understanding that it be both global and connected, that is, 
participatory while expansive. In terms of social communities, global 
understanding necessarily would imply the difficult task of straddling 
multiple forms of membership, and therefore of accepting possibly 
incoherent forms of membership. 
To cope with the increasing representational character of the world 
we live in, Zuboff (1988) speaks about the need to develop 
"intellective" skills in order to shift from "action-oriented" to 
information-based knowledge: she describes workers in a paper mill 
who have to interpret data on a computer screen instead of being able 
to dip their hands in the vats to determine the quality of the paper 
mixture, and managers who have to decipher computer print-outs 
instead of counting on their interactional skills. She defmes 
intellective skills as the ability to give meaning to symbols outside of 
the context of direct, action-oriented perception. Her observations 
and conclusions are important, but their usefulness is limited by the 
largely individualistic tendency of her focus. She speaks about 
participating in conversations, but mainly as an interpretation process 
takes place in front of the screen. For her participating in 
conversations is seen as an aspect of w~at she calls intellective skills, 
and her interpretation still seems to assume that conversations are not 
crucial to other forms of mastery and that becoming part of a new 
discourse is only a matter of acquiring new skills. By viewing 
intellective skills as individual abilities, she overlooks the social 
organization of the perspectives that abilities reflect and thus ignores 
the importance of membership as a vehicle for mastery. Whether 
abilities consist in putting one's hand in vats and interpreting what 
one feels or looking at a computer screen and interpreting what one 
sees, they are anchored in a discourse that sustains the practice of a 
community. Like the COB worksheet for the claim processors, the 
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computer system of the paper mill workers described by Zuboff was 
designed outside their community of practice. Their difficulties thus 
had to do in a very central way with straddling forms of membership, 
with conforming procedurally to a view of their practice which they 
had not constructed. 
Situating human knowing and learning in the world in order to give it 
meaning thus implies not just a view from somewhere, as 
Smith (1988) cleverly suggests, even if somewhere is construed 
broadly to be a specific activity rather than just a physical location. 
Activities take place in the context of specific practices, where a 
practice is a set of shared ways of going about doing things, including 
communicating. These practices shape the meanings of activities and 
thus give meaning to the representational information they involve, as 
Wittgenstein (1953) ·argues convincingly. But Wittgenstein's practice, 
what he calls a .. form of life," is that of a philosopher, still strangely 
unpopulated, or if assumed theoretically to be populated as a matter of 
course, only populated anonymously. Social practice is organized in an 
articulation of communities of practice in which members not only 
give meaning to symbols, but construct their sense of themselves as 
agents: social practices and social communities of actual persons are 
inseparable. 
Situating human knowing and learning in the world thus implies a 
view from someone: someone in some activities in the context of some 
practice in the context of some communities of practice in which the 
someone holds various forms of membership. Meaning is not just a 
matter of correspondence-another of Smith's terms-between 
representation and the world; it doesn't just require a location in time 
and space, which anchors consciousness in the world and from which 
denotation can be achieved. Meaning is always relative to a sense-
making landscape; it is the dynamic product of a trajectory of 
participation, of a crossroads of interrelated forms of membership, 
with a history and a future. Specific situations and specific activities 
are part of this node of participatory membership which anchors 
consciousness in cultural interpretation frameworks; and it is in the 
nexus of such frameworks that objectivity and subjectivity interact to 
produce meaning. 
The relation of information to learning is therefore a complex one: 
while important, issues of quantity and presentation of information are 
only one side of the question. I would claim that the paradox of the 
black-box syndrome is due to the fact that information by itself does 
not generate identities of participation, even when access to 
information is not a problem; it is in fact just as likely to generate 
identities of non-participation. The open structure of the claim 
processing office is an important characteristic in making 
conversations available for everyone in the direct neighborhood to 
overhear. But this is not just a matter of information flying around; for 
the claim processors, it also implies participation in their community 
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of practice. So it has a very different effect on their lives than the large 
windows of the manager's office or the internal publications 
distrtbuted by Alinsu's management. Even the suggestion box in the 
office is not the means of sharing information that it is meant to be, 
but a symbol of identities of non-participation. 
Sheila: "They have a suggestion box, but nobody uses 
it." 
Maureen: "But even if we went with a great suggestion, 
maybe how to speed things up or whatever. 
and I told [my supervisor], if it had to do 
with the computer or something, then it all. 
or ... even seating arrangements, I mean, it's 
a big thing, I mean, [management], they all 
have to get together to change, to change 
[the name of something], you know what I 
mean. They can't just, it seems to me, they 
make simple things, things that should be 
simple and clearcut, I mean, they make 
them into projects that go on forever ... 
Negotiation of meaning 
Because of the need constantly to produce and recontextualize 
representational objects in the fields of meanings, living meaningfully 
in a culturally constituted world implies a continuous process of 
negotiation of meaning. The use of the word "negotiation" here 
requires some clarifications, since negotiation for the present purpose 
is not defined as "striving toward an explicit agreement between 
parties." However, the term is convenient because it does convey 
essential aspects of the idea I am trying to propound: it gives a flavor of 
continuous interaction and of gradual give and take, and suggests that 
some shared entity extending beyond the individual spheres of 
participants is created in the process. Characteristics of negotiation 
in this context include: 
• it is a process meaning extends through time and 
space; meaning is dynamic, it 
requires existence in motion 
through fields of meanings; 
• it is an active process meaning arises out of active 
participation in practice; 
• it is an interactive process meaning implies differentiated 
resistance in an objectified world; 
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• it is a creative process meaning does not preexist, it is 
produced constructively in practice: 
for negotiation of meaning to be 
possible in practice, ambiguity must 
be inherent in any representation: 
• it is a process of change meaning is continuously productive 
for all involved of new meanings; 
• its result extends beyond meaning is a relation that can never 
the individual spheres be completely internalized or 
of participants externalized: 
• its result is not explicit meaning itself cannot be 
represented as it always arises out of 
a confluence of representational 
information and participation; 
• the viewpoints involved meaning itself is not communicable: 
need not be shared and need not be. Misunderstandings 
are sources of new meanings as 
much as sources of problems. They 
need to be resolved only when they 
become dysfunctional for a given 
practice. 
Because the negotiation of meaning always takes place as an activity, it 
is not just a contemplative process, but one that changes the world, 
and thus one that resolves dilemmas and achieves goals. There is an 
important idea about reasoning processes here, which I will only 
mention in passing and which I have explored a bit further elsewhere 
(Wenger, 1988a). The idea is that meaning, not representation, is the 
basic medium of what is often called "reasoning" or "problem-
solving." This presents a profound difference with rule-based theories 
of incremental knowledgeable actions because negotiation of meaning, 
while reflecting the contingency of behavior, does not make a 
fundamental distinction between condition and action. Situations and 
knowing are not discrete entities in which the latter applies to the 
former, but are both constructed at the same time in the fields of 
meanings. The person is part of the situation to be resolved and the 
process is one of constructing within the situation a vantage point that 
transforms it into its resolution. Conditionality, which is a form of 
reification, is different from contingency. In this context, the use of 
calculus on representations typical of information-processing theories 
is viewed as a very specialized cultural form of reasoning, which 
requires the availability of proceduralized representations, with both 
their power in achieving well-specified behaviors and their risks in 
ignoring meaning. 
112 
There is something hermeneutic to the relational view of meaning 
outlined in the table above, to this constant process of negotiation, of 
desituating and resituating; yet. placed in the context of membership 
in communities of practice. it is not solipsistic, because negotiation of 
meaning takes place as part of the practice of a community in which 
shared activities and artifacts are constructed and in which the 
individual self is defined with respect to trajectories of participation 
through the social structure. Thus neither the location of meaning nor 
the individual as an entity are taken as naturally given. Both are socially 
constituted. What is being negotiated is a constant becoming, through 
the continuity of activities in practice and at the same time through 
the forms of membership in which these activities belong and make 
sense. Cultural transparency in the socially constituted world then 
implies the negotiation of an identity with respect to a system of 
differentiated ways of belonging, differentiated ways of being. An 
important point to keep in mind is that this negotiation of identities of 
participation is not just an individual process but mutually constitutive 
relations between individuals and communities. 
Two crucial ideas are emerging from this discussion. First, information 
is always objectified in specific communities of practice; and second 
the negotiation of meaning implies the construction of identities of 
participation in shared practice as a vehicle for cultural transparency. 
These two considerations taken together have important ramifications 
for understanding and supporting learning processes. They suggest 
two dimensions for analyzing the quality of what is learned in specific 
circumstances, which could be called .. cultural distance" and 
.. negotiatedness." Cultural distance is a relation among communities of 
practice that would capture issues such as common practices, 
common members, shared boundary objects, etc. Negotiatedness 
would capture the degree to which the negotiated construction of 
identities of participation is allowed to enter in the transformation of 
information into cultural transparency. The construction of identity 
inherent to the negotiation and renegotiation of meaning provides a 
vehicle between learning and knowing so that the degree of 
negotiatedness is a feature of a learning process that carries over as a 
feature of the knowledge that results. Neither dimension by itself is 
sufficient to characterize learning. 
Learning about the claim processing office was an interesting 
experience in this regard, because there was a definite cultural 
distance to be bridged at many levels of mutual identities of non-
participation, and yet my presence there and my direct involvement in 
the local practice for an extended period of time allowed me to engage 
in negotiation of meaning and anchor my understanding in 
participation. Thus I can use it in a fluid way that is not possible for 
the reader of this thesis. It is not merely a matter of being on location: 
I could have taken a guided tour and still in a sense know "less" than 
by having some conversations in a cafe with people who work there. It 
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is not merely a matter of quantity of information either, even though it 
is true that I have acquired much more information than I can convey 
in this writing. But there is something about being there that got 
absorbed into my being and that gives life to the information I have: to 
some extent, and with all sorts of limitations, I have gained an identity 
of participation that gives fluidity to my understanding. 
The point I am trying to m-ake is that knowing more or less is not just 
a quantitative issue, but a qualitative one of negotiatedness as well. 
This may define a continuum of participation in meaning that would 
contrast literalness to negotiatedness of knowledge with respect to 
the communities of practice where information is rooted. One would 
usually expect identities of participation to result in knowledge with a 
high degree of negotiatedness and identities of non-participation to 
result in literal knowledge, that is, knowledge that is highly 
dependent on the representational form of information. 
The problems of the COB worksheet then can be understood both in 
terms of the cultural distance between communities of practice 
involved and in terms of the literalness promoted by the 
proceduralized encoding of the representation. The claim processors 
had no opportunity to negotiate a form of participation that included a 
meaning of the COB procedure that would support successful 
conversations with customers on the phone. Explanations, when there 
were any, could not become connected to the processors' own 
practice because they were handed down through intermediaries as 
representational labels such as "aggregate" without involving the 
collective construction of a shared practice in which the meaning of 
these representational labels could be negotiated. And it did not work: 
literalness propagated itself, amplified as it went through new layers, 
all the way to unsuccessful phone calls. The importance of the 
negotiatedness of understanding becomes manifest when one has to 
renegotiate it in a conversation with a new person who has a different 
perspective on the problem. Then it really matters that understanding 
possesses a degree of negotiatedness that frees it from 
representational labels. My argument is that such communicative 
fluidity requires an identity of participation in a community in which 
an ongoing discourse supports the negotiation of cultural transparency 
as part of the practice. 
Cultural distance and negotiatedness as characteristics of cultural 
transparency redefine the terms in which to think about issues of 
"knowledge transfer" by focusing attention on the social 
circumstances under which learning is taking place. They bring to the 
fore questions about the degree to which learning takes place within a 
community of practice or requires moving across community 
boundaries as well as the degree to which identities of participation 
provide a malleable medium for the renegotiation of meaning. For 
instance, authority and control are likely to engender literal 
knowledge, insofar as they distort negotiation by requiring conformity 
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to the visible (e.g., the articulate, the canonical). Literal knowledge on 
its own is likely to be brittle and narrowly applicable because the 
dependence on the literal representation makes it difficult to 
renegotiate the meaning of what has been learned in situations in 
which it could be useful. In contrast, negotiated knowledge is already 
part of an ongoing transformation of the self with respect to the 
cultural world. Thus the widely-held belief that decontextualized 
knowledge transfers better is probably wrong. In fact, it seems likely 
to be just the opposite. I suspect that negotiatedness is a more salient 
characteristic for issues of transfer than traditional notions such as 
generality, abstractness, concreteness, or articulateness. In contrast to 
these structural features of information, negotiatedness is a dynamic 
concept, which reflects continuous construction and renewed 
involvement. The important point here is that this negotiation must 
involve the negotiation of forms of membership and of identities of 
participation. In this regard, this framework goes beyond the 
traditional constructionist view, because what is constructed is not 
just a set of cognitive structures, but a way of belonging. Unlike the 
view of the person as cognitive entity typical of constructionist 
theories, my notion of negotiatedness centrally takes membership and 
social identity into account. 
Difficulties of didactic classroom teaching can then be understood at 
two levels. The wide cultural distance between the school context and 
the communities where what is taught in classrooms is "live practice" 
is problematic enough, and a discussion of it could take a whole thesis. 
One thinks of the difference between school problems in various 
subjects and the practice of professionals who deal with these 
subjects. Similarly one thinks of the distance between the world and 
the classroom for young Americans, who can keep track of 
complicated bowling scores (Herndon, 1971), or young Brazilians, who 
can perform complex price calculations during street sales (Carraher 
et al., 1985), but cannot solve structurally identical problems in their 
classrooms. Here questions of transfer clearly have little to do with the 
structure of the problem itself, but reflect the distance between 
distinct social practices. Viewing different practices as different ways 
of being in the world and analyzing them in terms of their internal 
coherence is more likely to afford the required breadth in analytical 
leverage than viewing problem-solving rationality in strictly 
information-processing terms as a universal, disembodied 
phenomenon which is hampered by "human factors" classified as 
"deviations" (Lave, 1988a). 
But in addition to cultural distance, the ex cathedra nature of the 
communication processes typical of classroom teaching further 
inhibits actual negotiation of meaning in practice. This is not only a 
question of verbal versus hands-on teaching, of discovery versus 
guidance, of group lecturing versus one-on-one tutoring. It is also, and 
perhaps primarily, an issue of the social landscape that would allow 
interesting communities of practice to be formed around subject 
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matters. In addition to its isolation from authentic practice, the 
traditional classroom is a terrible place to learn because there is little 
texture to negotiate knowing identities. Think of a classroom with a 
teacher sticking out and a flat landscape of thirty students all learning 
the same thing at the same time. Knowing means pleasing the teacher, 
raising your hand first. getting good grades. It is no surprise that by 
the time students are adolescents and their requirements for a 
coherent, well-structured identity of participation in their 
communities of practice becomes crucial, schooling does not offer 
them the material to do so and they have to create communities of 
practice of their own. These are at odds in various ways with the 
institution in which-and, according to the official agenda, from 
which-they are supposed learn. Either they set themselves in direct 
opposition to the school, viewed then as an alienating institution, or 
they use the school qua institution as a stage for becoming someone 
through its social activities and hierarchies (Eckert, 1989). 
The two dimensions of cultural distance and negotiatedness can shed 
a constructive as well as a critical light on the issue of specialized 
pedagogical settings. As my own experience in the claim processing 
office testifies, these two dimensions are interestingly related in that 
they may possibly compensate for each other. For instance, under a 
benevolently domineering master who seems to allow no give-and-
take, an apprentice may develop an identity of participation in highly 
negotiated forms of cultural transparency insofar as direct involvement 
in communal practice offers such a rich context to negotiate meaning 
that the rigidity of authority can do little harm. Conversely, there may 
be the possibility of having learning across cultural distances remain 
effective to the extent that the negotiatory process in the development 
of cultural transparency is preserved. If the degree to which 
communication can convey meaning is determined by the degree to 
which it involves negotiation, this would suggest the principle that the 
farther one is from the locus of the subject matter, the more one has 
to allow for, and in fact actively support, negotiation in communication 
processes. In other words, teachers, not so much by the specific 
content of their communication actions as by their status as members 
whose own relation to the target practice is based on the negotiation 
of an identity of participation, have to "represent" the community of 
practice as partners for the negotiation of meaning. This experience of 
"nonrepresentational representation," which in small but crucial ways 
is fairly common in our daily conversations, is not one that is 
emphasized in our schools. Identities of participation in a community 
of practice involved in such negotiation of meaning would in itself be 
an authentic experience of developing cultural transparency.12 
12 This suggests that being an active practitioner might be one of the most deeply 
essential requirements for teaching: it might even be in itseJf considered a pedagogical 
"method," so to speak. 
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Cultural transparency and design 
In sum, as a definition of understanding in practice, cultural 
transparency does not just refer to a quantity of information, to a 
horizon that delimits the surface of an area of visibility. It implies a 
form of membership in a socially textured cultural world, which 
provides access to information and gives it meaning through the 
negotiation of identities of participation. It thus emphasizes the 
qualitative character of knowing so that one could know .. less" by 
knowing .. more." Negotiatedness, that is, the degree to which 
participation and information interact in the process of the 
negotiation of meaning becomes a feature of what is known. If cultural 
distance, disconnectedness, rigidity, or scarcity of resources prevent 
negotiation and generate identities of non-participation, the resulting 
knowledge is limited by a literal dependence on the representational 
character of information. By contrast, negotiatedness is a dynamic 
quality of participation in meaning that carries with it the creation of 
new meanings. These concepts have provided a characterization of 
pedagogical relations in terms of their effects on knowledge and its 
potential use. 
If information and participation are intrinsically dual aspects of the 
negotiation of meaning, membership cannot be separated as a .. strictly 
motivational" issue, as it is if we think of knowledge as information. An 
identity of participation provides a way of becoming in which 
negotiating the meaning of information makes sense. In this respect, 
it plays an interpretive role. As the sense of self that one constructs in 
becoming a knower is an interpretive relation to a practice, this thesis 
could be viewed as an initial step toward exploring 'the .. indexical" 
function that social membership fulfills through the process of 
coherence of identity in the context of shared social practice. Unlike 
investigations of this type at a broad cultural level, the definition of 
cultural transparency in terms of relations between local communities 
of practice provides a framework for understanding the embodied 
details of the process. 
Looking at the situation from these differeµt perspectives is not of 
mere analytical interest, but leads to very different attitudes toward 
communicating, teaching, designing and organizing change in 
institutions. In particular, designing glass boxes turns out to be a 
broader enterprise than anticipated, since knowledge is socially 
organized and significant changes in knowledge will imply changes in 
the social organization of human communities. Bringing information 
into view, as difficult a task as it may be and in spite of all good 
intentions, may have the contrary effect by confirming identities of 
non-participation. Then supporting learning means organizing 
information and participation in ways that make sense to specific 
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locations in the social landscape and can make a difference in the 
forms of membership of those who live there. It means opening the 
possibility of becoming someone with respect to what is being learned. 
Such a view of learning is different from a view based on individual 
skills and has correspondingly different implications for what it may 
mean to .. teach," if teaching is construed broadly as supporting 
learning. For instance, instead of teaching individuals new skills to 
cope with new computer systems being installed. one would create 
design processes that include existing communities of practice and 
take advantage of their abilities as a way to transform them into their 
own future (see Ehn, 1989). 
The emphasis on identity construction in the development of cultural 
transparency as discussed here may give the impression of a largely 
adolescent perspective. Adults are supposed to have constructed an 
identity so they can proceed with the business of living. There are two 
points to make in this regard. First, the belief that identity 
construction, which is so critical a part of adolescence. is not part of 
adulthood is largely a myth: it is merely not experienced as a crisis. 
Second, to the degree that this belief is not a myth, it may reveal a 
problem. Learning may be easy in youth precisely because the person 
is still in construction. The most important aspect of learning may lie 
in the temporary acceptance of a non-coherent form of membership. 
That learning in nontrivial ways requires a transitional incoherence of 
identity may then be its most problematic and most difficult aspect. 
What this suggests with respect to the glass-box dream of a learning 
society is that our culture may need to develop new forms of 
adulthood, which quell the painful crises of adolescence without 
killing the dynamism of the sense of self that makes it such an open 
and creatively generative learning period in life. 
Computation and intelligence: the black-
box mirror 
I would like to conclude this chapter with a few important remarks on 
the subject of artificial intelligence (AI), which is my field of study. Not 
only are AI techniques holding the most challenging technological 
promises for the design of glass boxes, but considering some 
foundational questions about artificial intelligence will help clarify 
some of the points made in this chapter. Furthermore, questions about 
intelligence are the topic of a subtextual inquiry underlying this entire 
thesis. 
As any programmer could readily tell, it would be very easy to program 
the COB worksheet discussed in the last chapter. because the data 
structure used by the claim processors is already one on which one 
operates procedurally. In a sense, the worksheet is already a computer 
program, precisely because it obviates participation in meaning. The 
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fact that there is a profound similarity between programming a 
·· computer and designing procedural forms is to be expected of what 
both normative structures and AI are about and what they reveal about 
the definition of social agents. To anticipate my point, computer 
programming can be viewed as creating only fields of visibility without 
corresponding participation: therefore computer programs cannot 
renegotiate the meanings of their own terms. 
I would claim that AI, as a cultural and technological phenomenon, is 
the epitome of the black-box syndrome. Insofar as AI programs are 
meant to perform some of the functions culturally associated with 
human intelligence, they can be considered the ultimate technological 
artifacts. And producing proceduralized representations in order to 
automate is in final analysis what AI is about. Even though we may 
claim that our programs do search and perform inferences, this is only 
a "level of description ... Eventually our systems have to come down to 
extreme instances of the type of proceduralized interpretations I have 
been talking about. Such total dependence on the proceduralized 
representation of information is characteristic of what I have called 
literal knowledge, which I have claimed suffers from "brittleness" 
with respect to new situations. The "knowledge" of AI programs-or 
rather their information-can only apply to situations by matching 
features in classification schemes defined in advance. This process of 
classificatory feature matching is a one-sided, nonconstructive 
process, by which conditions for applicability are determined in terms 
of a fixed set of features. It is antithetical to negotiation, which is an 
interactive, relational process, by which both knowing and the 
situation are constructed together.13 
In the terms of earlier discussions, one could say that in its purpose of 
producing representations whose intended interpretation into 
behavior does not depend on participation in meaning at the time of 
interpretation, AI, as the end-product of a long tradition of logical 
rationalism in Western thought, could be described as the science of 
"the production of meaninglessness." Put in those terms, this 
statement is of course somewhat gratuitously iconoclastic, and is 
meant to be facetious rather than offensive. But it does hit on the point 
that our own intuitions about intelligence are in fact contrary to this 
demystifying perspective on AI. We tend intuitively to associate 
intelligence, not with the procedural interpretation of 
representations, but with the production of new meanings. Maybe this 
explains a curious phenomenon about the AI community: its subject 
eludes it. Indeed as soon as a problem looks like it is solved in AI 
13 AI-like intelHgence may therefore be the epitome of what we do not want learning to 
produce. But this interpretation of AI suggests a crisp characterization of one of the 
core issues to be addressed by the AI subfield of intelHgent tutoring systems (in the 
context of which the inquiry of this thesis originated): exploring the communicative 
characteristics of proceduralized representations when interpreted culturally. 
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terms, it tends no longer to be considered an AI issue because it no 
longer seems to involve intelligence. 
This view of programming as the production of meaninglessness is in 
keeping with my argument in preceding chapters that 
meaninglessness is a relation between the practice of a community 
and the outside of that community, a relation which articulate the two 
without a shared practice. Even though, as an artifact, a computer 
always exists as part of the practice of communities, there is no 
community of practice in which it can reasonably be said to find a form 
of membership, and I have argued that participation in meaning 
implies membership in a community of practice. The computer then 
is not to be viewed as a metaphor for human cognition in general, as it 
is in many current information-processing approaches to the study of 
cognition. Rather it is to be viewed as one extreme on a continuum of 
participation: the extreme that represents as absolute an absence of 
participation in meaning as an "enactor" can have.14 
In producing impressively appropriate behavior in machines, AI 
programming is therefore not an epistemological surprise. We already 
know that it is possible to proceduralize our understanding for 
interpretation outside our practice: we do it among ourselves, as I have 
described. To say that AI programming is not an epistemological 
surprise is not to say that it is useless or easy: sophisticated 
programming is an intellectual achievement and proceduralization 
does have its place in productive life. From this standpoint, as long as 
AI programs are useful, my remarks might mean little beyond 
philosophical niceties. At best, they may help clarify and resolve some 
problems these programs may encounter in fitting within broader 
human decision and communication processes, of which they are 
made part. But AI has an epistemological heritage and epistemological 
ambitions beyond the production of useful artifacts: in the 
computational metaphor for the mind. 
Of course, this metaphor finds its legitimation in the parallel that 
mental activity has to correspond to physical transformations in the 
brain, just like executing our AI programs has to correspond to 
physical transformations in electronic circuits. And the brain is but an 
object. That the brain has a crucial function for intelligence is not to 
be denied, but recognizing that fact does not imply, as a particular 
version of the mind/body problem would have it, that intelligence has 
to be located in the brain. The brain is the brain of a body and the body 
is the body of a person, and the person is, needless to say, a member 
of one or more communities of practice. From the perspective I have 
14 Or whatever one might want to call this social function: I was trying to avoid the 
term agent. Note that there may be very restricted areas in which the computer can be 
said to have some form of participation, for instance in its own physical exiStence 
through a primitively cyclic notion of time, via its internal clock (Smith, 1987). 
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developed in this chapter, the brain is information, just like the world 
is. Actions result in changes in the brain just like they result in 
changes in the world. What is inside is like what is outside: the grey 
chemistry of a synapse like the wild strawberry, which I just picked 
and is now being placed, deliciously red, between your carefully 
rounded lips. If intelligence has anything to do With meaning, then the 
locus of individual intelligence has to be in the dynamic relation of 
living in a cultural world, which gives rise to fields of meanings as a 
medium for intelligence and which I have described as the negotiation 
of meaning. The person exists in that moving stillness between the 
past and the future: shaped through changing fields of meanings by 
history in the making. What distinguishes a person from a machine 
then is not information, or information processing, to which they both 
have rightful claims; it is personhood through membership, which 
subsumes, but in our present culture clearly includes, the question of 
having a body. Membership as an indexical therefore resolves the 
dichotomy of the mind-body problem.us 
Because of the complete absence of identity of participation in 
meaning, the behavior of a computer is not terribly informative about 
intelligence as owned by members of communities of practice. When it 
comes to understanding intelligence, the production of behavior 
through proceduralized representations is not only epistemologically 
unsurprising; it may be deeply misguiding in relegating issues of 
meaning. For one thing, it may suggest pedagogical ramifications that 
are profoundly counter-productive, even while seemingly bound to 
achieve desired effects: emphasizing proceduralization on a large 
social scale because it seems to produce expected behavior may well 
be like killing the goose With the golden eggs. What we don't 
15 A few remarks are in order. First, one might be tempted to say 'Let us give our 
computer a form of membership then.' It is important to realize that membership is a 
mutual relation between a community of practice and a person that cannot be decreed 
in the abstract but arises out of participation in a shared practice, as anyone who tried 
with good will to get a group of children deep in play to include a weeping outcast knows 
well. It would therefore not be sufficient to decide that a computer is a member of a 
community or even to make discrete efforts to treat it as such; the community would 
have to develop a practice such that the computer's membership becomes a reality. Such 
a profound transformation of our culture is not very likely in the foreseeable future 
(and questionably desirable). Second, given differences in body and "culture" the issue 
of intelligence in other species is much more similar than those who feel a need to build 
clear separations would have us believe. Lastly, in addressing epistemological issues of 
personhood , this philosophical argument could easily be construed as addressing 
metaphysical issues of soul, which it is not. Construing it as such reflects, in my 
opinion, collective confusions we have developed on this subtle topic by investigating 
the issue of the existence of soul-with an attendant mythology of paralyzing 
proportions-as a philosophical question before trying to comprehend existentially 
what soul might be, what existing in the perception of self, time, and space might mean 
with respect to the existence of the universe and our presence in it. These profound 
issues require investigation tools which we as a culture have not even started to 
develop. 
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understand well about intelligence is how negotiation and creation of 
meaning are anchored in membership in communities of practice, 
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Learning 
the practice 
of communities: 
legitimate 
peripheral 
participation 
Cultural transparency has to be attained; a theory of cultural 
transparency is therefore in need of a theory of learning. Given the 
argument of the preceding chapter, a theory of learning that centers 
exclusively on the acquisition of information or skills by individuals 
viewed as cognitive entities is clearly inadequate, and probably 
misguiding. This chapter describes an attempt to develop an 
alternative framework for theories of learning, one that takes relations 
of membership as a analytical foundation. 
Identities of participation cannot be invented, decreed, or conferred; 
they have to grow out of engagement in the practice of a community of 
which one is becoming a member. This engagement in practice has to 
be such that the initial relation of membership can transform itself 
through time into a fully established form of membership: the 
newcomer has to have access to both fields of visibility and fields of 
invisibility. So the participation of the newcomer has to find a 
legitimate place in the practice of the community and this place has to 
be such that it allows the newcomer to be peripherally involved in 
activities of interest in order gradually to become a full participant. 
This process of increasing involvement, we have called .. legitimate 
peripheral participation" (Lave and Wenger, in press).16 
16 Like the related term community of practice, this term was ortgtnally coined by 
Jean Lave , who used it in the context of her ethnographic study of craft apprenticeship 
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Learning as legitimate peripheral 
participation: an analytical perspective 
The concept of legitimate peripheral participation has become the 
cornerstone of our theory of learning, whose purpose is to lay down a 
theoretical framework for understanding what people know and what 
they don't, what they can and cannot know, what they should or need 
not know and who decides, what they want to know and what they 
don't care to, and what form what they know takes in the context of 
their experience of their lives. 
The concept qf legitimat.e peripheral partici.pation 
Before moving on, it might be helpful to clarify briefly the choice of 
the term legitimate peripheral participation and of its components. 
Legitimacy and penpherality are relations to a practice: they are 
primarily characteristics of the form that learning takes, rather than 
characteristics of the person who is learning. The two obviously tend 
to become indistinguishable as, on the one hand, identities of 
participation and non-participation form, and on the other, legitimacy 
and peripherality become part of the content of learning. 
The three components of the term legitimate peripheral participation 
each contribute essential aspects of the total concept, but they are to 
be viewed as a whole. Indeed, there could be a temptation to consider 
each one separately as one pole of a pair of binacy opposites: legitimate 
versus illegitimate, peripheral versus central, participation versus non-
participation. For instance, it may not be very useful to try to 
understand our term by wondering what an "illegitimate peripheral 
participant" would be-a spy, an investigative journalist, or a reckless 
ethnographer perhaps. More to the point would be to ponder how the 
form that the legitimacy of participation takes is crucial in shaping 
both what can be learned and the form and significance that learning 
and knowing then take both for the learner and for the community. 
Similarly, it may not be very useful to wonder what a "legitimate 
among tailors in West Africa (Lave, in preparation). While many of the ideas explored in 
this thesis arose, directly or indirectly, out of my own intellectual apprenticeship with 
her, the development of the concept of legitimate peripheral participation into the 
foundation of a theory of learning were the fruit of our direct collaboration on this 
topic. Our research resulted in a monograph to be published as a short book, referenced 
in the text. When I use the first person plural in this chapter, I am referring to our 
working partnership. Here, I will only summarize briefly parts of the contents of the 
monograph to allow the reader to follow the inclusion of the concept of legttJmate 
peripheral participation into the argument of this thesis. For a more detailed account 
of the development of the theory of learning itself the reader is referred to the 
monograph. 
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central participant" is-a maypole image of social practice. More to the 
point would be to explore the multiple, differentiated, more or less 
committing ways in which a practice provides opportunities for 
participation and which locate participants in a landscape of forms of 
membership. To make this distinction very clear, we do not use the 
term "central participation .. as the endpoint of legitimate peripheral 
participation, but the term "full participation, .. where "full" is not 
used in the sense of complete, which would suggest a closed domain, 
but in the sense of .. totally qualified, accepted, or empowered, [as in] a 
full member. "17 In this sense, full participation does not imply one 
position at the top of a hierarchy, nor even success in a process of 
competitive selection. 
Legitimacy and peripherallty are used here to give a dynamic texture 
to the notion of participation. "Legitimate peripheral non-
participation" would make more sense than the opposition suggested 
earlier, and I have used a contrast of this sort in my argument so far. 
Again, however, this opposition should not be viewed as a simple polar 
dichotomy but as a textured variety of ways-some subtle and some 
flagrant-in which one can be included or excluded, or indeed both at 
the same. In this respect, there is a profound ambiguity in the notion 
of legitimate peripherality, in that peripherality may be a position from 
which one is in the process of gaining legitimate entrance into a 
practice, but it may also be a position in which one is maintained and 
thus legitimately kept from moving further inward. Peripherality as we 
use the term is thus a dynamic concept, which suggests movement. or 
opposition to movement. The ambiguity of the term is analytically 
useful because it reflects precisely the position of all newcomers in 
their ambitions to become participants in the practice of communities 
or in their reluctance to it: knowledge can be guarded just as it can be 
made available; it can be imposed just as it can be offered; a 
community of practice can be a fortress just as it can be an open door. 
A general analytical category.for learning 
Learning in the context of an apprenticeship was the original example 
of a historical realization of the concept that we used to explore our 
ideas. Apprenticeship has the clear characteristic of legitimate 
increasing involvement in the practice of a usually well-defined 
community: it starts with peripheral responsibilities of a useful sort, 
and leads, often through well-defined steps that imply changing 
viewpoints on and relations to the practice and the community, to full 
participation and a recognized identity of mastery. Although 
apprenticeship is often associated with craft and manual work, 
institutionalized as well as less formalized forms of it actually cover a 
17 The American Heritage Dictionary. Second College Edition. 
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very wide spectrum of practices in which highly skilled performance 
is expected, ranging from craft work to very abstract or intellectual 
specialties, such as post-graduate academic training or medical 
internship. This is an important point because we have found that our 
ideas are often met with the belief that they are only valid for a limited 
range of down-to earth, informal, narrowly contextualized capabilities. 
We claim that they are in fact very general. 
In spite of the useful parallel between apprenticeship and legitimate 
peripheral participation, it would be wrong to mistake our theory for a 
generalized or distilled version of apprenticeship. Apprenticeship is 
an educational institution with its own specific historical realizations, 
which present a wide variety of both successful and unsuccessful social 
and pedagogical systems. Legitimate peripheral participation thus 
takes place under apprenticeship as it does under other educational 
institutions. As a matter of fact, looking at apprenticeship from the 
perspective of legitimate peripheral participation has led us to 
reconsider some common beliefs about apprenticeship, such as its 
work-driven nature and the role of masters (see Lave and Wenger, in 
press). Legitimate peripheral participation is neither a specific 
educational form as opposed to another, nor a pedagogical method; it 
is a theoretical viewpoint, a general analytical category, which 
describes learning as a mode of engagement in practice, and which as 
such, cannot be said to be successful or unsuccessful. It is a descriptor 
of learning, whether or not it takes place in the context of an 
educational institution. 
Of course, there may be crucial differences in alignment between the 
trajectories of legitimate peripheral participation that take place in a 
particular context and the official agenda of an institution, an 
authority, or a pedagogical structure that attempt to defme that 
context, and thus to define success and failure. And finding an 
alignment may be an important task for success so defined. That is a 
very different issue; and it is one to the analysis of which the 
perspective of legitimate peripheral participation is essential because 
it clearly decouples learning from pedagogical structures and 
intentions. This decoupling does not imply that these structures and 
intentions are irrelevant to the analysis of learning or that no learning 
takes place where there is teaching. This is obviously not the case. But 
the decoupling suggests that what gets learned is not defined in any 
simple or direct way by what gets taught, or even by a subset of it or 
deviations from it. This relation is always mediated by the practices of 
communities that arise as a response to the pedagogical context. 
Therefore, no analysis of the pedagogical context by itself, its defming 
intentions and organizing structure, can render less analytically 
problematic the nature of what gets learned. 
In some sense, the perspective of legitimate peripheral participation 
turns the problem around. Instead of seeing learning as an 
independent activity that results in communities of practice among 
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people who have what they have learned in common-an alumni view 
of community formation-this perspective will attempt to identify the 
communities of practice that exist as a way to see what is being 
learned. These communities may be interstitial and their practice may 
be very different from the official agenda. Given a specific situation in 
which learning is of interest. does or does not take place according to 
some official version of what the situation is about. the analyst will try 
to understand what the landscape of legitimate peripheral 
participation is like. That will mean trying to find out what the 
relevant communities of practice are, how they are related and 
articulated, and how their respective membership is reproduced over 
time. In order to clarify this issue on the outset, it might be useful to 
look briefly at some other examples of learning situation, before 
turning to the claim processing office to explore further aspects of the 
concept as it relates the argument of this thesis. 
Analyzing learning as legitim.at.e peripheral participation 
The socialization of children is clearly another prime example of a 
context in which one can observe legitimate peripheral participation, 
given the position of children in its changing relations to the adult 
world. Looking at learning from this perspective would move the 
primary focus away from the child as a cognitive entity and place the 
emphasis on the possibilities for and organization of legitimate 
peripheral participation in the communities of practice of adults and 
older peers. Issues of fields of visibility and identities of participation 
would come to the fore. Viewing the process as legitimate peripheral 
participation also reveals the integrative character of this analytical 
perspective. Indeed it integrates, and thus includes in intricately 
connected and mutually constitutive ways, numerous aspects of 
socialization that are often reifled as separate phenomena for 
theorizing purposes. The formation of personhood is not a separate 
process from increasing participation in the practice of a child's 
adoptive communities: nor is language acquisition. The formation of 
personhood is not just a matter of interpersonal relations, but the 
construction of an identity of participation through mutual 
engagement in practice, where the coherence of identities is defined. 
Learning a language is not primarily learning a grammar and a lexicon 
from isolatable examples: neither is it primarily learning meanings and 
denotations, or even pragmatics from isolatable events; but it is 
primarily engaging in new shared ways of participating in practice, of 
which the use of language is an integral part. Utterances, semantic 
usage, 18 and speech acts are reified emerging properties of this 
18 I have avoided the word "meaning· here, since the integration of the acquisition of 
first llnguistic capabilities in increasing participation in the broader practice of a 
community speaks against the notion that words have well-definable meanings. The 
term "usage" is Wittgenstein's, whose views on language would I think imply the 
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broader process: becoming a co-talker is becoming a co-person, as it is 
becoming a co-practitioner, as it is becoming a co-member: all are 
integral aspects of becoming a participant in the total practice of a 
community. 
The two cases of apprenticeship and the socialization of children may 
seem selectively chosen to illustrate the concept of legitimate 
peripheral participation, but even schooling provides a compelling 
illustration. Even in the modem school, the last place where one 
would expect learning to take the form of legitimate peripheral 
participation; even there, in the home of the individual learner who 
acquires general knowledge and skills in a specialized, 
decontextualized setting; even there, in the center of a tightly 
intensified curricular process of knowledge transmission that makes 
the very concept of legitimate peripheral participation seem like the 
antiquated epitome of inefficiency; even there, in the shrine of an 
ideology of universality that makes the very notion of community of 
practice seem so profoundly, so absurdly, so dangerously parochial; 
even in the modern: school, like dandelions through cracks in the 
concrete, local communities of practice sprout everywhere; and 
viewing the learning that takes place in school as legitimate peripheral 
participation is insightful at two levels. 
At one level. the official classroom itself, confronted with the reality of 
its human task and of its isolation from society at large, abandons its 
universalistic ambitions and sets up a localized practice with its own 
idiosyncratic dilemmas, forms of discourse, and views of the world 
(Mehan, n.d.). And within that context, students form their own 
communities of practice, in the classroom as well as on the 
playground, to deal with the agenda of the imposing institution and 
the unsettling mysteries of youth.19 Processes of legitimate peripheral 
participation in actual classroom practices and in those of interstitial 
peer communities is likely to provide a more informative picture about 
what becomes substantial for the students' life trajectories, what they 
really learn, than thinking of school learning in terms of teachers 
implementing curricular prescriptions to impart general knowledge to 
cognitive entities who process it for their own future good. 
At another level, seeing the global position of schools in the context of 
society as a manifestation of the forms of legitimate peripheral 
participation that it offers to its newcomers with respect to its own 
social and cultural structures offers an understanding of what kinds of 
integration of language learning and socialization outlined here. The term "usage" is 
his way of conveying the idea that native speakers are unable to clearly articulate the 
meanings of their lexicon entries not because they do not have access to their own 
cognitive structures, but snnply because such isolable, articulable meanings do not 
exist. 
19 Not to talk about teachers who have to deal with school bureaucracies. 
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individuals our schools are producing and of the forms of identities of 
participation they enable in society at large. It was the great 
accomplishment of ethnographers of schooling such as Paul Willis and 
Penny Eckert to tie these two levels together: they studied the local, 
unofficial communities of practice that are formed within schools and 
analyzed how these relate to the social structure to the community at 
large in order to understand the production, in the same institutions, 
of such different persons as Willis' .. lads" and .. earholes" and Eckert's 
"jocks" and .. burnouts" (see Willis, 1977; and Eckert, 1989). 
The example of schooling also illustrates an important point about 
peripherality: its multi-layered character. The sequestration of the 
classroom from .. real world" practices (the school is, of course, also a 
real world practice, but a separate one) is a form of legitimate 
peripherality into which students are induced by increasing 
participation in the school's local practices. Furthermore, students 
form insterstitial communities of practice whose unofficial character 
makes them peripheral even to the school's own peripherality. And 
these communities have their own mutual articulations of 
peripherality, insiders and outsiders, newcomers and oldtimers. This 
entire system constitutes a very complex nexus of forms of 
membership in which identities of participation and and identities of 
non-participation are nested within one another. 
All the cases of legitimate peripheral participation I have described in 
this section have an important characteristic in common: involvement 
in actual practice along With more advanced peers as well as full 
practitioners brings to some extent their activities and attitudes into 
view. Legitimate peripheral participation thus implies some awareness 
of the paradigmatic trajectories and of the possibilities of full-or at 
least fuller-participation in a community of practice. This awareness 
is crucial to focusing exposure to the overwhelming richness, 
diversity, and vastness of the fields of visibility, available from the 
periphery of any practice, on the process of a coherent and dynamic 
transformation of the person. Therefore, having a sense of 
paradigmatic or possible trajectories of participation is an essential 
aspect of learning as a transformative process. 
This window of visibility is usually fairly local, or in any case localized 
through the practice of the immediate community, as it is in school 
through grade levels and status within peer groups. Thus this 
awareness of possible trajectories does not in itself imply a form of 
what Willis ( 1977) calls "penetration" or what one might want to call 
"true consciousness" or in-depth understanding on the part of 
newcomers (or of oldtimers for that matter). The fact that one can 
witness the lives of actual practitioners does not translate into a claim 
here that legitimate peripheral participation is necessarily a positive 
or elevating process for the learner. Hazing, for instance, is often a 
mechanism for forcing specific trajectories of participation onto 
newcomers. This can be found in many cases of apprenticeship, which 
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has often been used as a source of cheap labor in circumstances of 
exploitative labor relations.20 Hazing the neophyte can be seen as a way 
of reproducing conditions of oppression among peers and across 
generational waves. Similarly, the fact that socialization takes place in 
co-participation with older siblings, friends, and adults does not in any 
way mean that growing up gives one a "true" or even accurate 
perspective on life in any global sense. Analysis in terms of legitimate 
peripheral participation locates the determining factors of such 
outcomes not in the learning process but in the structure and 
articulation of communities of practice. The point I am trying to make 
here is that this analytical p~rspective draws attention to the 
importance of the awareness of paradigmatic trajectories in 
determining what in the fields of visibility becomes substantial in 
forming the person. 
Legitimate peripheral participation: 
becoming a claim processor 
On the morning of their first day at work, Alinsu's new recruits attend 
an introductory session in a conference room where they sit around a 
large conference table. During this session they are introduced to their 
choices in benefits packages, diligently sign forms about security 
breaches and display proofs of their eligibility for employment in the 
U.S., and watch a few videos that acquaint them in very general terms 
with the company, its businesses, and its official philosophy. The 
presentation of the session I attended was quite informative, though 
its style, while not unfriendly, was rather overbearing at times. It was 
made amply clear that the job was no joke and that failure to satisfy 
the requirements would result in firing. The imposing character of 
this magisterial introduction was met with a collusive demureness by 
the eleven new recruits. 
The training class: practicing peripherally 
In mid-morning, after our first ten-minute break, we moved into our 
classroom, where we were to take an 8-week training class before 
moving to our respective desks "on the floor." We met our instructors, 
who introduced themselves. Instructors are not specialized in this 
function, but are oltimers who take time off their regular functions to 
run these classes (and with very limited initial training on how to do 
this). After the friendly introductions, our class also started on a 
20 This common characteristic of apprenticeship has given it a poor reputation as an 
educational institution in some politically concerned circles. For a discussion of this 
issue, see our monograph (Lave and Wenger, 1n press) or some of the papers we refer to 
(Becker, 1972; Grosshans, 1989). 
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disciplinary tone reminiscent of the introduction. It took on a more 
congenial atmosphere as time went by, however, though still with 
occasional outbursts of stern digressions on discipline. And the 
demureness of my classmates relaxed progressively into a still 
submissive but less muted comraderte. 
During the first week. trainees are given definitions of terms and 
preliminary exercises that familiarize them with the use of the 
computer system. Toward the end of the week. they look at claims and 
process a few collectively. After that, the majority of the class is spent 
in processing claims, with one to three lectures per week. The lecture 
format is used to introduce new topics, such as surgery, coordination 
of benefits, chiropractic care, etc. A lecture typically lasts for about 
two hours. The trainees sit around the instructor who is either sitting 
with the training manual, which the group reads together, or standing 
at the blackboard giving explanations and writing down examples of 
encodings. After some introductory definitions, the lecture, both the 
instruction and the questions of the trainees, very quickly 
concentrates on how to handle a claim of the type under 
consideration. 
The claims processed by the trainees are not mere exercises, but real, 
"live" claims. For the first six weeks, all the claims to be processed in 
the class are selected by the instructors prior to distribution to the 
trainees so that their work is within the scope of what has been 
covered in the class so far. During the last two weeks of class, trainees 
get the same range of claims as they will on the floor. The only 
difference between the claims processed by the trainees and the 
claims processed by other processors is that the farmer's claims that 
result in payments of benefits are all sent to "quality review" before 
any disbursement is made. As processors move to the floor and 
become more experienced, this spending limit will be increased, so 
that only a small portion of the work of established processors goes 
through quality review (though there are also other reasons than 
amount of benefits that claims are routed to quality review, such as 
special payees different from the insured or the service provider). 
From practice to practice: making it on the.floor 
After the class is over, trainees physically Join their unit, but they 
remain "trainees" until they reach their "level 5." For the first few 
weeks after the class, their production quotas are very low, going up 
progressively to their level 4, called "training level." Furthermore, 
they do not have to answer the phone for quite a while. Reaching level 
5 can take up to._but must take less than-one year. During that time, 
trainees still receive special help from their "back-up trainer," an 
old timer. usually a "level 8," who will answer their questions and will 
on occasions sit with them at their desk to see them through the 
processing of a difficult claim. The situation, therefore, resembles 
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closely that of the class, except that the back-up trainer is less readily 
available than the class instructor. Still, trainees usually find the 
transition very difficult . 
.. It used to be 6 weeks, and they ... 6 weeks just wasn't 
enough. I mean, here, and then it was 8 weeks. So I don't 
know if they expanded it .... Cause the 8 weeks, it gives you 
the basic feel of things, but I mean, you're learning things 
everyday, new things everyday .... So they are just giving 
you, like, the bare essentials in training, you know, and 
then every day, for, even after 11 years, there is, you still 
see things new, because medical things are always 
changing. Ten years ago, an MRI, nobody knew what it 
was, you know, and people did not have AIDS, and you did 
not have all these experimental drugs and stuff, so it's 
always a learning process." 
In fact most people held the opinion that the classes were too short: 
!hat's probably why a lot of trainees leave, because they 
think 'Oh, now rm done, pow! I know how to process, and 
they come down here, and they, these claims that they 
can't readily ask the back-up trainer anything, you know, 
they don't have a person right there for them, you know. 
Whoever they have to ask, they have responsibilities just as 
well. They are not, you know, to be with them the whole 
time. So then, they come down, they have to start making 
decisions for themselves, or something. And then, here 
they think they knew it all, and they don't, arid that's just 
too hard for them. But you have to stick with it cause like, 
if you stick with it, you catch on with a lot of things, I 
think." 
But the perspective of legitimate peripheral participation might well 
shed a different light on the problem by focusing attention on the 
structure of participation. From that perspective, the class might even 
be too long. Indeed, one important reason that trainees find the 
transition to the unit difficult is that they leave most of the contacts 
they had established with other trainees during the class, and have to 
establish a new network for obtaining information quickly. Admittedly, 
trainees often do not join their unit alone, but in groups of two or 
three. The ones I followed, however, had not been given desks that 
were adjacent or even close enough for very rapid informal exchanges. 
The difficulty to form such a network quickly after joining the unit is 
due in large part to the production pressure on other processors and 
the absence of recognition of the general need for and work involved 
in helping newcomers (beyond the back-up trainer). I suspect that this 
is a major reason many newcomers quit in the first few weeks of being 
transferred to the floor. Correcting the situation by providing support 
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for the formation of networks is likely to be more effective than 
extending the class for a few weeks. 
To be a processor: a learning community of practice 
Learning among claim processors is not just a matter of training, but 
an integral part of the daily practice in the claim office. Memos. such 
as the one shown in Figure 6.1, keep coming in at a regular pace. And 
there are the voids, too, which constitute a threatening learning 
device so upsetting to all processors that they rarely forget something 
substantial for which they got "voided." Then there are all the 
reference material they consult, and the claims themselves, which 
often contain information about medical issues. And most important, 
processors learn through the constant flow of questions and 
comments they exchange in the course of their informal conversations 
and through what they sometimes refer to as "the grapevine." The 
importance of learning is officially recognized by the function of the 
back-up trainer who does not only answer questions from the trainees, 
but from everybody. And back-up trainers also ask other processors 
questions at times. While a back-up trainer holds her position for a 
substantial period of time, in some units, a role similar to that of the 
back-up trainer is fulfilled by the unit's level-S's who take turn to be 
the week's "question person." Oldtimers do not take advantage of this 
service very often, but this is not just because they have less questions: 
they also have their own networks for obtaining information. 
Though processors have used the word "learning" at times, (mainly 
while talking to me, it seems) to refer to their learning outside of 
training, they do not usually think of their work in this way. One day, 
at a meeting during which the unit supervisor had agreed that I could 
spend a few minutes explaining to everyone what I was trying to do 
there, I told the processors that I was interested in understanding 
how people learn, what they learn, and why, and that I was impressed 
by the amount of learning that was taking place day in and day out in 
the office. They were all surprised that I would choose this location for 
studying learning and to hear that they were learning so much. Yet 
when I gave them the concrete examples of the memos they receive, 
of the questions they ask each other, of the discussions they engage in, 
they all agreed that this was an integral part of their daily practice, 
and that they were in fact learning continually. 
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been overlooked that ••de the referral unnece11111ary. so to refre•h everyone's 
111emory, I have included copi•• of tho followin91 
non-Obstetrical time 
ASA modifier& 
1974 111odlfier• 
1969-1964 modifier• 
some thin9111 to r81118mber are1 
If ane11theala time i• OVl!R 4 ho\1r111 ..• unlt• are calc:ulated on 
10 minute interval• in•tead of 15 mlnut••· 
If the provldeE" uae• 11 modlflet· which 111 HOT on any of lheae 
liat•, call and obtain deacrlption. ln aome lnstances, the 
provider wlll uee -99 or -49 ..••. th••• denote MULTIPl.1! modifiers 
and we need a de11crlptlon to allow correct unit value•. 
Lately, there ha• been 1110re uae of the l'SI\ mrnHfiers .. these are 111111ally 
indicated by the uae or "Phyalcal Statu11 I.ett•r•" ... auch as Pl or PJ an<:! thP. 
uae of 5 dl9lt CPT codea ••• auch a• 99112 or 99140. 
I hope thl• i• helpful to all of you and U you have any queatlons, please 
see me. Thank•. 
Figure 6.1. A memo to help the processors in their learning. 
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When processors refer to what I call their constant need for learning, 
they tend to speak about change: changes in policies, in insurance 
plans, in medical practice, as well as changes in internal organization 
and practices. The constant need to adapt to change, which gives the 
lie to the label of routine even the claim processors sometimes put on 
their work, is perceived both as challenging and as frustrating; there 
seem to be a slight, gentle contradiction in their calling non-routine 
challenging claims .. junk" and their complaining that the job can be 
boring; of course, the coexistence of both can be understood by 
considering the production pressures that make any extraneous effort 
a threat to fulfilling quotas. 
Leaming as such is primarily associated in the mind of claim 
processors with the training classes and with occasional courses that 
are offered on specific topics. There are officially two types of learning 
taking place in the office; and the introduction of newcomers to the 
practice of claim processing and to the world of oldtimers can indeed 
be viewed as distinct from the ongoing learning of the community. Yet 
the actual processes involved in these two types of learning viewed as 
legitimate peripheral participation are amazingly similar. In a veiy real 
sense, even oldtimers are peripheral participants in the future 
practice of their community, as that future is continually constructed 
through a· multiplicity of interacting processes involving people close 
and far. 
To be a processor: leaming the practice of a community 
Because of the emphasis on actual processing, training classes are veiy 
similar to work in a real unit. Even the characteristic of constant 
change is something that trainees are exposed to veiy early on, as the 
practice they are just learning often changes from under their new 
knowledge. Moreover, being a trainee, both in the class and on the 
floor, is a legitimate and marked categoiy of membership within the 
community of claim processors. Even while attending the initial 
training class, trainees have with veiy close connection with the life of 
the office. As soon as they are hired, they officially belong to the unit in 
which they are going to work and which they have in fact already 
joined. The seating arrangement in the classes was determined by the 
instructors and indicated on the first day with name tags on each desk 
in the classroom and groups the trainees according to their units. 
Administratively, they are under the supervision of their 
future/ current unit supervisor, and not of the class instructor. They 
participate in unit meetings, missing class during that time, and use, 
as their practice curriculum, the plans and claims of their unit. 
This does not mean that the trainees' allegiance is completely with 
their unit. The local practice shared by the trainees is distinct from 
that of other workers. Friendships formed dµrtng the class, and some 
135 
processors were concerned that when the class was over and they 
joined their respective units, they would lose contact with each other. 
Thus the class also has a cohesion as a temporary community, which is 
recognized by the community at large. At Halloween time, for instance, 
there was a competition among all units in the office for the best 
decoration. Our class was asked whether we wanted to enter the 
competition for the best decoration with our respective units or as a 
unit of our own, and the trainees voted overwhelmingly to have our 
own decoration effort. (As it turned out, we actually won the 
competition, and as a result, received a loud and cheering .. round of 
applause for the trainees," along with a large box of M&M's.) Except 
for the presence of only one oldtimer (or often two) instead of a range 
of levels, the class is just like a unit. But this scarcity of exposure to a 
variety of full participants in the class is partially compensated by the 
fact that, while the trainees work in a separate room, they are in the 
same office as their more advanced colleagues, take breaks in the 
same lounge, ride the same elevators, and use the same bathrooms. 
They quickly become part of the scene. 
Thus from the very start, the trainees I was with in my classes were 
not just learning to process claims, they were becoming claim 
processors. The job skills they were acquiring were part of this 
becoming, but only a part of what they were learning. A lot had to do 
with how to be, how to become successful in that world, what to watch 
for, how the managers behaved, what consequences certain actions 
had, where useful information was to be found, who was who. And in 
the office as well as in the class, it is fascinating to observe how 
skillfully learners manage their learning with respect to the form of 
membership they are getting into. They learn how to engage and 
disengage, accept and resist, keep a sense of themselves in spite of 
the low prestige of their occupation. They learn to weave together 
their work and their private lives. They learn how to find little joys 
and how to be depressed. They learn how much they are to make 
sense of things they do or encounter. Trying or not to make sense, I 
observed earlier, is not just laziness or a matter of minimalizing the 
effort, but the formation of a coherent identity with respect to what 
they perceive as their opportunities. Thus they also learn how not to 
learn and how to live with their ignorance. They learn to keep their 
shoulders bent and their fingers busy. 
Yet it is not the case that one can easily reify individually the skills · 
they learn and categorize them individually as useful or harmful, as 
functional or dysfunctional. They become claim processors. The 
individual skills they learn only make sense within this total picture, 
which subsumes them and gives them life. This is not to say that no 
improvements are possible, that no changes to what they understand 
and to the sense of themselves they develop can be brought about. But 
it is to say that there is a coherence to the identity they construct, to 
the sense-making landscape they sculpt; a coherence that one must 
understand before dismissing any of its elements as limiting or 
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irrational, or as false consciousness. Any consequential changes will 
have to take such coherence into account and grow from inside it. 
Changing what they know in substantial ways will imply changing their 
condition in substantial ways: identities of participation do not lend 
themselves well to plastic surgery-an operation, claim processors 
would immediately think, most plans do not cover except as repair of 
accidental injuries. 
Legitimate peripheral participation: modes 
of engagement in social practice 
and forms of membership 
The fact that claim processors don't usually think of their adaptation 
to change as "Learning" is typical of the usual subsumption of learning 
under a person's engagement in practice. This points to an important 
aspect of the framework of legitimate peripheral participation: it does 
not take learning, viewed as the adaptation of behavior or 
informational changes in the brain, to be in itself problematic, to be 
the issue to reify. Learning is going on as a matter of routine. 
Moreover, learning as a trajectory of participation is not usually 
localizable in discrete events in time, nor informationally quantifiable. 
What is important to what one becomes, and thus to the degree of 
cultural transparency that one attains, is the landscape of forms of 
membership, fields of visibility and identities of participation. that are 
made possible by an individual's trajectory through the social 
landscape. 
This changes, for instance, the definition of what is traditionally 
descrtbed as a failure to learn. Acquiring an identity of non-
participation can involve just as much work. as much learning, as 
acquiring an identity of participation: it is simply learning something 
else than what is expected by the official agenda of the institutional 
setting. This was what I observed when I commented that some of the 
trainees in the classes I attended were managing their learning 
carefully in order to keep a distance from their job. But it can take 
much more dramatic dimensions, for instance, in the learning of 
marginalization through an identity of failure in schools, or through an 
identity of outsider in cases of sex or ethnic discrimination. And in 
institutional settings, learning this something else is often a process of 
developing an identity of participation in the practice of a 
marginalized community: failure to learn is learning somewhere else. 
To say that learning is subsumed under engagement in practice is not 
merely saying that it is situated in the activities of a practice, located 
there as an independently reifiable phenomenon. It is a claim that 
learning is above all an integral part of social practice, taken as a 
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generative process in which persons are engaged in the context of 
their life in a world in constant flux. Legitimate peripheral 
participation thus a way to talk about engagement in practice that 
subsumes learning as a central aspect. What is important to make clear 
is that it describes this engagement not just in terms of discrete 
activities but as a trajectory of participation. 
This does not imply that there are institutionalized forms of 
membership toward which one is moving; just that the progression 
makes sense as the construction of a coherent identity. While 
processing, claims processors don't just learn how to process claims, 
or even how to be a member of the claim processing community in a 
narrow sense. Their job also brings them into contact with other 
realms of life, where their functions give them privileged access to 
fields of visibility. 
Maureen: .. It's a good thing they don't have a lot of 
reports, so we don't read. I suppose some 
claims tend to have, you know, that kind of 
insight into the person. Uke sometimes, 
especially for psych, they'll send in these 
big long reports 'God, he tried to kill his 
wife!' 'Look what he did to his daughter!' ... 
But most of the claims, you know, I can't 
read this. I got production. 
Sheila: .. I know. Exactly. You're sitting there, and you 
know you're wasting about 10 minutes out 
of your production, cause you just, you get 
so ... " . 
Maureen: .. But we don't get that many reports." 
Sheila: .. No, we don't get that many." 
Mary: .. Or the accidents. And the little part that says, 
you know, 'Was this because of an accident?' 
Sometimes those are so funny. Oh, you just 
get some people that, ... Did you do that?" 
Maureen: "They tell you every little thing, you know, 
every little thing. I fell, I cracked two toes 
on my right foot, and I twisted the ankle on 
my left, and you know, I mean, every little 
thing. Then I took this pill and it gave me 
diarrhea. Things that you don't ... " 
Such windows of visibility take on temporary importance in bringing 
some amusing sparks into the pressured work lives of claim 
processors and may even cumulatively expand their horizon to some 
degree. But while these events certainly enter their brains and 
occasion informational changes there, they do not constitute 
substantive changes in their person. Other encounters do. For 
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instance, processors have a fairly intensive peripheral contact with the 
medical profession, which differs substantially from that of casual 
patients, and thus changes their own positions as patients. This 
consequence of their work was not part of their daily discourse, but 
many of them could describe this effect when asked, though they 
always kept a low profile about it. An oldtimer, who was also the 
mother of a young child, told me that knowing all the terms and 
having read many reports gave her critical insights into the work of 
the medical professionals she deals with. Yet, with a unarticulated 
awareness of her need to cooperate in maintaining a traditional 
doctor /patient relation, she confided that she usually tries not to show 
her own knowledge and not to ask too many technical questions. Some 
processors don't even admit that their relation to medical professional 
has changed, even though they talk openly about their own medical 
knowledge and awareness. 
Etienne: "Does that make a difference for you now, when 
you go see a doctor. Do you feel different?" 
Maureen: "No." 
Sheila: "Well, you know more about what they are 
talking about. I think it's ... when I went to 
the dentist yesterday, he told me that this 
joint and everything is kind of weak. And I 
knew exactly it was TMJ. I knew exactly. 
The way he was wording it." 
Maureen: "You're sort of, self-diagnosing yourself." 
Sheila: "Yeah, exactly. I think I pay more attention 
going to the doctor. Look at all these people 
who get sick, you know, maybe I should go. 
Maybe, I don't know if ... I haven't gone to 
the doctor in a long time, so." 
Maureen: "You read an operative report. 'Oh, I think I got 
this,' you know." 
Sheila: "Or I think I get to be a hypocondrtac. Oh that 
sounds like me, better go to the doctor; oh, 
that sounds like me, better go to the 
doctor." 
The processors' peripherality to the medical profession does build up 
to a new form of membership for them, even if it is still rather 
peripheral and does not result in a confidence to modify the service 
relation by displaying one's own resources, let alone challenging the 
performance of a professional in specific circumstances. This form of 
membership is admittedly not institutionalized or even explicitly 
marked in the culture in general. Yet one would not want an analysis in 
terms of legitimate peripheral participation to require that it move 
toward a predefined and marked form of membership or that it always 
end all the way in "full membership" in a well delineated community. 
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The fact that there exist actual communities of practice, with which 
one enters into peripheral contact, is crucial, as I will argue further, 
because it gives some structure to the potentialities of peripherality; 
but this does not mean defining fixed paths. Such an analytical 
requirement would create far too static a picture of the social world. 
At the same time, one would not want every encounter with a piece of 
information to be considered legitimate peripheral participation; the 
concept would lose its ability to capture the transformative character 
·of learning. 
The solution to this dilemma is that one has to ask about a given 
setting both what forms of legitimate peripheral participation are 
potentially open and what kinds of trajectory they align with. Analyzing 
learning, then, can be done not just in terms of information, not even 
just in terms of activities, but in terms of the opportunities for 
legitimate peripheral participation present in specific circumstances 
for specific persons on specific trajectories of participation. Thus it is 
not just the activity itself, but most of all the trajectories and forms of 
membership involved that determine the form of peripherality that 
any event actually carries. The encounters of claim processor with the 
medical establishment as well as the more common service 
encounters we experience daily-going to the doctor, interacting with 
a salesperson in a store, hiring a contractor to do some construction-
are typical examples of the complex relations between trajectories of 
participation that constitute engagement in practice. This view of the 
social world defines it more clearly and concretely as. a textured space 
of different potentials-both derivative and constitutive-for cultural 
transparency. 
Indeed what I have tried to show with the case of the claim processors 
is that not all events actually are on a trajectory into a form of 
membership, even though all events potentially are. The reader may 
recall my remark at the end of the first section of this chapter about 
the importance of paradigmatic trajectories of participation in 
determining what becomes substantial learning. This observation can 
be generalized when one views legitimate peripheral participation as a 
descriptor of engagement in practice: the analytical perspective of 
legitimate peripheral participation captures as one both the potentially 
dynamic and the actually transformative aspect of engagement in 
practice by aligning the great variety of peripheral experiences that 
living in the world provides along trajectories of becoming that are 
guided towards coherent-but not necessarily marked or even 
predictable-forms of membership. The indexicality of identities of 
participation constitutes and. is constituted by these trajectories, 
which are relations that involve an intricate dynamics between the 
past and future of individuals and the past and future of communities. 
The existence of corporeal, inhabited and socially organized, 
communities of practice, extant but in the process of their own · 
transformation, with a shared practice that represents a heritage but 
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is also in the process of its becoming, thus creates a varied-multiply 
strnctured but not rigidly so, open but not without limitations, 
unpredictable but not random-field of possibilities for becoming a 
knower. Understanding legitimate peripheral participation in specific 
circumstances will thus require an analysis of the configuration and 
articulation of communities of practice involved in specific situations. 
For a job like claim processing, which is considered to be relatively 
narrow, the con.figuration is actually rather complex, involving among 
others claim technicians, the medical establishment, underwriters, 
benefit representatives, accounting clerks, system designers, the legal 
profession, and their own managerial structure. Of course, newcomers 
to the claim processing community are peripheral to the community's 
own peripherality to these related practices. As in the example of 
schools discussed earlier, peripherality is multi-layered. Furthermore, 
the way in which identities of non-participation can be acquired in the 
process of acquiring identities of participation, and vice versa, in 
marginalized communities of practice further illustrates the complex 
nature of legitimate peripherality as the articulation of multiple forms 
of membership. 
In this regard, the unremarkable fact that trainees have a transitional, 
but very real, and here officially marked, form of membership points 
to a general but subtle aspect of the principle of legitimate peripheral 
participation. Saying that learning implies a trajectory to a form of 
membership does not mean merely that new forms of membership are 
the consequences of learning: going to school, passing exams, getting 
a degree, and then being a bona fide member. It means that learning 
must itself be understood as a transitional form of membership. This 
can be seen very clearly in traditional forms of apprenticeship by the 
fact that the apprentice's provisional membership must be legitimized 
by the master. As it turns out, this is often the master's main function, 
taking even precedence over instructional ones, as learning usually 
occurs in large part through interactions with peers or near peers, 
and through exposure to the practice. But even though such reified 
institutional markers of legitimacy are not usually found, it is still the 
case that the availability of the practice of any community is part of the 
organization of that community in its articulation with the broader 
community in which its practice has a place. Thus the legitimacy of 
the access that claim processors have to medical records as a matter 
of routine is a constitutive aspect of the organization of peripherality in 
the medical community. Opportunities for legitimate peripheral 
participation then become a defming characteristic of communities of 
practices, which describes the social organization of their practices in 
terms of the modes of legitimate peripheral participation they allow or 
provide, and discourage or prevent. 
To sum, the concept of legitimate peripheral participation has 
provided a perspective on learning that is not only consonant with the 
development of the concept of cultural transparency in earlier chapter 
but can be viewed as merely another angle of the same perspective. Its 
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expansion into a general descriptor of engagement in practice, which 
includes but is not limited to intentionally organized learning, has 
provided a handle on the potential and actual transfonnative character 
of such engagement through the concept of trajectories of 
participation. As a further dimension in this analytical discourse. 
legitimate peripheral participation has also given additional texture to 
the notion of communities of practice by defining around any practice 
a landscape of differentiated forms of participation and thus 
differentiated forms of membership. The picture of the importance of 
the notion of community of practice for a theory of cultural 
transparency comes out both refined and enriched. This has prepared 
the way for the next chapter, which further discusses the role of this 
notion as an analytical category. 
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Communities 
of practice: 
the social 
fabric of 
cultural transparency 
After some initial definitional remarks at the end of Chapter 3, I have 
used the term community of practice often but somewhat loosely, as 
its intuitive connotations have served my purpose, but it is now time to 
deal with the concept more directly. The purpose of this chapter is 
not, however, to provide the definitive definition of the concept of 
community of practice in the abstract. to provide for the reader a 
proceduralized method for determining, given any social 
configuration, whether it is or is not a bona fide community of 
practice. Such an operationalized definition would be at odds with the 
thrust of the argument I have tried to make earlier about the fluidity of 
negotiated meaning. Furthermore, pursuing such an elusive goal would 
require spending much time discussing borderline cases. Should a 
couple of lovers who see each other once a week be considered a 
community of practice? What about the English-speaking world? What 
about Asians? What about the commuters on a transit system or the 
theater-going crowd in New York? What about a tribe of Mountain 
Gorillas? To what degree is one processing unit in the claim 
processing office itself a community of practice? A part of a 
community of practice? A set of communities of practice? All of these? 
Such an exercise would certainly not be fruitless as an activity in itself, 
but it would be of limited use here at this initial stage. Let the concept 
for now be an opening, not a closing. 
Therefore, the purpose of this chapter ts first to outline the concept 
as an analytical category in broad lines and then to explore the notion 
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in some more depth as it can be used, to see how it is connected to 
the rest of the argument of this thesis, and to understand what 
threads it contributes to the analytical tapestry of the social world I am 
trying to weave. If in this expansive, exploratory process, the concept 
.also becomes more sharply characterized for the reader, I will have 
accomplished the double purpose of making the concept more precise 
and of demonstrating that an explicit and concise definition in the 
form of a proceduralized and contrastively exclusionary delineation is 
not the only-or even the most useful-way of doing so. 
The category of community of practice: an 
analytical level 
Communities of practice, I will try to argue, are a central organizing 
principle of the world as human societies constitute it. They are the 
primary setting of activities, the seat of the organization of knowledge, 
mastery, and understanding, and the social building blocks providing 
stage and material for the definition of the individual. As such, they 
always mediate and articulate the relation between individual agents 
and broader organizing principles of human societies, such as culture, 
institutions, social classes, and other structural properties. The latter 
structures are emerging properties of the social world as organized 
into communities of practice, which give them their social body. 
Viewing the social world as constituted through relations-even 
mutually constitutive-between a configuration of cultural, social, or 
institutional structures on the one hand, and individual agents and 
perhaps family units on the other, is therefore missing an essential 
unit of analysis. -
Let us illustrate this claim with an example that will show the 
analytical role that such a level of analysis can play. Pierre Bourdieu 
(1977, 1980) has developed the closely related concept of the habitus, 
a set of cultural principles that generate in a coherent fashion the 
modes of activities, the life style and tastes, and the interests of a 
group, usually a social class. It is for him the determinant factor in the 
way people shape their sense-making. I find the habitus to be a very 
useful concept. But the habitus differs from the notion of community of 
practice in being one of these broad structural principles, an emerging 
property of the social world. As such, it tends to overlook the social 
forms that we construct locally as we engage in practice and in 
reflection on practice. It overlooks the day-to-day mechanisms of co-
participation in practice, of construction of the self in perceptible 
communities that give it local coherence through shared practice; 
these give rise through practical co-engagement to what can be 
observed as a habitus. This broadly structural nature of the habitus 
makes it difficult to account for its reproduction and evolution time. 
For Bourdieu, this seems to be mostly located in the family, which 
becomes a privileged unit of reproduction through a dichotomy 
144 
between public and private life: the habitus is acquired in early 
childhood and becomes an inescapable, closed lifeworld. In short, the 
habitus has a social realm, but it does not have a social body. This is 
where the concretely inhabited character of communities of practice 
provides an important mediating level of analysis in structuring co-
participation in practice both within communities of practice and in 
the articulation among them. 
To clarify the use of the term community of practice, let me for a very 
short time, commit the crime of taking it apart, but only in order 
better to grasp how it stands as a unit by seeing what it components 
contribute. 21 
The practice: giving it unity 
Communities of practice are born, go through transformations, and 
dissolve as of their own accord. They are not defined by their size-
compare a couple running a small business with a professional 
community such as the medical establishment: nor by the length of 
their existence-compare violin-making with the short-lived but 
tightly connected teams of volunteers that formed in response to the 
San Francisco earthquake: nor by the co-presence of their members-
compare a family with the users of a distributed computer system. 
The claim processors I observed form a ill-defined group of people 
brought together by employment ads in the classified sections of 
newspapers. What makes their group a community of practice is 
neither the fact that that they spend time in the same physical 
location, nor the fact that they know each other. It is neither the fact 
that they speak the same language nor the fact that they belong to the 
same culture-even if these conditions were considered to be realized 
in spite of the fact that they come from different ethnic backgrounds. 
It is neither the actual fact that they are all employed by the same 
company nor the possibility that they share demographic 
characteristics that might give them a natural sense of fellowship. 
The critical point that makes them a community of practice is that 
they share a way of "going about doing some things" and that they 
share it because they have come in contact with each other, either 
directly or indirectly, through physical copresence or through some 
other way. In other word, they share a practice: this includes activities 
21 It is D:nportant to keep the term as a unit because it is not the case that anything 
commonly called a community is a community of practice nor that anything 
commonly called a practice is that of a community of practice in the specific sense 
given the term here. To avoid cumbersome repetitions in the text I will sometimes talk 
about "the practice of a community" without repeating the word practice, but that must 
be understood as an ellipsis. 
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they all engage in, specific ways of communicating about these 
activities they share, and as a result some perspectives and interests 
(in both senses) they have in common. This concrete aspect of sharing 
a practice is crucial in making the concept of community of practice 
analytically robust: because it is defined by this shared practice, which 
takes place in the lived-in world, the concept of community of 
practice does not presuppose any of the structural features that it can 
be used to explain. 
Because of this articulation around a shared practice, communities of 
practice are the the locus of "real work." The practice of a community 
is where the official meets the non-official, where the visible rests on 
the invisible, where the canonical is negotiated with the non-
canonical. Thus communities of practice are the locus of mastery, the 
site of the social negotiation of understanding, the seat of knowledge. 
When I say that knowledge exists within a community of practice, I do 
not mean that it is "already existing" there in a fixed form or state; 
rather I mean that knowledge cannot be meaningfully considered 
apart of the community to which it belongs because it "lives" there, as 
it were, that it is constructed, supported, communicated, hidden, 
distributed, guarded, transformed, extended, reconsidered within and 
by the community to the practice where it belongs. Thus mastery is 
not primarily viewed as a collection of reified information that is 
brought to bear whenever applicable; it fundamentally consists in 
participation in the practices of communities, which are defined by 
the social organization of such practices in their day-to-day realization. 
Now it so happened that the claim processors I was with were all 
employees of Alinsu, all worked in the same claim processing center, 
and had more or less similar economic status. Whether or not the 
boundaries of communities of practice follow institutional boundaries, 
however, is purely incidental. There were many interstitial 
communities of practice within the office and with people outside the 
office, at client companies and at service providers, that did not follow 
reified institutional lines. Ethnographers of the workplace have often 
noted the importance of these spontaneous, non-official communities 
of practice in getting things done in spite of bureaucratic obstacles 
(Kanter, 1977; Newman, 1989; Orr, in press, 1990). Similarly the 
communities of practice observed by Willis and Eckert in schools are 
certainly not defined by the institution or its divisional lines; some of 
them even find part of their identity in engaging in a practice that 
expands defiantly beyond institutional boundaries. 
From an analytical standpoint, it is thus crucial to make a clear 
distinction between institutions and communities of practice. Indeed, 
institutions-corporations, schools, nations, marriage, democracy-may 
in some cases look like communities of practice because they can 
claim a membership in the sense that a definable group of people may 
be considered or declare themselves to be their members because of a 
sense or a display of allegiance; but this does not in itself imply a 
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shared practice defmed in this precise context. It is true that 
practices may develop in the process of giving existence to an 
institution or of coping with it. and thus communities of practice may 
arise as a result; but that is very different from conflating them with 
the institution. 
In the terms used in this thesis. institutions are representational 
objects, which codify possibilities for participation into reified 
normative or paradigmatic structures. As desituated constructions, 
they actually require communities of practice to be given shape and to 
be given meaning through a social embodiment. So the existence of 
institutions implies the existence of communities of practice; but 
without any implication of congruence. On the contrary, the fact that 
institutions reify the potentials of practice into representational 
objects whereas communities of practice renegotiate a situated 
embodiment of these codified structures in practice means that there 
is an inherent tension between the two. 
An important consequence of this tension is that communities of 
practice cannot be legislated into existence: they are naturally-
occurrtng social phenomena. To the degree that design reifies the 
future, it is a representational decontextuallzation. Because of the 
negotiation of meaning involved in recontextualization in the social 
world, the formation of communities of practice always constitutes a 
response to design and thus cannot be the result of design: they 
cannot be designed. Through their roots in practice they inherit the 
living characteristics of their practitioners. Their formation, structure, 
evolution, and dissolution are shaped by the need for and 
contingencies of actual practice. And this practice is the practice of 
human agents in the world. While practice structures activities, 
engagement in it can thus never be considered the mere automated 
implementation of structures, like the execution of a computer 
program, but the situated negotiation of meaning through embodied 
activity. And its social and negotiated nature constantly implies 
moments of reflection in these activities and on their relation to the 
practice (see Giddens, 1979). Practitioners thus garner their own 
understanding of what their practice is about, anchored in their very 
involvement in it. These practitioners act on their understanding in 
constituting and reconstituting their practice together, and thus their 
communities. This understanding need not be called true in any 
objective sense for this fact to confer to communities of practice a life 
of their own. 
The community: giving it· life 
While I have argued that it is the practice that defines a community of 
practice, it is clearly not the practice that makes it exist. I have 
commented about Wittgenstein's forms of life being similar to a 
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practice, perhaps wrtt large, but seeming Platonically unpopulated. A 
community of practice exists through the activities of its members. 
And this co-participation in practice creates mutual relations among 
them, which manifest as relations of power and of dependence, of 
amassment and of deprivation. of mastery and of neophyte, of alliance 
and of competition, of trust and of suspicion, of friendship and of 
hatred ... the whole shazzam: it is a full-blown social formation. 
These relations, as developed through engagement in the practice, 
become the raw material for the development of identities of 
participation. These identities of participation do not require that 
members conceive of themselves as members of the particular 
community or that they be able to articulate their form of 
participation. This does not mean that these processes are 
subconscious. Engagement in shared practice is the vehicle of this 
progressive construction of a set of relations, which constitute such 
identities. And engagement in co-participation in the socially 
constituted practice of communities is a form of consciousness in that 
it implies the construction of a form of individuality through the 
negotiation of membership that it inherently entails. More discursive 
modes of articulation can then arise as processes of communicative 
reification of these practice-induced relations. 
Because communities of practice are organized around a practice, they 
have to organize themselves in such a way that their members can 
proceed with that practice, and proceeding with the practice both 
requires and results in an existentially coherent form of membership. 
Involvement in a practice is not something that paralyzes completely, 
that tears apart individualities-unless this happens to be the purpose 
of the practice as in some forms of therapy. This is not to say that 
there is peace, happiness, or harmony inside of a community of 
practice; conflict and misery can be its core characteristic. This is 
only to say that the shared practice stabilizes the forms of 
individualities it supports through identities of participation. This is 
not to say either that there is uniformity of individuality within a 
community of practice; even the most simple practice creates all sorts 
of ways of belonging through participation. This is only to say that the 
forms of individuality are constructed in the same practice, which 
gives them a coherence, both an internal existential coherence and a 
co-existential coherence among them. 
So far, my discussion has only looked at one community of practice 
and has assumed that the identities it gives rise to are all identities of 
full participation. But it is neither the case that a community of 
practice can be looked at in isolation nor that full participation-even 
in differentiated forms-is the only type of relation it sustains. 
Discussing the concept of legitimate peripheral participation has 
revealed that the forms of membership of a community of practice are 
multiple in terms of engagement, that is, related to the practice and 
thus among themselves in multiple ways. Peripheries have been shown 
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to be locations with complex textures so that a community of practice 
must always be understood as an open system within a broader system. 
In this sense, it includes forms of membership ranging from core 
membership to absolute non-membership. I am calling non-
membership a form of membership because identities of non-
participation-no matter how deeply rooted-still imply a relation to a 
community of practice. Non-membership is thus different from 
complete disconnectedness, which is yet another category that 
implies a total absence of relations whatsoever--even of extreme 
pertpherality-with the community of practice of interest. This 
suggests a landscape with three inflexion lines: membership, non-
membership, and disconnectedness, each of which potentially taking 
multiple forms. 
This is a crucial observation since I have argued that constructing 
identities of participation through these forms of membership shapes 
the individual. But the practice of communities can give rise to 
identities of non-participation, which will also shape the individual. 
Indeed, individuals define themselves and are defined as much by 
what they are not or by what they could be as they do by what they are: 
non-membership is as definitional as membership. In these terms, 
only disconnectedness is non-definitional. The community of players 
of a game I don't know about, who meet in a bar in Rio de Janeiro of 
which I know nothing is not definitional to me. I am, however, defined 
in a small but not insignificant way by my relation to the legal 
profession, of which I am not a fully participating member, but with 
which I have had to deal on occasions. I know enough about it not only 
to see myself as a non-participant in a specific mode of peripheral 
engagement, but to have a sense of what it is I am not. of what it is I 
do not know with respect to this practice. 
The idea here is that individuals define themselves with respect to the 
range of participation possibilities of the most encompassing 
community of which they can be said to be members. In carving a 
landscape of forms of membership and possibilities for participation, a 
community of practice is a condensation of membership through 
identities of participation in a practice, the ripples of which 
potentially resonate· through the entire community at large in which it 
exists. As a result, the medium in which the self is constructed is a 
rich landscape of various forms of peripherality and legitimacy of 
participation through which membership is negotiated. The identity of 
agent is thus neither fully centered, because it arises out of relations 
sustained by these forms of membership; nor fully decentered, 
because the nexus of these relations is an actual location where the 
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self is always in the process of construction and reproduction through 
engagement in practice.22 
Reproduction: giving it time 
The existence of communities of practice over time is driven by the 
persistence of the need fulfilled by the practice, as perceived by its 
practitioners. This persistence over time implies processes of 
reproduction at two levels in communities of practice. On the one 
hand, the world being in constant flux requires that their practice be 
produced in new circumstances. On the other hand, the finite nature 
of the trajectories of participation of their members makes it 
necessary to produce new members. While these two forms of re-
production, that of the practice and that of the membership, are 
clearly distinct, and will be discussed separately, I will argue that 
there are important interactions between the two. 
The word .. reproduction" has unfortunate connotations of cloning. I 
was therefore careful to say that both the practice and the 
membership are produced anew over time. Indeed, the process of 
reproduction as discussed here always implies the possibility of 
transformation. Throughout the discussion, the term reproduction 
must be construed as re-production. 
Beyond the two types of reproduction I have distinguished, Giddens 
( 1979) suggests that there is a third aspect of social reproduction: the 
reproduction of institutions. I will not be concerned with this third 
aspect here, because I claim that it belongs to another realm, to 
another level of analysis. Indeed, I consider institutions to be reifled 
objects, whose persistence through time has to do with their 
objectification in an essential way. Their existence through time as 
institutions-that is, their reproduction-is parasitic because it 
requires continual renegotiation into meaningfulness. This must be 
realized through the practice of "living" communities of practice, 
which are in the process of their own reproduction. Furthermore, 
because of the reified nature of institutions, this sustained production 
22 The quest for a decentered view of the individual, as opposed to the traditional 
centered view, which takes the individual as the fundamental, given unit of analysis, is 
central to both post-structuralism and feminism, but in very different ways. Post-
structuralists decenter the individual by giving plimacy to historically constituted 
forms of discourse or semiotic structures, of which the "presence" of the individual is 
an epiphenomenon (DelTida, 1972; Foucault. 1977: but see Giddens, 1979 for a 
constructive criticism). More along the line of the argument of this thesis, feminists 
decenter the tndMdual by deconstructlng classical dichotomies as historically 
constituted instruments of domination: public/private life and 
production/reproduction (Fraser. 1984) or visible/invisible work (Daniels, 1987; Star, 
in press). The argument is that these dichotomies reify social production into centered 
roles traditionally attributed to male individuality. 
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of significance can be imposed prescriptively by external perceptions 
of needs on the communities of practice in which it becomes realized. 
A community of practice is fundamentally different. First its practice is 
not itself reified, even if it produces or .. reproduces" reified objects: 
therefore its persistence must derive directly from its own 
reproduction. Second I have argued that communities of practice 
cannot be designed or legislated, which means for the present 
argument that they are self-reproducing in response to the perception 
of need of their practitioners (old or new). Of course, the persistent 
perception of need that causes the reproduction of the practice can 
itself be due, through recursive processes, to all sorts of complicated 
reasons, including the existence of reified structures such as 
institutions; and I have clearly stated that the practitioners' 
understanding need not be .. true .. in any objective sense for my 
argument to hold. But that does not change the fact that communities 
of practice are involved in a more fundamental process of 
reproduction than institutions and thus are to be considered the 
primary locus of social reproduction. 
The practice: producing the toorld through renegotiation 
Change is an inherent characteristic of the practice of a community, 
no matter how routine it is supposed to be. I have insisted on the 
constant flow of change that characterizes life in the claim processing 
office. At the same time, the community organizes itself to be stable in 
the midst of all this change by creating ways to deal with change and 
by reconstituting its practice under new circumstances. Change-and 
therefore improvisation-is so much a part of our day-to-day 
engagement in practice that it mostly goes unnoticed. Reproduction 
understood as production anew thus implies at the same time change 
and stability. The dynamic coexistence of the two in the same process 
is what sustains a flexible ability to survive. 
This interaction of stability and change can be found all the way deep 
in the microscopic structure of everyday activities, in the sequences of 
small improvisations required for the stability of every activity to be 
completed, every claim to be processed, every conversation to be 
handled. Structures in the world, including social and cultural forms, 
do not determine behavior; they are resources as well as constraints 
(Lave, l 988a). This dynamic aspect of everyday life has been at the 
core of detailed studies of the constructive nature of day-to-day 
interactions by ethnomethodologists (Garfinkel, 1967; Heritage, 
1984), and more specifically of conversations (Sacks et al., 1978). 
Conversation rules provide a good example of how structures are a 
medium for the negotiation of meaning, rather than a set of 
constraints determining behavior. Indeed, not following a tum-taking 
rule in a conversation, say, one that stipulates that a question is 
followed by an answer, is as constructive a communicative move as 
151 
following the same rule. More generally, each action, no matter how 
routine or insignificant, is viewed not as the automatic execution of a 
programmed sequence of operations, but as a situated, improvised 
construction, whether it is fully assembled on the fly (de la Rocha, 
1986), the adaptation of under-determined plans (Suchman, 1987), or 
the re-enactment anew of interactional "dynamics" or personalized 
routines (Agre, 1988). 
Stability is all too often explained in terms of memory. But activities 
are not just contingent, they have effects: they change the position of 
the self and and they change the world: they mold it, they structure it, 
they make it home. The need for improvisation in such a "dialogue 
with a situation" implies what Schon ( 1983) calls "reflection in 
action." Th.is notion of reflection in action in the context of a 
discursive cultural medium is crucial for analyzing the relation of 
human agents to the world. Continual moments of reflection in action 
are the device that Giddens ( 1979) uses to attribute to agents a form 
of knowledge of the social structures their activities reproduce. 
Furthermore, for both Schon and Giddens, reflection takes place in 
action, it is an integral part of action. This also is crucial because of a 
common problem with the notion of reflection when it enters into 
more mechanistic types of explanations of actions, which view agents 
as self-contained individuals: reflection is often thought to be caused 
exclusively by difficulties or breakdowns in the course of otherwise 
nonreflective activities (e.g., even in the Heideggertan perspective of 
Winograd and Flores, 1986).. But the organization of individualized 
actions thus analyzed cannot describe the organization of the meaning 
they take. The notion of membership as a pivot in the negotiation of 
meaning, and the notion of trajectories of participation in 
communities of practice add another dimension to reflection in action 
by placing it in the context of the construction of meaning, which is 
itself in the context of the construction of the self in practice, which 
is itself in the context of the construction of communities. 
Not viewing practice as belonging to a community causes theories to 
overlook the evolving configuration of the entire community as a locus 
of both change and stability. The practice of a community is 
reproduced as a configuration. Because of the mutually constitutive 
relations that bind individuals and communities, this configuration 
cannot be analyzed merely as the total of individual participations or 
even of partial processes of interaction or collaboration. So when I say 
that activities have effects, that they change the world, this molding of 
the world as a context for practice has to be understood as a 
configuration by which communities of practice mold the world into a 
place for their activities, for their purposes. The practice is 
reproduced in and with the world by a community as a total 
configuration. 
So far, I have argued that practice changes even while reproducing the 
old, that reproduction consists of both change and stability, that the 
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reflective negotiation of meaning in trajectories of participation 
involves agents in the constitution of change and stability, and that 
change and stability of practice take place as configurations. My last 
point will now expand on the distinction I made earlier between the 
reproduction of institutions and that of communities of practice. It is 
important to differentiate between invisibility and visibility each as 
providing sources of both change and stability: using the terms I have 
introduced, I want to distinguish between configurations of 
participation (or invisibility) and configurations of reification (or 
visibility) as two aspects of reproduction. 
In the table below I have attempted to summarize how the 
visibility/invisibility duality crosses with the stability/change duality. 
The four paragraphs following the table repeat the same points in 
textual form. 
invisibility: 
configurations 
of participation 
visibility: 
configurations 
of reification 
stability 
confluence of 
continuous 
trajectories of 
participation and 
coherence of 
membership 
physical rigidity of 
representational 
objectification and 
localization through 
proceduralization 
change 
fluidity of 
renegotiation and 
emergent 
restructuration 
reflection of practice 
and dislocation 
through perspectival 
reinterpretation, 
realignment and 
redesign 
Configurations of participation are sources of stability by renewal of the 
awareness that gave rise to the community of practice to start with; 
this reproductive process is located in the continuity of trajectories of 
participation and in the coherence of membership that characterize a 
community. 
Configurations of participation are sources of change by the fluidity 
that is inherent in the direct engagement in the renegotiation of 
meaning and by the restructuration that emerges from the 
configuration of this fluidity. 
Configurations of reification are sources of stability through the rigidity . 
of the physical world, including the memory of forms, and through the 
localization of interpretation around rigid representational forms that 
proceduralizatlon enforces. 
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Configurations of reification are sources of change by the fact that 
reified reflection of practice always needs reinterpretation in practice, 
but that this need for reinterpretation can dislocate practice or force 
realignment of perspectives: such dislocation can be made intentional 
through design. 
This distinction is crucial not just analytically but in its practical 
implications as well. Indeed stability and change through reification 
are often the mode of control that institutions-conservative or 
progressive-almost exclusively strive for in order to enlist the 
cooperation or compliance of communities of practice in the 
production of the future. They use this mode of control in order to 
assure predictable stability without having to rely on communities of 
practice as a reproduction mechanism; and in order to promote 
change, without having to engage communities of practice in its 
participatory construction. 
In discussing normative structures, I have already exposed the 
problems of erasure and prescription inherent in reification when it is 
a substitute for rather than an integral part of co-participation. First, 
because of the process of erasure inherent in the production of 
reification, the invisible nature of participation makes it easy to ignore 
essential aspects of how a community of practice functions. There are 
countless reports of design efforts-especially designs of technological 
improvements-that failed because they overlooked some essential but 
hardly visible aspect of the practice they were supposed to improve. 
Just one small example from the claim office: making a separate unit 
with claim technicians was intended to improve the technical support, 
but it overlooked the extent to which claim processors were learning 
by having these technicians among them. The move had to be 
reversed. Second, prescriptions of practice give rise to a new practice, 
that of satisfying-or giving the appearance of satisfying-the 
prescription, which is often at odds in fundamental ways with the 
intents of the prescription. Think of the treatment of erroneous Q's by 
claim processors or of students learning the practice of test taking 
instead of learning the subject matter. 
The principle here is not that reification is harmful, but that its very 
power makes its use a delicate process; that successful use of 
reification as an instrument of stability or change requires 
participation. There is a subtle wisdom in the invisibility of 
participation because its fluidity is essentially connected to the 
practice, which is the way it is and which transforms itself for reasons 
that cannot be dismissed lightly. Reification gains its transformative 
and its stabilizing powers from disconnectedness. but the identities of 
non-participation that it can sustain may backfire; they may take very 
variable forms, including mistakingly seductive or exhilarating ones; 
one can be very dazzled by what one does not understand or by the 
sheer elegance of a formal model precisely because one is 
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disconnected from the practice. This disconnectedness and this 
power to dislocate reinterpretation is a characteristic that new ideas 
share with old relics: the absorption of either into practice is never 
unproblematic. 
An injunction to tend to communities of practice does not imply that 
they are in any essential way an emancipatory force, a locus of 
resistance to coercion, a liberating platform for the individual, a haven 
for the seeker. Communities of practice are of essential importance in 
being the locus of social reproduction-and thus the necessary stage of 
its transformative potential. But they are not privileged in terms of 
social functions or effects. The invisibility of configurations of 
participation is a strength and it is a weakness; it is what can make 
communities of practice the locus of true resistance to oppression but 
it is also what can make them the locus of the reproduction of its 
conditions. It is what can make them the unlimited cradle of the self 
but it is also what can make them the unfathomable prison of the soul. 
Saying that communities of practice have a life of their own is not 
saying that they cannot be influenced, manipulated, intimidated, 
debilitated, decimated, or coerced into submission; nor is it saying 
that they cannot be inspired, helped, supported, transfigured, 
unshackled, or empowered into creativity. But it is saying that the 
power-benevolent or malevolent-that institutions or outsiders have 
over a community of practice is always mediated through its practice, 
over which external forces have no direct power, because it is not 
reified; because it is invisibly in the process of being re-produced, as a 
configuration, by its practitioners. This is what I meant earlier when I 
said that communities of practice are a response to-but never the 
result of-external design. 
The community: producing persons across generations 
Among claim processors at Alinsu, there is a very substantial turnover. 
(Turnover is both the subject of bitter complaints by management and 
the direct result of the way claim processors are treated; this to me 
was a striking paradox. which I have not resolved to this day.) But 
whatever the cause of the turnover, the company spends a significant 
amount of official energy recruiting new generations of workers, 
selecting them, and training them. And concomitantly. established 
processors spend much non-official energy-both intentionally and 
casually-inducing these newcomers into the practice of the 
community. Whether a sense of responsibility or mere decency in 
human relations makes up for the lack of official rewards, helping 
struggling newcomers is accepted as a fact of life, limited in attention 
and time only by production pressures: it does not seem to be in the 
interest of anyone to have around workers who are not full participants 
in the communal process. 
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In the preceding chapter. I have already described in some detail how 
reproduction takes place in the claim processing office, but I have 
done so under the rubric of learning as legitimate peripheral 
participation. Saying that learning implies the negotiation of new 
forms of membership, however, implies that both the learner and the 
community of practice must find ways of accommodating each other. It 
is a reciprocal relation. The individualistic focus of cognitive theories 
of learning tends to obscure the fact that learning is reproducing the 
world, that the production of knowledgeable persons is part of the 
process of community reproduction. In this regard, the concept of 
legitimate peripheral participation is an analytical bridge that 
connects and unifies two levels of analysis: looked at from the point of 
view of persons, it is learning; but looked at from the point of view of a 
communities, it is social reproduction. These are not different 
processes, but different viewpoints: persons and communities are part 
of the same transformative process. 
In the claim processing office, the reproduction of the community is a 
very intentional process, since the company is self-consciously 
involved in the maintenance of a workforce. In many cases, however, 
the process of reproduction of membership is much more diffuse with 
less or no official organization or sanction, or even without cultural 
markers; yet it is no less integral to the life of communities of 
practice. Self-conscious attempts to reproduce communities of 
practice, including professional training, institutionalized 
apprenticeship, and initiation rites in proselytic associations, are 
interesting analytically because the visibility of the process can 
indicate what to look for in cases in which it is culturally less 
articulated. 
I have suggested earlier, for instance, that viewing schooling as a 
process of reproduction as well as a process of learning draws 
attention to the forms of membership made possible by school life, 
and to the access that these forms of membership provide to 
resources for the construction of identities of full participation. Not 
that anybody would deny that social reproduction is what schooling is 
about or even find this analytical perspective surprising. Yet it is not 
the case that our folklore articulates it in such terms. Because the 
cultural emphasis is on the individual learner as a cognitive entity we 
view as natural the selection processes that our schools perform in 
generating a range of abilities and accept as unremarkable the 
disconnectedness of schooling from the life of our communities. In the 
claim processing office, by contrast, it is very clear that new recruits 
are prepared for different functions and that being a trainee is a form 
of membership in the community, which must give newcomers 
peripheral but increasing and legitimate access to the resources of full 
participation. 
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Understanding learning then implies understanding how forms of 
legitimate peripherality are organized as a definitional characteristic of 
a community of practice: the patterns of recruitment and selection, 
the communal rituals that mark the passage to new forms of 
membership, and the degree to which different forms of membership 
in reproduction cycles become articulated constituencies with 
prescribed roles and a sense of common interest. At Alinsu I have 
described how new recruits are carefully selected by a process of tests 
and interviews and how the goal of fmding employees who will stay 
with the job results in some degree of social homogeneity (see also 
Kanter, 1977) ... Getting your level .. is celebrated with a small ritual of 
sincere rejoicing and marked by a different name, but does not imply a 
form of membership in a new constituency, even the change from 
trainee to processor. Other important events like being "put on the 
phone" or getting yelled at for the first time are not marked at all. All 
this reflects a rather egalitarian community in which learning for the 
most part does not pit members against one another. Not that there 
are no jalousies, of course. One instructor told me that her being 
chosen for teaching classes turned many of her colleagues against her. 
a fact that she accepted as part of the process in her ambition to move 
up the corporate ladder. In this respect, she was already playing a 
different game: the corporate gamble of trading off friendship and 
career opportunities. 
Understanding learning also means understanding how learning is 
determined by existing opportunities that also tend to reproduce 
forms of membership. This includes seeing how the various 
generational forms of membership are themselves reproduced in the 
cycles of community reproduction, for instance how hazing and other 
types of initiatory mechanisms serve to reproduce forms of 
membership. Among claim processors, there is no overt hazing that I 
have seen. Perhaps in this case, this is just due to the fact that many 
new recruits are already overwhelmed and do not last very long 
anyway. But the form of maternalism I have described as prevalent 
rather than hazing is certainly also a matter of gender in addition to 
reflecting the fact that there is no active awareness of conflictual 
relation with the institution. In general, the treatment of newcomers 
is analytically crucial: it reveals the structural opportunities and 
contradictions that a community of practice lives by and the forms of 
individuality that it sustains. 
As newcomers are induced into communities of practice, their 
reproduction implies a notion of "generation," which is a 
generalization of the common biological notion. What is considered a 
generation depends on the reproduction cycle of the community of 
practice under study. Among claim processors, a complete 
reproduction cycle covers two to four years from the time one is a 
trainee to the time one becomes a level-8 and can be an instructor or a 
back-up trainer. But the generational spread is actually slightly broader 
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because it can take six to ten years before one can move up from 
processing to a technical or managerial position: although there is 
hardly any difference of status among level-S's, seniority will still 
influence selection for special functions. Generations constitute a 
significant organizational principle of the landscape of forms of 
membership. even when they are not formalized with official status. 
With respect to generations, apprenticeship as an institutionalized 
system for the reproduction of a community of practice illustrates 
another issue in learning that individualistic perspectives tend to 
ignore. There is a contradiction in the role of masters since by taking 
on apprentices, they are building their own competition: the 
continuity of the practice entails the displacement of the master. It 
would be wrong to conclude from the example of apprenticeship that 
these conflicts of continuity versus displacement only take the form of 
competition in the marketplace. The continuity/displacement 
contradiction is much more fundamental to learning understood as an 
aspect of social reproduction (Lave and Wenger, in press).23 Often it 
concerns the development of identities, as in relations between 
parents and adolescents. 
Among claim processors, there is little observable 
continuity/displacement conflict. I would say that this is because 
identities of mastery are not significantly commoditized; they are not 
commoditized as identities among peers because knowledge is 
something to be shared, not something to use to create differentiation; 
and they are not commoditized as abilities to reap coveted rewards or 
compete for scarce resources since advancement is not selective up to 
level eight. In contrast. these conflicts are prevalent at the 
management level where identities are commoditized as instruments 
of power. In her fascinating analysis of the corporate world, Rosabeth 
Moss Kanter ( 1977) documents the way in which corporate climbers 
manage their learning in terms of their opportunities to gain control 
over resources. Careers in the corporate ladder are built on the 
continuity/ displacement contradiction because the ability to 
distinguish oneself by breaking the continuity in taking over a new 
function is a key to advancement, and according to her, one of the 
most salient factors influencing managerial decisions. Similarly, the 
continuity/displacement conflicts can be very extreme in the arts or in 
the academia, where identities are highly commoditized qua 
identities: one's ideas are the material of one's identity, not just as 
contributions to the development of the practice, but as unique, 
personalized breakthroughs. A linguist friend of mine once told me 
facetiously that academics reach their maturity when they can no 
23 The continuity/ displacement contradiction is another concept ortginally set forth 
by Jean Lave, which we explored and developed further in our monograph on legitimate 
peripheral participation. 
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longer ask their advisor for letters of recommendation; but there is 
truth in his joke. How can we understand learning in graduate schools 
or in the arts unless we analyze learning as reproduction in the light of 
such built-in generational conflicts, not only as they influence learning, 
but as they form constitutive elements of its content? 
To the extent that different g~nerational forms of membership imply 
having a stake in different moments in the evolution of a practice, the 
continuity/displacement contradiction ties individual learning directly 
into transformations of the practice. The community of which one is 
becoming a member does not exist yet. The formation of identity 
becomes part of the dual process of stability and change as it requires 
finding a place in relation to the past and investing oneself in the 
future. 
Such transformations involve power struggles, which are reflected in 
continuity I displacement conflicts. But as power relations become 
mediated by nonnative structures, so are continuity I displacement 
conflicts. Nonnative structures can play an important role in the 
process of commoditization of identities, as a community of practice 
formalizes its recruitment and selections patterns. Tests and degrees 
become objects that mediate the continuity/displacement conflict, and 
thus the power struggles associated with it: but they can also mean 
that newcomers ftnd their initial identity outside of practice, a fact 
that can make a crucial difference in the way the practice itself is 
organized. 
For instance, I have noted the disconnectedness between workers and 
management. It is likely that the existence of business schools plays a 
central role in this formidable distance and in the difference between 
the social games the two groups are involved in. Indeed degrees do 
not only stand for the acquisition of knowledge that may or may not be 
applicable in practice, they allow managers to land with a 
prefabricated identity, which they have learned to construct outside of 
practice, and which is marked on the outset by a substantial difference 
in income. Upholding such identity may often require being set apart 
in a cloud of mystique and may thus make mutual involvement with 
workers difficult, because of the worry that its specialness might not 
survive a sustained, naked confrontation in a common practice. In this 
regard, the office manager is in a very different position than visitors 
from the home office because she started as a claim processor. But 
even though there seem to be no official limits as to how high she can 
climb the corporate ladder at Alinsu, she would be fighting an uphill 
battle. In practice trajectories of legitimate peripheral participation 
only very rarely provide a bridge between the bottom and the top of 
corporate hierarchies. 
More generally, schools are, on this view, institutionalizations of the 
continuity/ displacement contradiction. They replace the 
confrontational conflict fundamental to social reproduction with 
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prescriptive instruction and normative selection. Masters are not 
surrounded by apprentices who participate legitimately but 
peripherally in their practice: the task of initiating newcomers is 
entrusted to specialized institutions, which both channel the energy of 
the newcomers toward preparatory theories and exercises and 
subjugate this energy by using evaluations on these same tasks as 
selective obstacles. Apprentices and masters do not challenge each 
other in a common practice, in which their different stakes can be 
played out. The young are neither subjected to the evaluation 
processes inherent in engagement in practice, nor do they threaten 
the old by their increasing involvement. They are busy earning 
degrees, acquiring positions With respect to normative structures that 
will confer them rights. And the old are left alone. 
There are of course good reasons one might want to shelter 
newcomers from the power struggles of full participation in a 
conflictual society. I would not dispute that, but awareness of the 
trade-off involved remains crucial because of its ramifications for the 
forms of individualities that the system is producing. The price is that 
youth then becomes a time during which one is actively engaged in 
establishing one's identity with respect to normative structures that 
do not constitute actual opportunities to be a participant, of a 
peripheral but legitimate sort, in the social world at large. Broader 
social identities are not established by direct contributions to ongoing 
practice, but by locating one's self on normative scales of values, whose 
relations to practice are indirect at best. 
Interestingly enough, adolescent cultures have found ways to 
transcend school and to enter in open continuity/ displacement 
conflicts at the level at which adolescence has a legitimate place in 
social practice, for instance, in the consumer market, in expressions 
of sexuality, or in the world of entertainment. Nevertheless, the 
decontextualized, normative version of the conflict remains of central 
importance, as school is still considered the official meeting place of 
society and its newcomers. Even though some confrontational 
unfolding of the continuity I displacement conflict is taking place 
elsewhere in ways that may be experienced more personally by those 
involved, school is still perceived as the locus of social reproduction 
both by those who are subjected to it and by those who confer it its 
authority. 
Sequestration makes adolescent cultures painfully marginal, because 
the search for and construction of an identity-mediated by normative 
structures and staged in isolated communities of practice-becomes a 
purpose of its own, outside of the main stream of societal 
transformation. Adolescence in school becomes a separate world, 
whose self-contained structure both reproduces the conditions for 
social identification by replaying the social structure of the adult world 
(Eckert, 1989) and prevents the process of identification from 
interacting directly with society at large. Youths are not presented 
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with and engaged in issues of direct significance in the broader world 
in which they live, and they are not invited to participate in the 
solution of real problems by assuming pertpheral but legitimate 
responsibilities. Because the continuity I displacement conflict is tied 
to transformation of the practice, the sequestration is doubly costly. 
Not only are school students having to invent identities of 
participation, but the community deprtves itself of the contributions of 
the most dynamic, if inexperienced, segment of its population. I would 
argue that this institutional sublimation of the continuity/ displacement 
contradiction, which goes largely unrecognized, makes schooling on 
the one hand a conservative force with respect to social change and on 
the other the likely locus of erratic transformations. 
Peripheralities and boundaries: relations, 
people, and things 
The social discourse of the visible and the invisible that I have tried to 
develop in this dissertation does not take individual agents and objects 
as given primitives. Through this discourse, the world as a place to do 
knowing in has become a landscape of communities of practice with 
interlocking pertpheralities and overlapping membership. These 
communities of practice construct and sustain their own 
configurations of participation and configurations of reiftcation: thus 
they produce and define ways of becoming individuals through 
engagement in their practice and produce and define objects that 
enter into their practice. But communities of practice are not taken as 
given primitives either since they only exist and are reproduced 
through the practice that their members engage in out of their own 
perception of the need to do so and their own interpretation of the 
objects that are reified through this practice. It should therefore be 
clear that this discourse does not strive toward a causally reductionist 
theory of cultural transparency but toward a relational, dialectical view 
in which relations of dependence are mutually constitutive. 
Identities: nexus of membership and trajectories of 
participation 
I have argued that the move from a notion of the individual as a 
universal unit of analysis to a notion of individual as a member is 
neither a fully centered nor a fully decentered view of the individual, 
but a relational one. It implies a time dimension because membership 
is defined through a trajectory of participation. It also implies a space 
dimension because of the multiple communities to which each person 
belongs with various forms of pertpherality. Membership in our society 
is always experienced at least partly in connection with or even 
through other forms of membership. The constitution of the individual 
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therefore implies a nexus of forms of membership defined by 
interacting trajectories of participation. 
These forms of membership need not conflict. For instance, in 
describing the compromise of meaninglessness in Chapter 3, I should 
not be understood as hoping that work would become the processors' 
only preoccupation or that it would invade their private lives as with 
blood-sucking tentacles of expectation of productivity. We all belong to 
multiple communities of practice, but that does not imply by any 
measure that we cannot belong fully to each. Therefore there is no 
good reason that involvement with the communities of practice in 
which one engages in what is called .. work" should be a time of time 
watching, longing for its own end. Belonging fully to multiple 
communities of practice need not involve this kind of trade-off. 
And yet there is something peculiar about a nexus of membership as a 
place to exist as an individual if individuality is defined through 
engagement in the practice of communities. I have argued earlier in 
this chapter that a community of practice needs to provide an 
existential coherence to its members, but this requirement no longer 
applies across communities of practice. When one considers a single 
community of practice, the mutually constitutive relations between it 
and its members implies that somehow the trajectories of its 
members are in a profound sense parallel to that of the community. 
This is true in spite of all the conflicts that can and do take place in 
the practice and in reproduction cycles: in fact I have suggested that 
conflicts can be part of what sustains the coherence. But in a nexus of 
membership, this fundamental principle of parallelism of trajectories 
no longer holds: its relevance is indeed inversely proportional to the 
cultural distance between the various communities to which an 
individual belongs. 
Not only are the trajectories of individuals and communities no longer 
parallel, they may be in conflict especially when the cultural distance 
is significant. In such cases, the continuity I displacement contradiction 
for communities has a dual which works in reverse for individuals. 
Communities achieve their continuity by the displacement of 
individuals over generational waves. Individuals achieve their 
continuity as a multiple trajectory of participation which is reproduced 
over time by displacing membership in communities of practice. I 
believe that this provides an explanatory framework that can address 
some fundamental issues in the development of modern societies, by 
affording a handle on the formation of the individual. Different 
configurations of communities of practice will result in very different 
definitions of self, and the development of systems of education, work, 
social and political relations will have to be sensitive to these 
differences and their ramifications. There is no point either in 
regretting the dissolution of the principle of parallelism or in calling it 
progress: what we need to understand is how to deal with the trade-
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offs between forms of individualization and fragmentation of identity 
involved in the structure of complex social formations.24 
By the process of legitimate peripheral participation toward core 
membership, one can now lose as well as gain individuality, and that 
becomes a central issue is the quest for membership. For instance, the 
management of learning described in Chapter 3 is likely to have roots 
in conflicts of that sort. Similarly, the poor social landscape of the 
classroom discussed in Chapter 5 may not be a serious problem when 
the principle of parallelism of trajectories is more or less active, 
because individuality is sustained by the broader membership and 
need not find new material with each form of participation. But when 
the principle is not active, membership in a poorly textured 
community of practice such as arises in the classroom can become a 
discontinuity in the trajectory of the individual that is perceived as an 
unacceptable loss of identity. This is the more salient if there is a vast 
cultural distance between the communities of practice that the school 
represent and those that form the student's own nexus of 
membership. 
The notion of coherence of membership-or rather coherence of 
identity now-becomes extremely problematic, but extremely 
intriguing, in the context of nexus of forms of membership in a broadly 
diversified society; this is especially true when one includes the 
possibility of combined identities of participation and non-
participation. I have not had time to push this concept of coherence as 
far as I would like, but my intuition is that it is a central one. Exploring 
this notion of coherence of identity in nexus of membership could well 
lead to the possibility of historicizing some psychodynamic concepts 
and thus be a step toward bridging the gap between two traditionally 
incompatible explanatory frameworks for the construction of the 
individual: socio-historical theories of the social order and the 
production of the person on the one hand, and psychodynamic 
theories of subjective and interpersonal experience on the other. 
Nexus of membership and trajectories of participation are the meeting 
point of knowing, power, and identity, where they are not separate but 
24 Perhaps this is the issue that Emile Durkheim was trying to address when he 
claimed that modern societies need to develop a ·cwt of the individual," a term he did 
not use negatively. For him it referred to a social system that would sustain a new form 
of individuality while keeping society from falling apart, something he thought would 
happen if it was composed of the type of individual utilitarianism takes as its 
primitive building block. His distinction between mechanical and organic solidarity 
stemmed from a functionalist view, but could be restated in the terms proposed here. In 
mechanical solidartty, the development of the community and the development of the 
individual go in parallel, their trajectories are almost coextensive. In organic 
solidartty, the development of the individual supposes a trajectory through an evolving 
nexus of forms of membership so that the trajectories of individuals and the 
trajectories of communities are no longer in a single relation. 
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one in the experience of social agents. The related issue of power 
must undergo a projection onto the landscape of communities of 
practice similar to that undergone by the issue of identity through 
forms of membership and knowing in practice through cultural 
transparency. A landscape of communities of practice gives rise to two 
basic sources of power and powerlessness, which interact but do not 
necessarily work in parallel and can work in opposite directions. On 
the one hand are the forms of membership inside a community of 
practice, the control they provide over resources and the 
opportunities they open to members in various relations of legitimacy 
and peripherality. On the other hand are power relations among 
communities of practice, which are inherited in various ways by their 
members as they come in contact with other communities. There are 
of course also reified forms of institutionalized power, but these belong 
to another level of analysis, although they must still be realized 
through the practices of living communities. 
Maintaining or modifying power relations are central issues in 
processes of reproduction, which do not just involve power relations 
inside communities of practice but also power relations among them. 
This includes asymmetries in claiming ownership of meaning and 
determining modes of legitimate peripheral participation, which 
shape the possibilities for developing cultural transparency. 
These relations of power focus attention on the interacting 
peripheralities of related communities of practice. There is much to 
learn in the peripheries; they become at least as important as the core 
in the definition of communities of practice, as soon as communities of 
practice are viewed as interlocking systems and trajectories of 
participation are viewed as involving nexus of membership. This is 
especially true if one is interested in mechanisms of change. There is 
effective power is at the core of communities of practice, but there is 
also much potential power in the peripheries. In the context of her 
study of communities of practice of adolescents in high school, Penny 
Eckert (1989) has coined the term of "knowledge broker" to describe 
members who, by their position somewhat at the periphery of their 
peer communities as well as their membership in other communities, 
were able to introduce new styles and ideas into their peer groups. 
She noted that these knowledge brokers were able to fulfill functions 
as agents of change that group leaders could not by virtue of their core 
positions. 
This concept of knowledge broker is actually a crucial one because it 
allows configurations of participation to be vehicles of dislocating 
transformations in the practice. This implies a process of core 
displacement. which is a dual of legitimate peripheral participation: 
just as peripheral members can be empowered to move toward full 
participation, the practice can move toward its periphery as 
individuals become agents of change by bridging across communities 
of practice. Empowering knowledge brokers in interlocking 
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peripheries can then become an important mode of promoting 
change, of doing "design" without relying exclusively on reification 
from without, of doing "design from within." 
Boundary objects: objects as boundaries and boundaries as 
objects 
In analyzing the processors's COB worksheet in Chapter 4, I have 
claimed that it is designed to be a boundary object between 
communities of practice, which articulates their respective practices 
without the need for a common practice.25 The analysis thus revealed 
the issue of a relation between processors and the COB procedure to 
be an issue of a relation between communities of practice. In that 
context, I made an important distinction between abstractions for 
consumption inside and for consumption outside a community of 
practice and I discussed the use of proceduralization as a method for 
crossing community boundaries. As an effort to direct interpretation in 
a localized way, proceduralization is an attempt to minimize ambiguity. 
But ambiguity is central to signification because it allows renegotiation 
of meaning through engagement in common practice. Literality then is 
a meaningless meaning that is likely to give rise to identities of non-
participation. 
The distinction between consumption inside and consumption outside 
is still crucial in terms of the way in which reified abstractions are 
produced and the forms they take, but the issue can now be taken a 
step further. Artifacts, even when symbolic, are objects. They have a 
form, which implies a physical existence. "E=mc2," or a Christmas 
tree, or a computer system are objects whose materiality gives them 
physical autonomy: it allows them to move across communities. Any 
objectification can travel, regardless of the intentions of those who 
produced it, because of the physicality of its form. Thus any object is 
potentially a boundary object. The notion of boundariness then is not a 
dichotomic distinction that classifies objects into two categories, but a 
characteristic of any object to the extent that it travels through the 
landscape of communities of practice. 
Boundariness becomes a characteristic of objects, which can take 
different forms, proceduralization being one of them. In this shift of 
perspective, the concept of boundary object does not lose its meaning, 
25 Of course, by common practice here I mean "with respect to thJs specific topic." 
Sharmg any artifact as an articulation of practices requires a common practice at 
some level. Here the two communities have a large area of practice in common, such as 
dealJng with health insurance issues or using the same computer system. This is 
without mentioning broader contextual areas of commonality that are crucial for the 
activity to proceed, such as understanding English or lmowtng about arithmetic 
operations. 
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but is given a different significance as a basic category for a theory of 
cultural transparency. What the concept now says is that there is never 
a direct relation between an object and a person, which one could 
qualify as understanding, or meaningfulness, or meaninglessness; both 
the person and the object belong in communities practice-usually a 
number of them each-and the relation of cultural transparency is 
always mediated by the relations among these communities and the 
relations of the object and the person to these communities. Objects 
are not objects; they are reflections of boundaries, of relations of 
peripherality, of articulations among forms of membership.26 
This shift in perspective has consequences for what one would do 
about supporting the development of cultural transparency. For 
instance, I have mentioned that the COB worksheet as a 
proceduralized representation could be very useful in focusing 
conversations about the concept that it implements if a form of co-
practice could be achieved. It may thus not be necessary to change the 
COB worksheet itself at all. The very artifact that disconnects can 
become the artifact that connects. It is not a matter of the form of the 
artifact, it is a matter of co-practice. Not that the form of the artifact is 
irrelevant; it can play a crucial role. But it is relevant only as support 
for shared practice. Extending meaningfulness, therefore, will not 
primarily mean designing different artifacts, different systems, but 
designing openings for shared practice, creating opportunities for 
legitimate peripheral participation in and across communities, 
empowering knowledge brokers. 
In a dual of the view of objects as boundaries, boundaries become 
objects as the practice produces a configuration of reiftcation that 
reflects its configuration of participation. In this process, the 
existence of the community of practice is reified, both for inside, for 
itself, and for the outside. Notwithstanding all the gradations of 
peripheralities, the significance of this reification is fundamentally 
different inside and outside. 
For the community itself, this reification becomes part of a self-image, 
if its ideology, as it were. This ideology can of course be very different 
from "actual" practice, especially when there are institutional 
pressures to have things a certain way or a need to manufacture an 
image of practice for outside consumption. This is as true of scientific 
practice in the laboratory (Latour and Woolgar, 1979) as it is of the 
practice of third graders, who, during some math classes observed by 
ethnographers, learned almost exclusively from each other or invented 
their own ways around problems, but when asked, answered without 
26 In a parallel with the notion of commodity fetishism (Mmx, 1867), we could then 
talk about a kind of •artjfact fetishism" when we say that claJm processors do not 
understand the COB worksheet. The illusion here is to assume that there is a direct 
relation of non-understanding between the artjfact and the processors. 
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hesitation that they had learned from the teacher (Lave, personal 
communication: Hass, n.d.). 
It is, however, very delicate to claim from the outside that one knows 
better than a community of practice what it is about. This is a dilemma 
that I faced constantly when I was with the claim processors, trying to 
articulate an understanding of what was going on. Claim processors 
know so well just how to be claim processors: yet that does not mean 
that they have a full understanding of the conditions of their existence. 
So for one thing, it is always trivially true that communities of practice 
do not know what they are about; from the outside one can indeed 
always come up with a viewpoint that the inside does not have access 
to. It is completely unrealistic to expect anyone to search for 
meaningfulness beyond the boundaries of communities of practice to 
which one has reasons to belong. Our intellectual culture has produced 
a myth that a rational being can and should be ready to understand 
anything anywhere anytime. But even leisurely curiosity is a luxury that 
is part of specific practices, like "reading the Scientific American" 
among the intellectual middle class. Reifying the image of a practice 
from the outside is always reframing it in a new frame; this becomes a 
relation between communities of practice.27 
One also has to be very careful about statements concerning the 
differences between the self-image of a community of practice and its 
actual practice because the ideology can hardly be distinguished from 
the practice. Indeed, since reflection is inherent in practice, there is 
no practice without an image of itself; and more importantly, that 
image is part of the practice. It does not stand outside of it, as a 
decorative label, but for better or for worse, it functions inside of it. 
The ideology of scientific rationality is as important in structuring 
scientific practice as are all tricks of the trade that make its day-to-day 
construction possible. The belief that the teacher teaches is not just a 
fancy but has its own crucial function in structuring both the practice 
and interpersonal relations and thus is at one level a reality. Coming in 
from the outside-with the best intentions-to try to break this 
"illusion" could have disastrous results. Reifying an image of a 
community of practice from the outside only becomes useful inside if 
it can result in a co-practice, in a process of mutual legitimate 
peripheral participation that extends cultural transparency through 
expanded identities of participation. 
The self-image of a community of practice need not be reified to 
perform its function: but to the extent that it is, it can always be 
renegotiated through the practice and made meaningful. There may be 
times of internal conflict for ownership of meaning when reiflcation 
27 Therefore the researcher, or the actlvist, or the manager have to be very cautious 
about any claun of privileged perspective before dism1ssing the lore of a community of 
practice as "mere" ideology. 
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can create dislocations in the self-image that result in identities of 
non-participation, but these are likely either to be temporary or to 
lead to splits into different communities of practice (even with an 
ideology of unity). In a deep sense, therefore, communities of practice 
can be said to know very well what it is they are doing: the 
configuration of reification and the configuration of participation 
function in mutually constitutive ways. 
Things are very different on the outside. Completely on the outside 
only the configuration of reification, or part of it, is visible. And the 
disconnecting effect of the phenomenon is socially amplified because 
it is generally the case that the more power and prestige a community 
of practice has, the more visible its configuration of reification is; it is 
hard to ignore. The difference between the visibility of reification on 
the inside and the outside is like the difference between negotiated 
and literal knowledge: the latter's excessive dependence on the form 
of the representation is a source of meaninglessness. From the outside 
boundaries become purely representational objects that delineate 
identities of non-participation because the negotiation of meaning is 
not supported by engagement in shared practice. Meaninglessness 
then is a boundary become object, whose meaning is non-membership. 
Dispelling meaninglessness implies connecting, opening the practice. 
But how can one become a member without being one to start with? In 
the mutually constitutive relations between individuals and practice, 
between configurations of participation and configurations of 
reification lies a paradox of learning. If one has to understand objects 
in order to participate and to participate in order to understand 
objects, if one has to engage in practice in order to gain membership 
and to have membership in order to engage in practice, how is 
learning possible at all? How can cultural transparency even begin? 
There just seems to be no way to start. That is in the last analysis the 
profound paradox that legitimate peripheral participation is about. In 
its power lies the miracle of motherhood," the magic of 
apprenticeship, the wonder of social reproduction in communities of 
practice; a frail bridge across the abyss, a slight breach of the law, a 
small gift of ilndeserved trust, it's almost a theorem of love, that 
community members can invite newcomers into their own identities 
of participation, let them be what they are not, and thus start what 
cannot be started. 
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Conclusion 
and 
discussion: 
toward 
a practice of 
cultural transparency 
As my weaving of a tapestry of the social world comes to an end, it is 
time to take a last look at my live model. But the threads of my 
depiction have grown beyond the loom and are working their way into 
the world they are supposed to portray. The claim processing center 
does not look the same. Where I used to see employees sitting in front 
of their terminals, processing claims and answering phone calls, I now 
see communities sharing a practice at the crossing boundaries of many 
other communities, reaching out through nexus of membership and 
trajectories of participation across the social landscape; I see 
newcomers finding their way in by legitimate peripheral participation; 
I see the construction of identities of participation arid non-
participation. There are peripheries that create variously textured 
regions through the office and that open countless windows onto the 
world outside. Configurations of reification include various types of 
objects: the computer system and the reference books the processors 
use are nodes at which the boundaries of communities of practice near 
and far meet; the forms they use have become normative structures 
that enclose their world around local decisions. 
This new vision brings with it new questions to ask and new 
transformative steps to take. For instance, it becomes essential to see 
how legitimate peripheral participation is enabled for newcomers and 
for established members; what the recruiting patterns are; how access 
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to resources is organized; how commoditized information and 
identities are in the conteXt of hierarchical relations: how localness is 
connected to globalness: how the self-image of communities of 
practice functions inside and outside; how permeable the boundaries 
are where objects articulate communities of practice and how much 
co-practice supports their boundary roles: the degree to which 
stability and change rely on configurations of reiftcation or 
configurations of participation; who are the knowledge brokers and 
what power they have as agents of change. 
The power that institutions and outsiders have over these 
communities of practice is mediated through their practice. Therefore 
alignment rather than design is likely to be successful. Aligning the 
institutional context so that practices can fulfill the goals of the 
institution allows design from within rather than design from without. 
This may involve supporting change by empowering peripheries, 
interstitial communities of practice, or knowledge brokers. All this 
implies creating bridges for new forms of shared practice that become 
essential to expanding cultural transparency. 
The Appendix contains a number of specific observations about 
problems and suggestions for improvements in the claim processing 
office along the lines of this dissertation. Here, rather than expanding 
on a conclusion, I would like to use the rest of this chapter for an 
opening discussion. With a set of speculative questions, I will briefly 
explore the picture that the framework of this dissertation might offer 
for a practice of cultural transparency in the organization of society at 
large and in a quest for individual and societal intelligence. 
Operationalization and ownership of 
meaning 
By creating configurations of reification that reproduce their practice, 
communities of practice codify and proceduralize the understanding 
and the mastery around which they organize themselves. The creation 
of normative structures and other kinds of representations that 
decontextualize practice is always potentially an attempt to claim 
ownership of the meaning of some activities, just as the COB 
worksheet is an attempt to control the meaning of the procedure 
through literal interpretation. Once the bid for ownership of meaning 
has succeeded, outsiders become dependent for these activities on the 
service of experts because knowledge of procedures becomes more 
important than participation in meaning. So for instance, the 
complexity of encoding of social relations into laws means that dealing 
with the justice system has more to do with local knowledge of how 
the system works than with understanding the concept of justice. This 
is why we need specialists, who know about all these obscure 
procedures, rather than consultants who can help us understand for 
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ourselves what our own relations are with the issues we are trying to 
deal with. Operationalization is therefore similar to the process of 
commoditization in that it gives to knowing and understanding forms 
that make them ownable and thus marketable. 
The process of ownership of meaning through operationalization 
transforms agents who have to deal with a problem into consumers 
who receive a service. These service relations can be characterized by 
the same black-box syndrome as any relation with a community of 
practice to which one does not belong, whether or not this relation is 
mediated by a physical artifact. Assumptions of patients who cannot or 
don't need to understand, of computer users who don't want or don't 
need to know, of constituencies who are not interested in real 
debates, can be self-fulfilling prophecies. If so they have serious long-
term consequences for a social formation, which we don't understand 
very well. Nor do we understand the characteristics of and the 
strnctural conditions for an empowering public discourse that would 
be a key to cultural transparency. The problem is much more rampant 
than one of education in the classical sense. If daim processors are 
parents, will they teach their children to get by filling out COB 
worksheets? If a society is organized around assumptions of limited 
intelligence and limited engagement and interest in the issues that its 
members face, is there any hope that schools, training, and other 
similar institutions can perform the unlikely miracle of turning around 
the social formation in which they function and which they can but 
reflect? 
If Foucault (1975) is right that power relations have evolved from 
confrontational relations to relations mediated by normative 
strnctures, then ownership of meaning implies owning the ability to 
set the mediating strnctures of power relations. In this regard, 
professionalism is a crucial development. The notion of ownership of 
the means of production as the key to understanding societal 
formations must then be supplemented with the notion of ownership 
of meaning. Though the two are tightly interrelated, it does not seem 
that one can be reduced to the other. But to the extent that cultural 
transparency is a form of what Bourdieu calls symbolic capital, an 
increasing black-box syndrome in service relations is similar in nature 
to the impoverishment of the proletariat, which Marx ( 1967) thought 
placed a theoretical limit on the development of capitalism. Of course, 
the impoverishment of the proletariat did not come about, but neither 
did the type of raw capitalism he was analyzing. Are there theoretical 
limits to the cultural distance across which service relations can be 
carried out meaningfully? Is the ability of consumers to understand the 
artifacts they use the ultimate limit on the complexity of the 
technology we can produce? Could the concentration of ownership of 
meaning in specialized communities of practice place in-principle 
limits to the development of democracy? I will obviously not provide 
final answers to these questions, but I wtll extend the discourse I have 
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been building in this dissertation with a few more concepts that I 
think would be useful in starting to address these issues. 
Essential cultural forms 
First I want to distinguish between what I call .. essential cultural 
forms" and "technicized cultural forms." Essential cultural forms are 
issues that are shared in one way or another by everyone in a culture, 
whereas technicized cultural forms are aspects of the culture that have 
been appropriated by specific communities of practice through a 
process of operationalization. The two often go in pairs or clusters. 
Health is an essential cultural form, but medicine is one of its 
technicized counterpart. Justice is an essential cultural form, but law 
is its technicized counterpart. I might even say that intelligence is an 
essential cultural form, and that academic intellectualism and artificial 
intelligence are two of its technicized counterparts. 
There are many serious problems with the concept of essential 
cultural form. How many are there? Are they static? If they evolve, to 
what degree are they influenced by their technicized counterparts? 
Are they shared by the entire population of a social formation? Do they 
represent forms of cultural hegemony? One would hope that one could 
delineate a number of essential cultural forms, which may be 
influenced by their technicized realization, yet evolve of their own 
right; which cut across broad divisions such as class or gender within 
one social formation even if they take somewhat different shape in 
different segments, possibly with relations of domination (e.g., 
rationalistic over intuitive realizations of intelligence, or high culture 
over popular realizations of entertainment). I will assume that the 
concept is a coherent analytical category for now, even if it needs to be 
refined later. 
The reason I need this analytical category is to have something that 
remains public property even though it has technicized realizations 
appropriated by specific communities of practice. It is a bit like the 
rule that one can patent implementations, but not ideas. In our 
culture, things like intelligence, justice, health, power, wealth, sanity, 
democracy, pleasure, etc., belong to everyone and pervade our 
thoughts in unarticulable ways. As such they are ever elusive-objects of 
an unending quest, grails of our cultural journey-even though their 
meaningfulness is deeply rooted in our day-to-day lives. Essential 
cultural form seemed like a good term for them. I was careful not to 
call them concepts because I do not want to reify them out of their 
diffuse, participative embodiment. Nor do. I want to intellectualize 
them: the negotiation of meaning involved in participation in essential 
cultural forms is not in its basic nature an intellectual process. 
Intellectualizing essential cultural forms is itself a bid for setting the 
public discourse about them in ways that foster exclusionary social 
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dichotomies of the type expert versus layperson or mental versus 
manual. I want to use the category of essential cultural forms as an 
argument against such dichotomies and toward a definition of expert 
practice that would create a relation of mutual dependence between 
membership and non-membership. 
Membership and non-membership 
When communities of practice such as professions technicize cultural 
forms, they can proceed with their practice even though they may 
have lost touch in serious ways with the essential cultural forms that 
are the counterparts of their areas of specialization. A lawyer with 
whom I was talking recently told me that he not only did not believe 
in justice, but thought that the concept was and had always been 
useless and meaningless. The problem is not limited to lawyers by any 
means. One thinks of doctors whose technical view of health prevents 
them from letting old patients die their- own death, of fast food 
restaurants whose technical marketing of taste makes them poison the 
population, of financiers whose technical analyses of financial 
opportunities make them dismantle entire industries, of politicians 
whose technical surveys of reelection chances paralyze them into 
complete non-commitment. The question is not whether my lawyer 
friend is right or wrong, which is itself a meaningless question. Rather 
one would like to understand what such an attitude does to a society 
when it is widely transformed into what Schon in his analysis of 
professions call technical rationality; this technicizatlon disconnects 
the practice of a community from the essential cultural form it 
proceduralizes but allows the community to claim ownership of its 
realization for other members of society for whom it is elusively yet 
profoundly meaningful. 
We are talking here about the domination of some forms of 
intelligence by others in a political economy of meaning. Its market is 
what Habermas (1961) calls the "public sphere," where reifying 
articulation and proceduralized representation are the exchange value 
of commodities. To wedge ·the discourse of cultural transparency· in 
this context with its essential interaction of visibility and invisibility, 
means to talk then about what Foucault (1980) calls "the resurgence of 
subjugated knowledges." 
The reader may recall that in the preceding chapter, I have described 
communities of practice as condensations of membership in a 
landscape of peripheralities that are definitional of identities all the 
way to non-membership. In this context, the notion of essential 
cultural form is crucial in allowing me to claim at some level a 
legitimate ownership of meaning across the entire spectrum of forms 
of membership. 
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Of course there are all sorts of conflicts of interest that have raised 
barriers and caused non-members to be made to feel like outsiders. 
But I am arguing that non-members can be as essential to the life of a 
practice as core members. While there is power and insight at the 
core of communities of practice, there is also a tendency to become 
blind to the limitations of the practice. This phenomenon of core 
blindness is central to the problems of professionals described above. 
Legitimate peripheral participation always involves trade-offs between 
gaining and losing sight. Thus there is value for a community in finding 
a truly negotiatory shared practice with non-members or peripheral 
members as a counter-weight to the blindness inherent in core 
membership. For instance, non-members are likely to have more 
untainted relations with essential cultural forms than professionals. 
This is not just glorifying naivete, but trying to come up with a notion 
of expertise that would be more resistant to the fossilization of core 
membership while at the same time enable forms of peripherality that 
would be more permeable in order to support cultural transparency. 
Expertise redefined in terms of such a client relation is not the 
characteristic of a person by contrast to another, but a co-
construction, a mutual exchange between members and non-members. 
This creates a new sense of what an expert is and of the training an 
expert should receive. Instead of placing all the emphasis on the 
professional discourse, the new training will emphasize the ability to 
free oneself from the professional discourse by using the client 
relation in order to reconnect with essential cultural forms and 
rediscover the professional discourse along with the non-member. 
Similarly, this creates a new sense of what a professional community of 
practice is, in particular with respect to reproduction processes: these 
must be viewed as covering the entire spectrum of forms of 
membership, including non-membership. It is symptomatic of our 
current definition of expertise that the category of non-membership is 
a non-category, shadowed by our culture, and only defined by contrast. 
Non-membership, however, is an extremely important category 
because it is a state in which we find ourselves much of the time in our 
daily interactions with the world as a landscape of communities of 
practice. Yet our education does not teach us how to be non-members, 
that is, how to co-construct expertise in the member/non-member 
relation. In school we learn to become pseudo-experts and pseudo-
members, but never to become non-members. We always meet 
"experts" whose exclusive purpose is to teach us and who, at least 
ideally, have nothing to gain from the interaction, have no other 
agenda. The reality of the division of labor and of the expert/ client 
relation in the market place is quite different, of course, but it is 
something we are not prepared to deal with; it is a situation we are 
not prepared to contribute to or to learn from. 
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Intelligence and belonging 
In the age of the computer, we have embarked on a quest to a 
mechanical account of intelligence, but we have hardly achieved a 
humanistic account of it. My quest in this dissertation has largely been 
one for intelligence. I have mostly insisted on cultural transparency 
because the need for· procedural transparency seems to be fairly well 
understood. Indeed, if we ignore the failure of formal definitions, our 
culture in practice has largely taken intelligence to be the ability to 
move toward the core membership of communities· of practice as 
demonstrated by the ability to deal with configurations of reification. 
My association of procedurallzation with the notion of black box early 
in the development should not give the impression that-procedural 
transparency is something negative: it is an essential ingredient of 
intelligence by which irrelevant aspects of activities can be pushed out 
of sight so the relevant aspects can be attended to. 
But procedural transparency by itself turned out to be brittle and to 
give rise to a sense of meaninglessness. Cultural transparency on the 
other hand turned out to be insightful, though by itself ineffective. And 
I found that I needed both. Visibility was overwhelming and invisibility 
left my thirst unquenched. Again I found I needed both. I then 
explored the texture that communities of practice give the world and I 
engaged in legitimate peripheral participation. I visited peripheries 
and found that I wanted to participate more fully in order to gain a 
deeper understanding. I visited core membership and reached full 
mastery, but found a core blindness there. And my actions and my 
thoughts, which reflect my trajectories of participation, and thus my 
forms of membership, became both distractedly insightful and blindly 
focused, cleverly dreamy and stupidly real. And intelligence, as much 
as I could fmd it, I found in navigating between the two. 
Now membership and non-membership chase each other in a constant 
circular race, and it is impossible to know which pursues and which 
flees. When membership charges blindly or cracks a joke at the cost of 
non-membership, it is swept out of sight. When non-membership loses 
its sense of self, membership comes to the rescue. When the local 
becomes too narrow and too disconnected, the global pulls it apart: 
and when the global becomes a disconnected, local game of its own, 
the local roots it back. 
The picture that comes to life is not a simple one, but it is one that 
has dynamism and connectedness. It is also one in which we 
desperately need each other: to come together and to pull apart. 
In the age of Enlightenment, we thought that we had caught the 
elusive treasure. We had tamed raw power: we had abolished the 
confrontations of domination; we had become civilized at last. But old 
175 
forms of power turned out to be like the phoenix; new ones were born 
from their ashes, more formidable perhaps than the old ones in their 
very civility: contracts for honesty, laws for justice, morality for love, 
surveillance for punishment, expertise for wisdom, rules for 
intelligence. Power had become technicized, domination nonnative. 
We had colonized the planet; soon the vision of power and 
powerlessness of the information society was upon us. But civilization 
had eluded us. 
If intelligence was not made out of rules, then what was it made out 
of? If intelligence was not centered on the individual, if it had to do 
with trajectories of belonging, with straddling boundaries between 
defining structures, with-constantly and at once-constructing and 
deconstructing cultural objects that congeal and mediate our shared 
practices, with negotiating and renegotiating the self in a fluid dance 
among forms of participation, then how could we achieve it, as 
individuals and as human communities, which is the same thing? We 
seemed like Orpheus, walking out of Hades with our treasure behind 
us, knowing that turning around to check if we really had it was the 
surest way to lose it. 
It was necessary, against all odds, to fmd new ways of belonging-with 
each other and on our planet: to connect to essential cultural forms; to 
participate together in the significance of the techniques some of us 
owned; to engage in new modes of shared practice where to trade our 
forms of membership and non-membership; to find the social fabric of 
intelligence. 
Trajectories 
and meeting places 
One thought, one word 
and thousand faces 
Timeless the wind 
on waning traces 
Catch, catch the wind 
to more embraces28 
28 To leave the reader with an openmg onto further rea1ms of thought, I decided to 
conclude with this short poem , which I wrote a little over two years ago, and which at 
the time I entitled "Friendships" but which turns out to be surprisingly relevant to the 
themes in this dissertation. 
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Reflections on 
work 
and design: 
an inf 01·111al 
report 
The following report was written for the benefits of people at Alinsu. It 
lists a number of personal observations I made during my fieldwork at 
the claim processing center along with some design recommendations 
in line with the argument of the thesis. 
The personal observations listed here are not a summary of my 
doctoral dissertation; they are not meant to provide a complete 
analysis but to bring up a number of points of interest. I thought it 
might be useful to collect them in a document for the benefit of the 
people at Alinsu. In this informal report, I have tried to be candid 
because I believe it is the best way to be helpful given my unusual 
status of external observer/participant. 
At a more general level, all my observations, while targeted specifically 
to the claim processing center, reflect important issues typical of 
emerging service industries. Cast in terms of the service that the 
claim processors are offering, these general issues include the 
following trends: 
• the field of health care is undergoing deep and rapid 
transformations; 
• the increasing complexity, allowed in part by new technologies, 
is becoming overwhelming, to service providers as well as 
clients: 
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• and the mechanical aspects of claim processing are 
increasingly being automated. 
I started my fieldwork by attending two complete training classes, one 
for each of the two types of health insurance handled by the claim 
processing center (the traditional indemnity system, which 
reimburses patients for their expenses, and the more recently 
developed managed medical system, which is based on contractual 
relations between service providers and Alinsu). I also took some of 
the exams for new recruits and was subjected to a mock job interview. 
After the two training classes, I followed some processors through 
their day, and then joined a processing unit as an observant-
participant: I processed claims at my own desk and I participated in 
the conversations and the social events of the unit. In addition to my 
direct involvement, I interviewed a number of trainees and claim 
processors, some individually and some in small groups. 
Whenever possible, I tried to receive all my information from the same 
channels as the trainees and processors with whom I was working. In 
this regard, I limited my interactions with management to the process 
of obtaining permission to participate in activities. In many cases, I 
even chose to remain ignorant about specific points rather than to 
obtain information from sources outside the purview of a processor. 
This intentional restraint was a strategy I adopted for this initial piece 
of fieldwork in order to understand as authentically as possible the 
viewpoints and experiences of claim processors. 
For concision and ease of perusing I present most of my observations 
in a list consisting of pairs of issues/possible directions. The list is 
organized under topical rubrics, which cover three broad areas of 
concern. 
The first two sections deal with the internal organization of the job 
and of the communities involved. First I present a general framework 
for understanding the problems I address and I consider the 
possibility of a global redesign in the light of this framework. Second, I 
discuss individual problems I have observed; these provide additional 
details about issues and possible solutions which ground the general 
framework and may offer opportunities for tactical improvements. 
In the third section, I present some thoughts about long-term 
strategies for the functions of claim processors and the services they 
offer, as issues of internal organization cannot be dealt with 
independently of a reflection on the nature of the work. 
In a fourth and final section, I deal separately with issues concerning 
the design of adequate supporting computer systems. 
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1. Redesigning claim processing 
While not belonging to a doctoral dissertation, the following remarks 
are connected to my doctoral work in important ways, and informed 
by its theoretical framework. The existence of an underlying level of 
theoretical analysis that gives observations and suggestions coherence 
is important because the success of change will depend on the degree 
to which their implementation continues to reflect and be informed by 
this understanding. 
A central argument of my dissertation is that people organize their 
world by forming what I will call "communities of practice." The term 
.. community" suggests a social structure with some degree of 
organization (here, it does not imply co-presence) and the term 
"practice" suggests a shared way of going about doing things. 
With regard to the first term, I argue that these communities of 
practice provide the context in which people live, engage in activities, 
communicate, learn, and understand the world and themselves. They 
provide the context in which the meanings of objects and events are 
constructed and renegotiated. Communities of practice are crucially 
distinct from the institutions in the context of which they arise. As a 
matter of fact, they are often at odds with institutions in important 
ways. 
With regard to the second term, I argue that these communities of 
practice are the locus of "real work." The practice of a community is 
where the official meets the non-official, where the visible rests on the 
invisible, where the canonical is negotiated with the non-canonical. 
Because the practice and the community cannot be dissociated, 
learning must then be understood as becoming a member of a 
community of practice through increasing participation. 
Thus viewing the social world as consisting merely of individuals and 
institutions in fact misses the key unit of analysis when it comes to 
making sense of- and providing support for-the activities, 
experience, knowing, and understanding of a person or of a group of 
persons. 
From this perspective, the isolated remarks I make in the following 
sections can be understood from a unifying perspective. They can be 
viewed as stemming from the fact that the institutions that implement 
business objectives happen to be in certain respects at odds with the 
ways in which the communities of practice within it function. Specific 
changes can be made, but they will really make a difference insofar as 
the institution comes into alignment with the communities of 
practice. 
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Thus wWle my remarks in the following sections can be construed as 
individual obseivations with the possibility of incremental 
improvement, they fit within a broader redesign of the workplace, 
which subsumes them. To place everything in perspective, I will start 
by addressing on the outset the possibility of such a thorough redesign 
understood in terms of communities of practice. 
al Issue: misalignment of institution with communities of practice 
Communities of practice are a context for organizing one's 
engagement in socially meaningful activities, and therefore a context 
for developing a sense of oneself as an agent in the world, as a social 
person. In this regard, my impression is that the organization of the 
work of claim processors in many ways fosters "identities of non-
participation," that is, a sense of the self as only marginally involved in 
the meaning of the activities around wWch one's community is 
organized. 
Not only is there no participation through shared profits schemes and 
the like, as is usually the case for such low-status jobs, but there is 
hardly any participation in the understanding, negotiation, and 
defmition of what the job of claim processing is about and what it 
entails. For instance, there is a suggestion box in the office, but I have 
yet to find someone who reported using it. The processors I asked 
about the suggestion box answered that they did not think their 
suggestions would be followed anyway. Overall most of them did not 
feel that they could make a difference they would care about. 
Before proceeding, I should clarify one point: there are in the office 
communities of practice in place already, in which people are engaged 
and participate actively. It is not that people do not care about what 
they are doing. In spite of the institutional issues I will discuss, these 
communities are rather effective at producing what is expected of 
them. Jobs get done, actions are perceived as meaningful, processors 
all learn continually, and they learn from each other. They all invent 
small tricks to deal with their work and with the organization, and the 
most crucial of these tricks successfully spread through the 
community. This should not be belittled. 
Yet there is institutional misalignment in that membersWp in these 
existing communities of practice, while involving engagement in the 
confine of the communities, generates identities that do not involve 
concern for the content of work activities. I am not saying that it is 
possible-or even desirable for that matter-to have a community of 
practice at the workplace whose preoccupation is exclusively "work": 
human beings are just not that simple and any institution has to 
incorporate multiple dimensions of social life. Besides, claim 
processors report that they enjoy being able to go home and not 
having to think about work (which may mean among other things that 
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thinking about work is not something they would find exciting). But 
there is a problem, I would argue, when the institution and its 
implementation of business objectives are such that the communities 
of practice that arise are sustained around a sense of non-participation. 
This usually occurs because the official version of jobs does not provide 
enough support, recognition, and reward for the work that communal 
participation in the meaning of activities would entail. 
The ensuing disengagement results both in poor performance and in 
limited enjoyment. My intuition is that these identities of non-
participation not only limit the work experience of claim processors 
and other employees, but are one of the most serious limits on Alinsu's 
ability to conduct its business successfully and to expand it. 
bl Possible directions: supporting the functioning of communities of 
practice 
Identities of participation arise out of engagement in the construction 
of one's social world. Communities of practice, as the articulation of 
this participatory construction of the self, can vary greatly in the kinds 
of identities they provide material for, depending on the institutional 
context in which they develop. What follows is a general outline of the 
directions in which I would encourage change. 
I would support the current work units in organize themselves as 
small communities of practice embedded in larger ones (as opposed to 
the current attitude of a pool of replaceable workers). Crucially, 
membership in these human communities and participation in their 
practice should be allowed to have personality, to have color, to have 
social texture and dynamism, so that knowing can be part of a rich 
sense of self. 
I would encourage the redefinition of these units around specific 
tasks, client plans, or problems. These should form logical 
articulations of the work and constitute areas over which they could 
gain a high level of mastery, including a broad understanding of the 
relations involved. I would let these specific responsibilities as well as 
the goal of cohesiveness determine the sizes of these units (in contrast 
with the current units which for administrative reasons are uniform in 
size, and given a load in accordance). 
Right now, processors can organize their own personal work 
strategies. They enjoy that and are very inventive about it. But the 
hierarchical structure does not give them a sense of ownership over 
what they can do at the unit level in this regard. I would therefore 
deemphasize hierarchy, encourage cooperation, and make sure 
important decisions are achieved communally within units. This will 
mean that related supervisory functions will need to be rethought 
seriously. 
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I would encourage these units-and give them the means and latitude-
to become creative in providing the service of figuring out benefits and 
helping customers with their problems. If there is much 
dissatisfaction on the phone, for instance, let each unit investigate the 
problems they encounter on an ongoing basis and come up with 
solutions in their own purview and proposals for more global issues. 
It is in this context that I would hold these units responsible for the 
performance of their function. This would imply giving them access to 
the information they need in order to understand for themselves and 
explain to outsiders how well they are doing or what resources they 
need in order to improve. 
I would officially make continuous training an integral part of the work 
and make sure that growing expertise is valued. In fact, I might even 
consider doing away with training classes, partially or altogether, and 
letting the units select and train their own newcomers into their 
practice. In any case, I would also foster mutual responsibility by 
encouraging buddy systems that associate oldtlmers with newcomers: 
the collaboration of such teams benefits both participants and makes 
clear how valued the exchange and development of expertise is. By the 
way, this would also take care of the problem that, according to most 
processors, training is too short and "moving to the floor" is too much 
of a shock for newcomers, many of whom quit. Their reports suggest 
that it is primarily the scarceness of community resources that 
discourages them. 
I would support the participation of these units in broader 
communities of practice. I would create multiple forums for the 
exchange of ideas and create feedback loops that carry information 
across community boundaries and allow communication among many 
levels within the corporation. Given the size of the corporation, I 
would also facilitate and encourage communication with other units 
over large regions. This would give rise to new communities of 
practice, membership in which would enrich the experience of claim 
processors and thus broaden their understanding. 
I would actually consider a more radical way of achieving this result. I 
would encourage the formation of units that are not just responsible 
for claim processing, but for the entire range of relations with the 
client companies of which they take charge. That would mean that one 
unit would include enough of a variety of people to take care of sales, 
negotiations, underwriting, open enrollment days, processing, quality 
review, technical referrals, and phone answering. The members of 
these units would have simultaneous, lateral forms of membership in 
broader communities of practice in which their specialized expertise 
would be sustained, but their primary allegiance would be to these 
heterogeneous communities of practice, which would combine all 
aspects of a well-defined task. This would have the result of 
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broadening the discourse, exposing all involved to the various aspects 
of the service process in which their own work fits, and provide ways 
for these communities to be able themselves to evaluate in a realistic, 
connected fashion how well they are doing. The role of the company at 
large would then be to provide support for the functioning of these 
autonomous units. 
This whole process would have to be ongoing and self-renewing. 
Change from within (even when in response to change from without) · 
is one of the most important characteristics of the nature of 
communities of practice.· Indeed, I have talked about redesigning the 
organization of work, about aligning the institution with the needs of 
communities of practice that can function, but not about redesigning 
the communities of practice. There is a subtle, but delicate point about 
communities of practice, a secret as it were: they are a naturally-
occurrtng social phenomenon. Whether they are official or interstitial 
with respect to the surrounding institutions, they clearly have a life of 
their own. Large or small, long-lasting or temporary, involving co-
presence or distributed, they arise, develop, change, and disappear: 
they inherit some of the living, unpredictable characteristics of the 
human agents who compose them. They can be supported or opposed, 
but they cannot be decreed nor erased; they can be influenced-with 
expected or unexpected results-but they cannot be steered. When 
there is a design effort in surrounding institutions, communities of 
practice occur or reconstitute themselves as a response to design; 
thus they are not the result of design: they cannot themselves be 
designed. 
If institutions cannot "design" communities of practice, they have to 
learn to support their functioning in ways that are likely to foster what 
the institution is about; or perhaps another way of saying that is that 
we have to reconsider, to rediscover the meaning of "design": when 
we think in social terms, design has to be understood as not just 
"from without" but primarily "from within," in the context of a 
relation of mutual dependency between the two. 
2. Specific issues in the claim processing 
center 
2.1 Customer service and customer education. 
a) Issue: health insurance as financial computations 
From the standpoint of the organization of claim processing, providing 
health insurance is currently viewed primarily as a computational 
service. Paying claims accurately, however, is not the only service that 
Alinsu is expected to perform. People want to be helped in dealing 
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with the services they receive. I have seen personal letters of thanks 
to employees who had provided personalized help in dealing with a 
difficult case. Examples of issues about which processors must be able 
to provide explanations include: 
- what the plan says: 
Although this is usually considered to be the responsibility 
of benefit representatives at the client company, individual 
customers constantly call the insurance company 
expecting this type of explanation. 
- why certain policies of the plan exist and how they function: 
These types of question include: what their rationale is; 
who makes decisions about the plans; and what criteria 
these decisions are based on. These questions are not 
always articulated by callers, but they underlie much of the 
confusion that exists in the former types of question. 
- how benefits are calculated: 
By themselves, calculation procedures are often 
meaningless. But they can become interesting when they 
make concrete what is said in the plan. Explanations then 
become a matter of connecting the substance of policies 
with their implementation. Being able to maintain this 
connection requires both involvement in ongoing practice 
and access to resources for constructing meaning. (This is 
at the core of the notion of glass-box system.) 
- what is happening to submitted claims and, if they are delayed. why; 
- what medical procedures accomplish, what they are good for, and 
what alternatives are available: 
While I have heard reports of questions of this type being 
asked, I do not know to what extent claim processors are 
involved in phone conversations requiring this kind of 
knowledge. 
There is much awareness of the issue of communication with 
customers among claim processors. 
"Oh people are so, oh, it's so bad now the phones. I'm 
embarrassed the way some people answer the phone 
[laughs]. I'm embarrassed the way they tell the poor 
insured. It's terrible, it's terrible. Phones are really bad. 
Alinsu does not realize that, but they are creating a lot of 
animosity with these insureds by the way the phones are 
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being answered. It, it makes them mad." 
(A claim processor) 
There seems to be increasing awareness of this problem at Alinsu 
recently; but the broad thematic directives from corporate offices and 
the short training sessions about phone manners do not generate the 
kind of atmosphere required for a change in awareness. They fail to 
spur a serious and broad public discourse and shared reflection on the 
nature of the service Alinsu is providing and on how to organize the 
work in order to provide such service. 
bl Possible directions: customer service as communication and 
education 
As its services develop, one of the main functions, perhaps even the 
main function, of the successful service corporation of the future will 
be to educate its customers to help them deal with its own 
inventiveness and the complexity of its own as well as related 
industries. In this context I would attempt to personalize the services 
as much as possible; this would become a high priority for the 
organization of the units. I would take as a main goal to help Alinsu 
customers become informed patients/employees/insured, engaged in 
their own reflections. To this end, I would search for ways to help 
customers learn about crucial issues of concern to them, by building 
on their experience with their individual cases. 
As with any community of practice, there is a public discourse among 
claim processors; they do talk about their problems and try to come 
up with solutions. Phone calls were the topic of many conversations in 
which I participated. The problem has to do with the level at which 
these conversations address the issue: time spent on phone rather 
than production; complaints about nasty calls, and the like. For 
instance, processors complain that many people think of insurance 
companies as the bad guys (to the point that patients league up with 
their doctors to cheat them). And of course, insurance companies have 
their own interests, but these are also implicated in the contradictions 
among the interests of employees, of employers, and of the medical 
establishment: insurance companies-and to some extent the claim 
processors who represent them-even come to stand for these 
contradictions in the minds of most people. I have practically never 
seen the claim processors involved in a discussion of the place of their 
work in this problematic context, even though they are individually 
acutely aware of the public images that cause unpleasant phone calls, 
and when prompted in conversations do express opinions. 
When it comes to providing understanding to clients, to "changing a 
black box into a glass box, .. there are no substitutes for a community of 
concerned service providers who themselves have a "culture of 
understanding," that is, have access to and are involved in 
constructing a comprehensive understanding of what their activities 
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are about. This is because understanding-or perhaps more precisely 
given my perspective what I call .. cultural transparency"-is not a 
packageable commodity. Narrowness propagates itself. It is necessary 
to use intelligence to call upon intelligence. 
al Issue: narrow focus on procedures 
The focus of the organization of work is on following procedures. 
Training too is very much focused on procedures. This exclusive focus 
may be justified for the initial training classes in that it allows 
newcomers to be involved directly in the actual activities of the 
community early on. But my overall impression was one of continued 
emphasis on procedures. Processors are aware of this problem . 
.. Also, if they can't follow up, they're gonna make mistakes. 
If they are just a little cog, you make mistakes, because 
you're doing what you do, this is what I do, but you don't 
know where it's going from there, what's gonna happen to 
it, and eventually, if people don't have that feedback, 
they're not gonna do it. You know, when it comes up, and 
they get this, they're gonna say 'Oh, I don't know what to 
do with this.' Toss it.'' 
(A claim processor) 
Transforming social relations into local procedures for people to 
follow limits the possibilities for understanding. In practice at the 
claim processing center, this focus on procedures leads to a personal 
disengagement with the work. It also leads to problems in handling 
calls in a constructive way. 
In addition to the emphasis on procedures, the stress caused by tight 
production quotas in terms of quantitative claim throughput prevents 
even the most willing learners from becoming interested in the 
substantive aspects of their job. 
A related factor is that' the claim processors have limited contact with 
the communities where they could obtain a better understanding. For 
instance, when a claim is referred to a technical unit, the level of 
involvement of the claim processor in the substance of the technical 
investigation is minimal. often limited to receiving a recommendation 
for action. 
bl Possible directions: inte~ate leaminli in practice and broaden its 
scope 
I would make sure that training engenders the emergence of a culture 
of understanding in a community of practice engaged in providing and 
developing a service. Tutorials and seminars, especially with regard to 
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customer service, only have limited and temporary effects if they are 
not placed in the context of a shared inquicy to which they provide 
resources. That is why I would make training a continuous, integral 
part of the work practices, and place it under the control of the units 
concerned. 
I would place much more emphasis on understanding and explaining. 
Procedures can be opaque when they are just used as a way to get 
people to perform actions such as calculations as localized step-by-
step processes. But they can also be a resource for cultural 
transparency: they are tools for conveying understanding when they 
are used as representations of principles which they implement in a 
well specified way. 
That is why it would be a mistake to create a separate, specialized 
phone unit to deal with customers, an idea that was being talked about 
while I was at the claim processing center. This does not constitute a 
useful articulation of the job. The overlap in knowledge between the 
two functions of claim processing and telephone answering is a 
precious asset for performing both. The idea is to support the 
development of a broad understanding rooted in the practice of 
providing a service. 
With respect to the isolation of claim processors, there was an 
important change toward the end of my fieldwork. The technicians, 
who had for some years been working together in a separate office, 
were sent back into individual units so they would have more contact 
with the processors. This is certainly a step in the right direction. In 
general, I would foster a better understanding of other related · 
communities of practice by creating channels through which 
processors have substantive contacts with panelists, technicians, pre-
authorization evaluators, and even possibly underwriters and service 
providers. 
2.3 Evaluation, s~. and infantilization 
al Issue: mismatch between evaluation and work 
There is a pervasive and frustrating feeling among claim processors 
that the measures by which their work is evaluated are not related 
enough to what they actually do. This creates a constant conflict 
between doing their job well and achieving high scores on the scales 
by which they are evaluated. The resulting stress actually makes many 
people quit, especially in the period following their initial training. In 
addition many processors complain of not being trusted and of being 
treated like school children. 
Management has recognized that there are problems with the 
evaluation of what is known as "quality" (whether claims are 
processed correctly or in error) and is working on a new quality 
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measure that takes into account the types and seriousness of errors. 
Processors have shown interest in the proposals though in private 
many are skeptical that this will make a big difference in their work 
lives. 
But even if the new measures are better than the old "void system," 
they still leave off many aspects of the work. There is still no official or 
tangible appreciation for people's work on the phone and for their 
participation in constructing a functioning community in which 
knowledge is shared and whose practice is flexible enough to deal 
with the unexpected and the informal. 
bl Possible directions: communal resolutions of inherent 
contradictions 
In proposing as I will resolutions to problems of evaluation that involve 
the communities of practice directly, I am not necessarily talking 
against the automatic advancement procedure. In spite of its basis in 
individual performance, I think that such an advancement program 
currently helps the sustenance of the community. First, it clearly 
attracts new recruits. It ranks high on their reasons for choosing the 
job: they like the fact that there is a clear path to advancement and 
that they have control over it. Second, the scheme avoids direct 
competition for promotion. With little advantage in hoarding 
knowledge, claim processors freely exchange information and foster 
the functioning of the community as a communal memory. In any 
changes, I would therefore strive to preserve this sense of control and 
this local absence of direct competition for promotion. 
It is crucial to recognize openly that there are essential contradictions 
between production and service, between scoring high on quantitative 
measures and doing a quality job and that these contradictions do not 
have solutions but only contingent resolutions. Such resolutions 
require an ongoing reflection on the nature of expertise with a 
continual process of definition of success and valued contributions. I 
would make this process a core responsibility of working units. 
The processors for the most part have a sense of fairness and are more 
responsible than management seems to think. In particular, they all 
accept undisputedly their responsibility as employees to contribute to 
the business objectives of the company, and they agree to be 
accountable to this, even though they often resent the current 
structures of accountability. Of course they would not be doing what 
they are doing just for fun and without being paid, but they do care 
about what they are doing more than one would expect under their 
circumstances. 
Evaluation-self-evaluation and evaluation of others-is inherent in the 
practice of any community as people decide whom to collaborate with, 
whom to ask questions from, whom to refer issues to. In fact, it is 
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amazing how accurately processors know who is doing well and who is 
contributing. But the current evaluation structures not only impose 
external criteria that supersede their own sense of a good job; they 
offer them no way of finding out how well they are doing with respect 
to the broader business objectives of the corporation. Mechanisms of 
control are often as much a cause of as they are a response to 
irresponsibility. I would shift the emphasis from structures of control 
to providing units with the wherewithal to become actively and 
officially involved in the local and global resolutions of the inherent 
contradictions of their situation. 
2.4 Turnover, experience, and oldtimers 
al Issue: not enouw incentive to become oldtlmer 
Given that oldtimers are much faster, more accurate, and likely to 
provide better service on the phone than newcomers, I am very 
surprised to find out that Alinsu does little to keep people around. 
Actually Alinsu is known, at least by its employees but according to 
them outside as well, as the training ground of the industry: people 
come there, get their training, and go on to better paying jobs in other 
companies that require prior experience. 
I do not question the policy of not requiring prior experience and of 
offering training locally. The idea has a lot of merit both from a 
business standpoint because it gives Alinsu an opportunity to form 
people up to its standard and socially because it opens careers to 
people who may not have such an opportunity otherwise. Furthermore, 
the initial training is fairly successful. What is surprising is what 
happens after the initial training as people become oldtimers. I asked 
many of them what Alinsu was doing to keep them around and none of 
them could mention a single thing. 
For instance, the issue of pay raises has given rise to widespread 
resentment among oldtimers. These raises are awarded individually on 
the basis of employee reviews which take into account performance 
and behavior. Some processors argue that these reviews are an unfair 
substitute for regular cost-of-living adjustments since they always tie 
pay raises to performance. One claim processor even suspects that this 
is "a way of cutting cost: if they give you bad reviews, they can give you 
small raises." The reasoning behind the resentment of oldtimers is as 
follows. The pay raises of continuing employees as well as their 
advancement are always based on their original starting salaries. They 
have had to "gain" their current level of pay. At the same time, Alinsu 
has had to adjust starting wages to the cost of living in order to keep 
attracting new recruits. Oldtimers therefore find their wages 
insufficiently .different from those of newcomers. 
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The fmancial issue reflects a lack of appreciation for accumulated 
expertise. Claim processors definitely keep on learning after their 
training classes . 
.. So they are just giving you, like, the bare essentials in 
training, you know, and then every day, for, even after 11 
years, there is, you still see things new, because medical 
things are always changing. You know, 10 years ago, an 
MRI, nobody knew what it was, you know, and people did 
not have AIDS, and you did not have all these experimental 
drugs and stuff, so it's always a learning process." 
(A claim processor) 
But there is little official recognition and appreciation for the 
expertise they acquire and for the role it plays. Overall, the job of 
claim processor seems to be viewed as one that can be filled by people 
who are hastily trained and whose involvement in the meanings of 
what they are doing need not grow substantially beyond their initial 
training. 
'"There is a lot involved, a lot involved, right? And I think 
they think it is just like that, like a little candy line where 
you pinch the candy as it goes by to keep the shape, and 
that's all you do." 
(A claim processor) 
This official lack of recognition for the need for and existence of high 
levels of expertise is accompanied by a lack of commitment on both 
sides. Alinsu seems to view processors as replaceable entitles and the 
processors mostly view their job as either a temporary stopover or as a 
way merely to exchange their time for a wage without having to care. 
Since I have not talked to management much, I do not know what 
kinds of calculations are involved in Alinsu's policy of paying low 
wages, which implies accepting a high turnover, and having a large 
proportion of inexperienced employees. But my own suspicion is that 
it is not a good strategy: in the short term it generates recurring 
training costs; but more importantly in the long term, it conflicts with 
the increasing need for providing high-quality customer service. 
bl Possible directions: encouraa;e and reward seniority. attendant 
expertise. and new challena;es 
First, I would question the wisdom of the current strategy concerning 
salaries and turnover. To the extent that it has not been done, I would 
engage in broad calculations and evaluations of the short-term and 
long-term benefits of alternative strategies, taking into account the 
effects on business of qualitative differences in service. 
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I would also search for new ways to recognize the high level of 
expertise reached by oldtimers, encourage and reward the continuous 
development of their expertise as well as their sharing this expertise 
toward the development of an effective community of practice. The 
move toward autonomous units would provide such opportunities at 
the same time as it would provide opportunities for making the job 
more exciting, challenging, and diversified. This would happen, for 
instance, through the transformation of supervisory functions into 
those of coach, resource, and facilitator of communal processes, and 
the sharing of these functions among oldtimers through distributed 
schemes such as the buddy system or special task forces. 
2.5 771e broader organization: disconnectednes versus 
mutual involvement 
al Issue: locality. forma}isms. and disconnectedness 
One really striking point to me as a naive newcomer to the corporate 
world was the profound degree of disconnectedness between 
management and employees. The various communities are really black 
boxes to each other; the disconnectedness is reciprocal. I suspect 
that, beyond the local inefficiencies I have witnessed, this reciprocal 
disconnectedness on a large scale must have enormous costs. 
On the one hand claim processors do not know what their managers 
and their managers' bosses do, think, strive for; and they do not care. 
They do not feel concerned about that, except perhaps to the degree 
that they wonder for themselves whether it is worth striving to move 
to a supervisory function. 
The drumming of new company-wide directions-directions which 
must seem like essential visions to those who instigate them-thus 
becomes mere background noise when it reaches the workers, who 
feel like it comes from a different world altogether. 
On the other hand, so much of the crucial local work is simply 
invisible to the abstracted eye of management. One claim processor 
expressed this thought as we were talking about problems with phone 
answering: 
"See, you can see it, and all these little people can see it. 
Why don't the bosses see it?" 
This invisibility is reflected in the nature of data gathering techniques 
and evaluation schemes, which translate work into figures 
representing productivity and quality. These figures are important for 
calculational purposes, but that very purpose, which implies erasing 
the practice out of which they arise, casts doubts on their ability to 
represent how well the actual business is taken care of. 
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Management is supposed to take care of global issues and workers to 
take care of local ones. But as work is transformed into figures. the 
.. globalness" of management itself becomes a local, self-contained 
practice. The respective communities of practice are both equally local 
as, in their disconnectedness, they form fundamentally different 
worlds, with different cultures and different currencies. 
Facilitating connections between the two, striving toward a "glass-box 
institution," is not just a matter of information. The technical and 
organizational issues involved in providing the facilities for the 
communication of information are only a small part of the problem. 
Some channels for this type of communication across levels are 
available right now: there are internal publications, and even a local 
"open door" policy for talking to managers. But these channels are not 
used much by claim processors. Information by itself is not a solution 
as long as it is not accompanied by a sense of participation in the 
meaning, in the purpose of this information. I have mentioned the 
difficulties with the suggestion box. I would argue that the very nature 
of a suggestion box, an enclosed, impersonal object, is in contradiction 
with its purpose. In fact, the suggestion box, in its lonely and empty 
silence, stands as an enduring symbol of the very distance it is 
supposed to bridge. 
bl Possible directions: mutual involvement 
I have addressed two levels of opposition between substance and 
formalism, between understanding and calculating: 
• at the level at which the business is viewed-financial 
calculation versus customer service; 
• at the level at which it is conducted-quantitative measures 
versus mutual involvement. 
These two levels are not independent; much of this report can in fact 
be construed as an argument that they are crucially related. A move 
toward substance at one level will imply a move toward substance at 
the other. The key term here is .. mutual involvement." 
I have talked much about supporting communities of practice that are 
involved in the meaning of their work. So far I have talked mostly 
about workers, but this is an accidental consequence of my fieldwork 
strategy. Involvement cannot be a one-way process. I would make sure 
that the organization of autonomous units includes them in a double 
feedback loop connecting local information with global decisions as 
well as global information with local decisions. (The terms .. global" 
and "local" however, are not as straightforward as one would think 
once interpreted in the context of my observation about the localness 
of the practice of both communities.) 
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Connecting communities requires the development of a common 
practice. That practice can be organized around "boundary objects" 
(language, in the form of texts and common terms: representations 
such as pictures or diagrams; artifacts such as computers and 
programs); but these must be connected to all local practices in a rich 
enough way that, through the shared practice, they can carry 
meaningful information as they cross community boundaries. 
Quantitative formalisms and procedural prescriptions are two 
examples I have talked about in this report which not only often do 
not achieve this result, but can even be obstacles. 
Connecting communities of practice is a significant part of the project 
of fostering identities of participation. I would strive to replace the 
one-way suggestion box with an open, shared culture of understanding 
and inquiry, and to support the participation of all communities of 
practice in this culture by a process of mutual involvement. 
3. The business of claim processing 
So far, I have mainly talked about the internal organization of the 
service of claim processing. I conclude these personal observations 
with some remarks about global business strategies for Alinsu because 
the sense of participation that can be gained from an internal 
reorganization of the work can only be fully achieved if it includes an 
involvement in a reflection on the nature of the business. 
3.1 Front line: phone answering 
al Issue: telephone answerin" as local crisis mana"ement 
It seems that telephone answering is mostly a process of taking care of 
problems on a day to day basis. Processors have to deal with a lot of 
anger and dissatisfaction. 
"Alinsu envisions itself as being a very ... the picture given 
to people is not the picture here. I feel, and especially 
since they merged the unit, I feel, they have this picture 
of, you know, something solid, that you can count on, it's 
going to be there. But I feel like behind, it's this 
cardboard, and behind it, it's just chaos." 
(A claim processor) 
Overall, dealing with customer problems and complaints on a strictly 
individual basis gives the impression of a constant patching up of 
symptoms without an attempt at a cure. 
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bl Possible directions: telephone answerin~ as feedback loop 
A traditional approach to the problem might be to organize a study of 
phone calls to understand better what problems need addressing. But 
I view this situation as a symptom of the disconnectedness mentioned 
earlier. I would therefore suggest a more dynamic strategy, which 
would make such a study continuous and-crucially-involve directly 
the communities of practice of processors themselves. 
After answering so many phone calls, processors have a great amount 
of knowledge about the nature of problems that come up. For instance, 
after working on this job for a while, most claim processors believe 
that there is a coherence, a local fairness to the way the policies are 
implemented, in that in their experience rules are genuinely applied 
independently of the amounts involved. But one of their problems is 
that they do not see any concerted effort to communicate this kind of 
information to customers. 
Nor do they feel that Alinsu is organized in such a way that their 
awareness of communication problems can make a difference. 
Through the process of involving units in thinking about their jobs, I 
would make sure that phone answering becomes a link in a far-
reaching feedback loop designed to improve not only the service they 
perform, but the broader service of which theirs is a part. This would 
mean supporting communication channels through multiple levels in 
the corporation, in the context of a broad reflective process through 
which the processors' knowledge can contribute to remedying the 
problems they perceive as well as to redefming their work. 
3.2 Charting out thejil.ture: collective discourse 
a) Issue: no broad reflection on the nature of the business 
Responding to perceived needs is not the only challenge. With a 
broad-and broadly shared-understanding of its business, a selVice 
company can take the lead in offering selVices customers do not even 
expect. Receiving healthcare is becoming a very complicated affair, 
involving at once personal, medical, fmancial, and social policy issues. 
In spite of the ongoing debate about healthcare in this country, I have 
never witnessed any local sign among processors that Alinsu as a major 
player is involved in a reflection on these issues. 
Let me illustrate this with a small example from my own uninformed 
reflections on the subject. I was surprised to learn that "Preferred 
Provider" contracts were purely :financial and did not involve any sort 
of quality assurance programs that would place the insurance company 
on the side of the patient while still serving the marketing needs of 
deselVing providers. Many people feel as disempowered by the 
prestige of the medical profession, as they do by the black-box nature 
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of insurance issues. There is a contradiction in medical care in that 
the medical profession is supposed to promote health but makes its 
profit from diseases. Insofar as it does not just make its profit from 
cash flow but from actual insurance, the insurance industry does not 
share this specific contradiction. It might therefore find that it is in 
its long-term interest to deal with an educated, empowered medical 
clientele. 
bl Possible directions: ongoing public discourse about the future 
Obviously this last example is a very complex and delicate issue 
because of the conflicting interests involved, including thorny 
questions of liability. My point is not to resolve it here, nor even to 
propose suggestions, but to highlight the fact that there is much room 
for new ways of thinking about what one is doing at many interrelated 
levels, and that exploring these new ways of thinking is at the core of 
how a service industry progresses. My argument is that doing this 
systematically requires an ongoing discourse on the substance of one's 
work, not only among high-level strategists but at all levels within the 
corporation. 
Such a discourse is useful not only in its direct purpose of creating 
ideas, but also in the identities of participation it fosters, and in the 
culture of understanding and inquiry, which I have argued will need to 
be the foundation of an effective customer service. 
3.3 Inventing the practice of the claim processors of thefature 
In conclusion, I have talked about involving the claim processors in a 
feedback loop to improve the system, in communicating about their 
business, and in a reflective discourse about possible futures. To gain 
this sort of critical cutting edge, I would right now think of organizing 
Alinsu as an environment for the communities of practice of the claim 
processors of the future. Given the confluence of increasing 
complexity, increasing automation, and increasing need for service, 
the claim processor of the future will definitely have to be oriented 
toward dealing with people and concepts as well as with claims. To 
fulfill this function, she or he will have to be involved in the kind of 
ongoing discourse I have talked about as well as in adjudication issues. 
Thus understanding the nature and supporting the functioning of 
communities of practice seriously involved with the substantive 
content of their activities will become the key to success. 
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4.. System design for claim processing 
4.1 System design issues.for the CWTen.t view of the job 
al Issue: design for an idealized process 
The current system reflects an ideal input/ output view of what claim 
processing is about: check information, enter information, and 
compute benefits. 
In fact, the system has become a normative frame for defining the job. 
Processors often describe their work in terms of the functions of the 
system. They say: .. Now you can PRCL," instead of "Now you can 
process the claim, or .. I will need to learn PROSYS, .. instead of "I will 
need to learn managed medical ... 
While the current system includes help functions that are useful in 
supporting the claim processing activity, the system is not 
systematically designed to support a realistic understanding of what 
claim processors actually do in their daily work and to enable the 
expertise that they develop over time within their community. (This is 
also true of computer-based training systems such as SCHOLAR-
TEACH, which trainees find irrelevant and do not enjoy working with 
at all.) 
bl Possible directions: design for actual work activities 
It is essential to design for the work that people do rather than for a 
disembodied, idealized description of the work process. The following 
suggestions are some simple examples of features that would make the 
system support observable activities. 
Putting cases on hold: right now, a claim cannot be put on hold. If it 
cannot be completely processed, it has be to abandoned and 
started all over again. This is a source of much frustration. When 
it turns out that processors need additional information for 
processing a claim, it is very rare that they are able to get it 
right away. It would be useful to have a facility in the system for 
stacking unfinished claims, including various mechanisms for 
reaccessing them depending on their status either by browsing 
lists or by automatic reminders of follow-up. 
Work organizing tools: claim processors continually have to request 
information and services from multiple sources and follow up on 
these requests. Their desks are covered with notes and piles. 
Thus in parallel with the case holding facility just mentioned. 
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there should be facilities for organizing one's work along 
multiple lines, such as calendars, reminders, note pads, etc. 
Phone doc: processors use the phone a lot and are required to ftll out 
forms known as phone doc's. Because people are often difficult 
to reach, there is much need for follow-up calls and monitoring 
of returned calls. One could imagine a complete support system 
that would provide on-line phone doc's with automatic updates, 
reminders, dialing and redialing, etc. 
Memo access: an important aspect of the work of claim processors is 
to receive memos, read them, file them, and remember them at 
the right time. A system should have facilities for recalling 
memos under specific circumstances. Processors should also be 
allowed to enter comments on these memos for use by 
themselves and others. 
Notebook: a facility similar to memo access could also be used during 
training. Claim processors keep notes from their training classes 
which they use long after they have left their classes. A notebook 
facility, which could be used by trainees and updated easily later 
on would be very useful, especially if it supported individualized 
indexing. 
An important point about the suggestions above is that such facilities 
should always leave the control over the organization of their work to 
individual claim processors. Not only do they have very different styles, 
but being able to organize their job locally is something they value 
greatly (They sometimes contrast it to a secretarial job where they are 
always told what to do next). 
4.2 System design.for a communal. view qf thejob 
al Issue: desi~n for individual workers 
The current system is not designed to support in any systematic way 
the kind of communal memory that I have observed at work among 
claim processors. 
Admittedly, there are facilities for attaching notes to claims and to 
database records, but these notes are not used to exchange knowledge. 
They are mainly used to record information; in many cases the system 
should handle this information directly but was never updated to be 
able to. Basically, the system is designed with the view that a claim 
processor works alone. 
bl Possible directions: desi@ for communities of users 
Here are some examples of tools that can be provided for the ongoing 
construction of support for communal memory: 
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Question referrals: finding someone who knows about an issue is a 
problem that claim processors encounter frequently. The system 
should be able to direct them to a person who has worked on 
similar problems or who is likely to know something about their 
question. This would require keeping audit trails of work, 
histories of cases, classifications of issues, and models of 
interactions patterns. 
Communal notes: processors are always learning new facts, tricks, and 
ways of doing things. They often write notes for themselves. If 
they had a notepad on the computer, it might be useful to 
explore the feasibility of an indexing scheme that would give 
them access to notes written by others. 
Any attempts in this direction would require careful experimentation 
because there are limits to the usefulness of such computer supports 
for the construction of communal processes. For instance, they should 
not attempt to replace the ongoing discourse among processors; 
overhearing questions and exchanges is an important source of 
· information and of connections. 
It is also important to allow local communities of users to have control 
over the development and use of such communal tools. Under 
situations of external control, the public documents created with the 
help of these tools can be viewed as threatening and intrusive. 
4.3 System designfor the job of the.future 
a) Issue: automation. service. and the black-box syndrome 
The claim processing job will face a challenging contradiction typical 
of service industries. There will be more automation yet there will be 
more need for personal services. There will be less direct involvement 
with processing, yet processing and the policies that it implements 
will become more complex. There will be less opportunity to gain 
access to the practice of claim processing through successive, 
increasingly complex, less and less peripheral functions because these 
intermediate functions will be automated, yet there will be more need 
for people who really understand what is going on. 
The challenge includes two typical glass-box issues: taking care of the 
needs of customers who call about claims that have been processed 
automatically and sustaining the expertise necessary to deal with the 
limitations of the system. 
bl Possible directions: automated system as communication artifact 
The system of the future will not just be an automated claim 
processing system whose function it is to calculate benefits. It will 
198 
have to be viewed as a communication artifact that will become the 
focus of collaborative work across multiple communities with different 
viewpoints and interests, including technical panels and other 
specialists, system designers, and claim processors. In other words, 
the system must be viewed as providing a bridge between the various 
communities of practice involved with it, as a "boundary object" 
connecting communities with different viewpoints. 
For instance, instead of memos on new policies, claim processors will 
have to understand and remember updates and modifications to the 
system so they can explain benefits to customers. It is not likely that 
simply sending descriptions around will work; memos as currently 
distributed become effective in the context of repeated use in multiple 
circumstances including processing and conversations that ground 
them in the practice. 
It will be necessary to find ways to involve the claim processors in 
activities that give meaning to the information they will have to deal 
with. For instance, it may be necessary to allow people with different 
levels of expertise to follow the working of the system, to create ways 
that some claims can be processed in cooperation between a person 
and the system, and to allow modifications to the system to be 
proposed by a variety of users. 
Such a system might have very sophisticated features such as 
explanation facilities, distributed updating facilities, user models, etc. 
But it might also include fairly standard features such as electronic 
mail, conferencing, and bulletin boards. The level of sophistication is 
not the main point. What will be critical is the ongoing process of 
work organization of which the design will be part. Will this process 
do justice to the invisible work that goes on in local communities? Will 
it support the participation in social practice necessary for developing 
understanding? Will it enable the development of identities of 
participation necessary for engagement in innovative work? 
4.4 Syst.em design processes 
al Issue: desiimin~ for non-existent users 
I have deduced the examples of facilities from my own exposure to the 
current system, my observations of .current work practices, and my 
conversations with claim processors. Many more such improvements 
could be devised. But without the continuous participation of all 
constituencies involved, chances are that these improvements will 
turn out. to be counter-productive, misunderstood, or underutilized. 
bl Possible directions: participatory desim 
In order to facilitate such improvements, I would create an ongoing 
process of "participatory design" which would involve the claim 
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processors in working directly With system designers in order to 
produce facilities that build upon their understanding of their own 
work. Unlike designers, they know what the job is, but they do not 
know what can be designed. This does not mean, however-and this is 
an important point since the job is viewed as routine-that they are 
oriented towards routine; change is a constant characteristic of their 
work, not only because medical practice, insurance policies, 
personnel, and the organization of work are constantly changing, but 
also because they are constantly adjusting and refining their own 
personal techniques for handling their job and living in the office. The 
problem is only that they are not accustomed to thinking broadly in 
terms of different futures because it is not part of the current local 
culture. A process of participatory design would give global legitimacy 
to this constant local refmement. 
Participation in such design process would be an important source of 
cohesion and empowerment for autonomous units. If it can become a 
point of focus for the kind of broad, ongoing public discourse on the 
nature of the business and on the invention of the future I have talked 
about, the design of computer systems could play an entirely new role 
in the organization. The maintenance of such a system would provide a 
basis for a common language and even a forum for communication by 
means of distributed improvement facilities, as it spurs the creation of 
new communities of practice. 
In conclusion 
I should perhaps make sure that my purpose in writing this report is 
clear. There are always dangers in presenting one's observations as a 
series of problems. One of them is giving the impression that 
problems are all one has seen, which is not my case at all: I have seen 
many more solutions. 
Another danger is taking a one-sided view of problems, simplifying the 
issues to make one's points. I am somewhat guilty of that. There is no 
space in such a short report to enter into all the details and subtleties 
of variations in degrees, which are characteristic of real situations. 
While I am sensitive to many nuances in the specific circumstances I 
address, I am convinced that exposing these issues somewhat bluntly 
is useful in engendering an awareness capable of addressing them. 
A third danger is singling out a specific instance of a more general 
problem. Alinsu is of course not an isolated case; it is part of a much 
broader context in which widespread identities of non-participation 
are causing much waste of human potential both in terms of economic 
productivity and in terms of human experience. But while having 
company may lessen the blame, it certainly does not lessen the effects 
of the problem. 
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A final danger is offending the people involved. My purpose here is to 
help, not to point the finger. The issues I bring up are structural, not 
personal. In fact, I want to thank all those who have made my 
fieldwork possible. who have born with my intrusive presence, and 
who have actively helped me by sharing their time, their activities, and 
their thoughts. 
I should add that my fieldwork is not really completed. I have been 
taking a break in the last few months in order to write my 
dissertation, which I need to finish soon for administrative reasons. 
There are still many aspects of the context of claim processing I would 
like to know more about, many conversations I would like to have. 
many relations I would like to explore. I am still interested in studying 
the implementation of ALINSYS II. 
Eventually, I would like my involvement to become more active than 
mere observations. The ideas that I have exposed here and in my 
thesis can only be explored, refined, proved or disproved in practice, 
and it is only in practice that they can make a difference. I would be 
interested in participating in a pilot project based on this preliminary 
study. In this document, I have taken the liberty to talk about my 
observations at all levels, but I understand that any pilot project would 
need to be focused and prioritized. 
I have tried to express my ideas in terms that make economic sense 
and I believe they do. There are other reasons, however, why I think 
they are important. These reasons have to do with the kind of world 
we are creating for ourselves and should not be overlooked even 
though they may at first seem less tangible. In fmal analysis, a 
knowledgeable, concerned citizenry benefits everyone in very tangible 
ways. One common viewpoint on a corporation is that it is a profit-
making entity, which serves the interests of its shareholders and at 
the same time allows its employees to make a living. Another related 
common viewpoint is that a corporation is a producer of goods or a 
provider of services. These are the viewpoints I have assumed in this 
report, but they are only two among many views of a corporation. 
Another extremely important function is that it provides a context for 
people to be involved in productive activities, to develop a sense of 
themselves, of their world, of their ability and desire to understand 
and have an effect on this world. In this regard, corporations just as 
much as our schools produce a type of citizenry-and thus a type of 
parents-and contribute to producing the society of today and 
tomorrow. 
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